Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NPT Preparatory Committee, April 8 - 19, 2002

Statements and Documents

UK Intervention on Disarmament, April 11

Intervention by Ambassador Peter Jenkins, Acting Head of Delegation

Let me stress at the outset that the UK has long been and remains fully committed to the ultimate goal of verifiable global nuclear disarmament. We worked hard to encourage constructive thinking and the achievement of consensus during both the 1995 and 2000 Review Conference cycles. We remain fully committed to the final documents of both these Conferences. The final document of the 2000 conference, including its '13 practical steps', identifies a number of ways in which we can move towards the goal I have just mentioned. The UK has taken an active role in implementing measures to reduce its own reliance on nuclear weapons to a single system at the minimum level necessary consistent with national security. And we have been equally active in working towards creating the conditions necessary for the global elimination of nuclear weapons.

I referred on Tuesday [April 9] to a range of measures we have taken to bring about a situation in which Trident is our only nuclear system, reducing our operationally available stockpile to fewer than 200 warheads. This represents a reduction of more than 70% in the potential explosive power of our deterrent, with just one submarine on patrol at reduced readiness, carrying 48 warheads, all de-targeted. And as I said on Tuesday, the UK's last Chevaline warhead will be dismantled by the end of this month - part of our commitment to irreversibility in reductions in the UK's nuclear weapons.

We have also become more transparent about our nuclear and fissile material stockpiles, as I outlined on Tuesday. The publication in some detail of information about costs associated with our nuclear deterrent, most recently (in an answer to a Parliamentary Question) on 19 July 2001, is a further example of our commitment to greater transparency. In addition we are continuing work to develop UK expertise in verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons internationally. Since the 2000 Review Conference, the UK has begun theoretical and practical studies to identify candidate technologies that could be used to verify reductions in any future arms reduction process that involves the decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear weapons. In particular we are considering what would be involved in monitoring an operational warhead infrastructure. We are working, using a variety of mature and developmental techniques, through modeling and experiments, to examine how typical warhead 'signatures' might be used to authenticate, through the warhead life-cycle, that a container contains a nuclear warhead, without revealing sensitive design details.

Additionally, we are examining the impact of potential Treaty technologies and protocols on national security and proliferation, and we are examining potential Treaty verification regimes and transparency and confidence building measures. This work is in its early stages but results to date are encouraging. The issue is not without difficulties, since there are many security concerns associated with the work, the revelation of which would contravene our obligations under the NPT. But within this constraint we are looking to make information about the work as possible available. Before the next Review Conference in 2005 we aim to follow up on our initial paper circulated in 2000, by providing further papers to help with verification internationally since this will be vital for verifiable global nuclear disarmament.

In addition to these national actions, I outlined on Tuesday the broader international actions we have taken, notably agreement of an Additional Protocol to our safeguards agreement with the IAEA and EURATOM, ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and contributions to CTBT verification. More widely, we are pleased to see others taking positive steps in the direction of global nuclear disarmament. The US and Russia have both agreed to reduce their numbers of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads over the next ten years, by as much as two thirds. The result will be a dramatic cut in the world's deployed nuclear arsenals, a move that all must warmly welcome. The present discussions are still ongoing, but we have good reason to hope that the improving US/Russia relationship will produce lasting agreements based on mutual respect and co-operation. These are positive and practical moves, which bring us closer to our ultimate goal of verifiable global nuclear disarmament and which should therefore be welcomed.

Before closing, as I am a newcomer to this process, I hope I can be forgiven for sharing with you a first impression. I was struck during the general debate by how much emphasis is being put on Article VI, and how little, in comparison, on Articles I, II and III. We understand the importance all attach to nuclear disarmament. We share these concerns. But it is important that equal attention be given to non-proliferation and the vital role it has to play in the disarmament process. We will develop our views on this further in Cluster 1 tomorrow.

Chairman, I assure you of the UK's continuing resolve to do all it can unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally to help create the conditions necessary for the achievement of global and verifiable nuclear disarmament.

Source: http://www.basicint.org

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