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Intervention by Ambassador David Broucher, Head of Delegation
In the UK's statement in the General Debate and in our statement yesterday we set out in some detail our views on both the nuclear disarmament and the nuclear nonproliferation provisions of the Treaty. I won't repeat now all that was said on all of these issues, vitally important though they are. In this Cluster I would like to focus on specific areas in detail.
The first is universality. Our commitment to global and verifiable nuclear disarmament leads us to attach great importance to the universal adoption of the NPT. The four states which remain outside the NPT...must accede as non-nuclear weapon states. We have been active in encouraging them to join and shall continue to be so. We urge others to do the same.
The second relates to compliance. Strict observance of the treaty is vital. States parties to the NPT must comply with the obligations to which they are committed under the treaty. They must react robustly and with vigour if evidence of non-compliance comes to light. It is in none of our interests to allow the impression to gain ground that some NPT parties are indifferent to respect for the non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty. Work to prevent proliferation directly serves the goal of nuclear disarmament. I repeat here UK concerns that respect for the Treaty by Iraq and DPRK in particular is in doubt. We can only hope to build a safer world by remaining vigilant about proliferation risks and being energetic in addressing them.
The third point I should like to touch on is export controls. Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons requires that Nuclear Weapon States will not transfer 'nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices' to non-nuclear weapon states or take any steps that will assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring such devices. In turn, non-nuclear weapon states undertake not to receive or develop such devices.
It is vital that none of us contributes to the development of nuclear weapons by inadvertently or deliberately supplying goods or technology which could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons. We need to guard against the risk of supply or diversion to states who may be clandestinely seeking to develop nuclear weapons. We need to be equally vigilant in relation to non-state actors and to take into account the very real risk of terrorists seeking to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction. That means strong export controls: and strong enforcement of those controls.
Following on from this, my fourth point relates to the risk of non-state actors seeking to acquire nuclear material. I want to stress our readiness to work with NPT partners to minimise the risk of nuclear material falling into the hands of such groups. The UK has allocated a budget of over 60 million pounds sterling for projects relating to various aspects, including proliferation concerns, of the nuclear legacy in the Former Soviet Union. This includes our work with the Russian Federation on nuclear security. In addition, we are contributing 70 million pounds to US and Russian plans for the safe disposition of 34 tonnes of surplus Russian weapons-grade plutonium. In a similar vein, we are also helping to provide suitable employment for former Soviet nuclear weapons designers and technicians. ...
My final point relates to security assurances. The UK has given security assurances to states under the Protocols we have signed to Nuclear Weapons Free Zones. We have always supported the principle of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. We believe they can make a valuable contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and to global and regional peace and security, as long as they are based on arrangements freely arrived at by all the states in the region concerned. For that reason, we have signed and ratified the relevant Protocols to the Treaties establishing Nuclear Weapons Free Zones in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (the Treaty of Rarotonga) and Africa (the Treaty of Pelindaba). Since the NPT Review Conference in 2000, the UK has been pleased to ratify its Protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba and we hope that the Treaty will enter into force soon. We have been working with the ASEAN states to produce a Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok that will be acceptable to the nuclear weapons states. The UK will continue to seek resolution of the outstanding issues, and we look forward to progress.
The UK takes a similarly positive approach to the proposed Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. We raised the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Almaty and Dushanbe last month, and we look forward to receiving a draft text soon. We have also consistently supported the principle of establishing a Middle East Zone free from all weapons of mass destruction. We have raised this issue in bilateral contacts with Israel, and we continue to urge Israel to commit itself to the establishment of such a zone. ...
Mr. Chairman, there has been speculation in the press about whether the UK is still committed to the negative security assurances we gave in 1995. This speculation was echoed in statements by Non-Governmental Organisations on Wednesday. I can assure those who have concerns that these fears are groundless. I would like to take this opportunity to remind delegations that we remain fully committed to our declaration on Negative Security Assurances in April 1995, as noted in UN Security Council Resolution 984. Our policy has not changed.
Mr. Chairman, as the UK said yesterday, in the last few days we have focused on nuclear disarmament. We have also discussed non-proliferation, compliance and universality. These are all inextricably linked. Nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, compliance and universality are all vital if we are to work together to achieve the goals of the NPT.
Source: http://www.basicint.org
© 2002 The Acronym Institute.