Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NPT Preparatory Committee, April 8 - 19, 2002

Opening Statements, April 8

Russia: Ambassador Alexander Mostivets

As a State party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and one of its depositories, Russia is of the opinion that [the] NPT is a time-tested document, which has become one of the main pillars of the international security system. The time continues to test the non-proliferation regime as a whole and its foundation - the Treaty - for strength. The NPT has withstood this hard test, confirmed its role as the most important international instrument which safeguards global and regional stability end security.

The world community has practically come to a consensus regarding the scope of new threats and challenges. The problem of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, together with the problem of international terrorism, is among the top items within that scope. At the same time, in combination these two problems - terrorism and non-proliferation - constitute the greatest...danger. That is why enhancement of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is the most important integral part of combating terrorism and vice versa.

The Russian Federation confirms its position of principle in support of the efforts undertaken by the international community, including the UN, Conference on Disarmament and IAEA to fight terrorism and proliferation. Now it is important to unite efforts to create a global system of counteracting new challenges and threats, including also in nuclear sphere. The proposed new measures should not 'compete' with traditional disarmament and non-proliferation aspects of security; on the contrary, they are called upon to make them more comprehensive and give them a new quality dimension. ...

We are of the opinion that the nature of today's real threats of nuclear terrorism makes it necessary to develop adequate measures which would hamper the access of potential terrorists to nuclear materials and technologies. One must speak here about coordinated approaches to strengthening of multilateral regimes of non-proliferation and export control. We all clearly understand that under today's conditions the spread of nuclear weapons, together with missile vehicles of their' delivery, would be fraught with generating strategic turmoil, Increased risk of regional conflicts and use of nuclear weapons. Quite naturally, it is urgent to counteract such a course of events. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the main factor allowing the community to hold back such a development of events, providing at the same time for the development of international cooperation in the sphere of peaceful use of nuclear energy. That is why Russia attaches great importance to the comprehensive and impartial consideration of the NPT functioning.

We proceed from the understanding that the main objective of the Committee is the preparation of regular review of functioning of the Treaty in the totality of its provisions in 2005. The basis for that is available - the Final Document approved in 2000. The range of measures listed therein at the multilateral, regional and other levels makes, in essence, the program of joint efforts to further increase the NPT effectiveness.

We adhere to [the] decisions of the 2000 Conference and take specific steps to implement them. We consider the Final Document of the Conference as a really forward-looking program of measures of multilateral, regional and other nature, which provide benchmarks for negotiations on step-by-step and consensus basis - carefully taking interests of security of all the NPT parties into account under conditions of stability and predictability, which should be implemented totally, not selectively.

To provide for a universal nature of the NPT is still the task of principal importance. It is necessary to make further efforts to involve the states which are not yet party to the Treaty into the regime of nuclear non-proliferation.

We are of the opinion that recommendations to further strengthen the NPT should become the principal result of our joint work to prepare the 2005 Conference. We are sure that the Preparatory Committee is able to do that without establishing any new bodies or overlapping the functions of other international mechanisms.

We want to emphasize that today, already, in what concerns the actions of Russia, essential progress has been achieved in the realization of key objectives of the Treaty, including priority tasks, agreed upon at the 2000 Conference.

We would like again to draw your attention to the initiative of President of Russia Vladimir V. Putin put forward at the Millennium Summit to develop nuclear technologies sustainable against proliferation... Russia takes consistent steps to lessen nuclear hazard in the world and achieve [the] final objective...of complete nuclear disarmament. At the same time Russia is not only scrupulous in meeting her obligations under international treaties in the sphere of limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments, but also is prepared to further reduce her nuclear arms on both a bilateral basis together with the United States, as well as [on a] multilateral basis together with other nuclear States down to minimum levels corresponding to requirements of strategic stability.

Russia has completely fulfilled her obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of unlimited duration (the INF Treaty), which entered into force on 1 June 1988. As a result, ground-based missiles of two classes - medium range (from 1,000 to 5,500 km) and shorter-range (from 500 to 1,000 km) missiles have been eliminated. ... [I]nspection activity under that Treaty was completed in May 2001.

At the same time also we continue reducing strategic offensive weapons. The period of reduction of strategic offensive weapons foreseen under the START I ended on December 5, 2001. According to the Treaty, the parties committed themselves to reduce the number of their strategic delivery systems seven years after its entry into force down to 1,600 units, and the reentry vehicles [warheads] counted with them down to the level of 6,000 units to each of the parties. Russia completely and ahead of the time-schedule fulfilled her obligations under the above mentioned reduction provisions and on the deadline date December 5, 2001 has actually lowered the number of her deployed strategic delivery systems (ICBM, SLBM and strategic bombers) down to 1,136 units, and the number of the reentry vehicles accounted with them down to 5,518 units.

As is well known, Russia has ratified the START II [Treaty] and as far back as summer 2000 delivered her draft START III to the United States. We are convinced that under present conditions it is necessary to conclude a new legally binding treaty regarding further SOW [strategic offensive weapons] reductions, where...a new level of reduction down to 1,700-2,200 reentry vehicles will be specified, to which Russia and the United States will come during [a] 10 year period. I will remind [you] here that Russia has been prepared to agree to a lower level of reductions - down to 1,500 reentry vehicles. It will also be necessary to underscore [that] there [is] an interrelation between strategic offensive weapons and defensive weapons. We think it is important that such reductions are real and reliably monitored. At present, Russia and the United States are engaged in intensive negotiations on the elaboration of such a treaty, as well as [a] declaration on new strategic relations between both nations.

All are very well familiar with the fact that Russia qualified [the] unilateral US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty as a wrong step. Besides anything else, it is not in line with either recommendations of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, or the opinion of the world community, reflected in UN General Assembly resolutions, which have been adopted...[for] three years in a row on preservation and compliance with the ABM Treaty. We are also concerned because of the fact that the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may bring along such a dangerous development of events as 'weaponization' of space.

As regards tactical nuclear weapons, in accordance with statements made by the President of the USSR on October 5, 1991 and the President of the Russian Federation on January 29, 1992, Russia consistently fulfills the initiatives which she declared unilaterally. We would like to remind [you] in this juncture that all nuclear weapons deployed outside Russia, have been brought back to her territory and are in the process of liquidation. In this connection we would like again draw the attention to the Russian proposal that all the nuclear weapons should be brought back to the territories of the nuclear states to which they belong.

Russia still attaches an extraordinary importance to an unconditional fulfillment of negative security assurances given by nuclear-weapon states to non-nuclear-weapon states in 1995. This provision has been fixed in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation.

The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an important measure of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We express our hope that all the countries which possess a respective potential and whose ratification papers are of principal importance for the entry of the Treaty into force, will join the CTBT, which, as is well known, has been long ago ratified by Russia.

We positively assess the process of creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world... For the last thirty years that have elapsed since the [Latin American] Tlatelolco Treaty was signed, and which established the first such zone, the number of states covered by NWFZ regime[s] has increased several times and now exceeds 100. The establishment of the zones free from nuclear weapons is an important measure of disarmament in itself. Forming the zone, the states strive for enhancing the regional and international security [and so] increase the level of mutual trust and agreement. At the same time they resolve another, not less important task: acting in the spirit of NPT Article VII they make an essential contribution into the development and consolidation of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation regime. Such a logical combination of mutually complimentary factors determines the significance of all the NWFZs taken together and each separately.

The international community has accumulated a great experience in matters of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It testifies to the fact that when the process of institutionalizing the zones follows the channel of [established international legal] principles and parameters...then the NWFZs receive recognition and respective assurances. And vice versa, non-observance of these conditions makes the process of recognition of a zone more difficult, [for example] the way it happened to the NWFZ in South-East Asia. We express our hope that the dialogue between the ASEAN countries and nuclear powers will, in [the] final analysis, allow them to settle the resulting difficulties.

The work on the draft nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia is in progress. At the same time efforts to create such alone in the Middle East skid and that fact cannot but cause concern, especially taking into consideration a complicated situation in the region. Russia is still of the opinion that it is important to implement the resolutions on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference.

We consider it necessary to elaborate and adopt effective measures with the objective of further enhancing the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation regime without detriment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy by all states. In our opinion, it should be done through improvements of national legislations in the sphere of export control [and] development of multilateral mechanisms of export control in nuclear sphere - Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG]. In our opinion, the NSG activities as a whole are adequate to the nature of existing problems. We totally support its policy to promote transparency and develop a dialogue with non-member countries.

Russia actively supports the IAEA activity. The priority tasks of this activity are strengthening of safeguards, prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, creation of effective verification mechanisms for the member states of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, etc. We appreciate the efforts of the Agency to create an integral safeguards system.

Approaching the process of the NPT review with all...responsibility, the Russian delegation will make its contribution into constructive dialogue of participants of the PrepCom first session in order to enhance the efficiency and validity of this most important international treaty. In the consideration of procedural issues of the agenda, we consider it reasonable to use to the maximum possible degree the experience accumulated during six previous conferences and, it goes without saying, taking due account of specific nature of the 2005 Conference. As for the formula of distribution of costs to finance the sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the Conference itself, we consider it reasonable to adhere to the previously existing practice in this sphere.

Source: BASIC, http://www.basicint.org.

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