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At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, States parties agreed on further measures to improve the effectiveness of the strengthened review process. In doing so, as reflected in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, they reaffirmed the provisions in Decision 1 adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty".
The States parties agreed that the purpose of the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee would be to "consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty as well as its universality". Furthermore, "each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty".
In the period since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the international political and strategic environment has changed significantly. Making progress in the area of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation is more important than ever in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001. These tragic events have underscored the urgency to implement effective measures to eliminate the risk of weapons of mass destruction proliferating and falling into the hands of terrorists.
As the Secretary-General stated on 1 October 2001 when addressing the General Assembly on terrorism, "...we must now strengthen the global norm against the use or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This means, among other actions, redoubling the efforts to ensure universality, verification and full implementation of key treaties related to weapons of mass destruction..."
In the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, the General Assembly not only reaffirmed multilateralism as a core principle in negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, but also emphasised that progress is urgently needed in this area to help maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism.
At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, participants agreed that the "total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". The States parties agreed on 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".
Several events in the period following the conclusion of the Review Conference have cast a shadow on the prospects for progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Some of these have caused the advance of the Chicago-based Doomsday Clock - a barometer of nuclear danger for the past 55 years - to seven minutes to twelve, two minutes closer to the midnight hour symbolising nuclear conflict.
Despite the strong reaffirmation of international support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the 2001 Conference to Facilitate the Treaty's Entry into Force, five years after the opening for signature, it has yet to do so. Pending this entry into force, a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions should be maintained.
Progress to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols remains slow. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, States parties reaffirmed that IAEA safeguards are an essential component of the non-proliferation regime. Fifty-one States have yet to fulfill their obligations under the NPT Treaty to bring safeguards agreements with the Agency into force, and out of the additional protocols approved for 61 States, only 24 have entered into force.
Major efforts are needed to consolidate and strengthen the non-proliferation regime and to achieve its universality. All Parties have the responsibility to comply with the provisions in the Treaty and must be held accountable for their commitments under the non-proliferation regime. Let me remind you of the value of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as it is the only treaty committing all parties to nuclear disarmament.
Source: BASIC, http://www.basicint.org.
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