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Back to Proliferation in Parliament, Spring 2009
Mr. Elfyn Llwyd (Meirionnydd Nant Conwy) (PC): On another serious policy issue, given the Prime Minister’s commitment to greater parliamentary scrutiny, will he confirm today that there will be a full parliamentary debate and vote before the next stage of the Trident programme?
The Prime Minister: There are regular parliamentary debates on these
issues. There is the defence debate that takes place every year. The House of
Commons came to a view on this issue, and people are perfectly free to raise
it on the Floor of the House. Defence debates happen regularly and will continue
to do so.
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Mr. Gary Streeter (South-West Devon) (Con): It is a pleasure to sit under your wise counsel, Mr. Wilshire, and I am delighted that my colleagues, the hon. Members for Plymouth, Devonport (Alison Seabeck) and for Plymouth, Sutton (Linda Gilroy) are able to attend the debate.
In July 2007, the Government announced the outcome of their naval base review. It stated that the three bases, Devonport, Faslane and Portsmouth, are to remain open but that each would be optimised to achieve savings for the Ministry of Defence, which is a perfectly laudable objective. More than 22 months have elapsed, but we are still waiting to find out what the announcement means for Devonport.
Why does it matter? That the ships that defeated the Spanish armada in 1588 sailed from the mouth of the Plym and that Devonport has been providing support services to the Royal Navy since 1691 are important, but it is not only about history or heritage, although Plymouth is the size it is because of the dockyard and the naval base. It matters because Her Majesty’s naval base at Devonport is a huge local employer—it employs about 2,500 people directly—and because one in 10 of all jobs in the city travel-to-work area have been created directly or indirectly through the dockyard and naval base. It also matters because the dockyard and naval base support 24,000 jobs and contribute £850 million to the local economy, according to the university of Plymouth’s business school, and especially because millions of pounds a year flow through the local economy because of the salaries and spending of the 5,000 men and women who serve on the frigates and submarines that are base-ported at Devonport, a significant proportion of whom—perhaps 40 per cent.—live locally with their families, spend locally and contribute to the local economy in many ways. For all those reasons, a severe pruning of our naval base or the shifting of the frigates to Portsmouth or the submarines to Faslane would devastate the local economy. It really matters to our city.
Since July 2007, there have been many meetings between the Minister and his colleagues, local Members of Parliament, business and community leaders, trade unions and others. At all times, the Minister has treated us courteously and listened to our concerns with respect. On many occasions, he and other Ministers have said that the future of Devonport is secure, but I am afraid that that is an entirely meaningless statement. First, perhaps deliberately, it fails to distinguish between the dockyards and the naval base. I recognise that there is a promising work load for the dockyard in the next five to seven years, especially once the displaced aircraft carrier work begins, but that is not what we are talking about: we are talking about the naval base. Secondly, the expression, “Devonport has a secure future” says nothing about the scale of that future. What future does it have if the frigates and nuclear submarines go? How many people will it employ? We have been told that it will be the home of our amphibious fleet, but that is very small compared with the activity generated by frigates and submarines.
We
can no longer accept generalities from the Minister; we need specifics. I recognise
that since the naval base review announcement, the whole of the defence
procurement industry has been transformed. That is often given as the reason
for the delay, which I understand. However, there have been 22 months of delay.
Why do this Government find it so hard to take tough decisions?
Why have I chosen to introduce this debate today rather than at another time in the past two years? In the past few weeks, we have been beset by leaks, speculation and rumours and it is impossible for the city to continue under the current level of uncertainty. Even this morning in the Plymouth Herald, Tim Jones, the chairman of Devon and Cornwall Business Council, made it clear that investors are delaying their investment decisions until the future of the naval base is sorted out. He said:
“We are talking about millions of pounds.”
On 15 April 2009, the BBC ran a story claiming that senior MOD sources had told it that the frigates were going to Portsmouth. A Portsmouth MP appeared on television celebrating a great success, but the MOD said simply that no decisions had been taken. On 27 April 2009, Channel 4 ran a story based on reports prepared for Faslane that were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and stated that Devonport will cease to be a submarine base after 2015. That fits in with the Minister’s well-received words that even if vessels are to leave us, they will not do so for five years. The MOD said that the Channel 4 story was only speculation, but that was hardly a robust denial.
That brings me to an important question: when the Minister says that no decisions have been taken, does he mean that they have not been taken by Ministers, but that the Navy Board has taken them and that they have not yet been signed off, doubtless because of political sensitivities, or does he mean that the Navy retains an open mind on all such issues? If the latter is true, why is it taking so long? Having been a Minister—a thousand years ago, at least—and having some knowledge of how these things work, I put it to the Minister that the decisions that the frigates will go to Portsmouth and the submarines will go to Faslane have already been taken, and that, understandably, he is trying to find a way to break this devastating news to the local population without causing political mayhem.
Rear-Admiral Mike Wood, who retired in 2003, stated recently that he suspected that MOD Ministers were holding back on revealing the real future of Devonport because the Government did not want bad news to emerge close to a general election. Can the Minister see the damage that this level of uncertainty is causing us? If the decisions have been taken—I hope they have not—it is far better for us to know the truth so that the city can plan its recovery.
I should like to mention two other things at this stage. It is not the slightest bit good for the MOD to think that taking the frigates and submarines away would be compensated, as some media reports would have it, by the contract to decommission the nuclear reactors of the submarine fleet in Devonport. That would be a highly controversial decision. It would once again confuse the naval base and the dockyard and it would require a major dialogue with city leaders and a massive public consultation exercise before it could be agreed. Will the Minister say something about the fact that it would also require substantial compensation?
It
also seems to be in Ministers’ minds that if our naval base shrinks significantly,
the city would gain in the medium term by the release of MOD property for
commercial purposes. I must tell the Minister that without substantial Government
investment, any such real estate is of limited value, not least because of contamination
and location. It should not be seen as any form of compensation unless it comes
with significant capital.
What do we want? We in Plymouth are very reasonable people. We want the frigates to remain at Devonport and we believe that we made a compelling case for that in the naval base review. We also want the submarines to stay. Is it really wise, when there is a Scottish National party Executive who want to break away from the United Kingdom, to base our entire nuclear fleet, including our nuclear deterrent, in Scotland? If Scotland became an independent country, which I very much hope it never does, where would our submarines go?
We accept that the MOD must make savings, but not that that must happen by ripping the heart out of Devonport. We want the frigates and submarines to stay but, above all, we want to call a halt to the endless foot-dragging and uncertainty. We know that the Minister is arranging a trip to Plymouth tomorrow, but let me warn him, in the right spirit, that simply saying that no decisions have yet been made will go down like a lead balloon. It would be better for him to reduce his carbon footprint and stay in London than to travel to the south-west to tell us that there is no news.
I e-mailed the Minister’s office nine questions on Friday lunchtime, and I am keen to give him plenty of time to answer them today. First, will he confirm that no hidden MOD document exists suggesting that Devonport naval base will close in 2015 or at any other time? I hope that that will be an easy one to deal with. Secondly, when will the Government be able to tell us the practical, on-the-ground implications of the naval base review? What will be the job losses, savings and changes? It has been 22 months. Thirdly, which decisions in the process fall to the Navy Board and which to Ministers? When the Minister says that no decisions have been made, does that include Navy Board decisions on base porting?
Fourthly, has a decision been taken at any level in the MOD or the Royal Navy to transfer the frigates to Portsmouth? Fifthly, has a decision been taken at any level in the MOD or the Royal Navy to transfer the submarines to Faslane? Sixthly, if we are to lose either the frigates or the submarines base ported in Plymouth, will the Minister spell out precisely what we are to get in return? What will be the long-term operational activity in the naval base?
Linda Gilroy (Plymouth, Sutton) (Lab/Co-op): I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way and congratulate him on securing this timely debate. He is making a strong case that has cross-party support in calling for an end to the uncertainty. Is he as worried as I am that the Trident update and the carriers will be put into the melting pot for review by an incoming Tory Government, as was widely reported last week? Is he taking his Front-Bench colleagues to task for dashing our hopes of obtaining the certainty that we need?
Mr.
Streeter: I am doing my best today to get some answers
from this Government, who as far as I know have at least another year to run.
I hope that we will not
hear for the next 12 months that the decision is very close and will be announced
soon, while day follows day and it is still not made.
Eighthly, how much real estate can be released from the naval base to the city as a result of the review, and how much capital will the Government provide to make any such assets viable for commercial or residential use?
During the intervention, I forgot my seventh question, which I know the Minister is keen to answer. Seventhly, if we are to lose the frigates and submarines, what implications will that have, not just for the naval base but for the work force at the dockyard? Although I do not want to confuse his answers, co-location is an important point. Ninthly, when will the MOD engage in a dialogue with the city about the proposed decommissioning of nuclear submarines? It is a hugely significant and sensitive issue. I was told by the chief executive of Plymouth city council as recently as last Friday that no real dialogue has yet started on the matter between the MOD and the city.
If the Minister cannot give us the answers today, although I know he will do his best, will he at least give us a specific date when he will be able to do so? The endless leaks from within the MOD are deeply damaging. The Government have had 22 months to make the decisions. The city of Plymouth has served the Royal Navy since 1588, and we are seeking a long-term future. We deserve to be treated better than this.
Mr. David Wilshire (in the Chair): Mr. Ainsworth, had I known it would be you, I would have worn a different tie.
Mr. Ainsworth: The hon. Member for South-West Devon (Mr. Streeter) has provided me with a number of questions. I counted 10; he said that he had only nine, so I think I counted his final demand for a date as an additional question.
The hon. Gentleman is right to mention the history of Devonport and the fantastic support and service that it has provided for the Royal Navy over the centuries. He is also right to discuss the importance of the employment that the naval base provides for the city and the economy of the wider area.
The hon. Gentleman’s frustration is understandable. I get it in the neck from my hon. Friends as well as from him for not being able to be clear as quickly as everybody understandably wants. All I ask is that he and others accept that I am doing my best to plough through the situation and get to a point where we can be as clear as possible as soon as possible in an enormously complicated situation. It is okay for him to refer to 22 months, but he knows—I think he acknowledged it in his speech—that an awful lot has happened in those 22 months. We have had to re-profile the carriers, for example, and the MOD equipment review has taken place. Both have affected our ability to enter into agreement and know exactly where we stand with regard to the situation at Devonport and elsewhere.
Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Devonport) (Lab): I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way and the hon. Member for South-West Devon (Mr. Streeter) for securing this timely debate. My concern is that if a statement is forthcoming to finalise and explain exactly what is going on, we want something more than simply, “Your frigates are going to X, Y or Z.” We need to understand the evidence behind the decision. At the moment, that is not clear. What is the business case, and why does the Navy feel that the frigates need to be moved out of Plymouth?
Mr. Ainsworth: I understand that people will not accept it. I do not see why anybody as steeped in the issue as my hon. Friend would accept decisions without evidence, backup and reasoning. If decisions are taken and we attempt not to provide that evidence, I am sure that we will hear about it in no uncertain terms.
On employment, the naval base review said that we need all three naval bases, but that we need to optimise those naval bases to increase efficiency. The hon. Member for South-West Devon and others have said that they do not disagree with that in principle, but they want to know the detail. They are hearing rumours and believing stories that the situation in Devonport will be decimated. I do not see that, and I do not believe it to be true.
The first of the hon. Gentleman’s questions was whether there was some document lying around in the MOD saying that Devonport would close in 15 years. I have never seen any such document, and I am as steeped in the situation as in any other. I wind up reading the Plymouth Herald more often than the Coventry Telegraph nowadays, so I know all the stories being peddled about the situation. There is no such document or plan. I am not aware that anybody in the MOD has ever pushed the point of view—certainly not while I have been Minister—that Devonport will close within 15 years. I am completely and utterly unaware of any such information.
With regard to the employment situation, all the scenarios that we are considering lead us to believe that Devonport will have roughly the same size work force going forward as it has now. There will be no substantial change. There might be some slight decrease or increase, but there will be no substantial change in the size of the work force in Devonport in any of the scenarios that we have been considering to bring to a conclusion all the details flowing from the naval base review.
Of course, things will change over time. They cannot stay as they are. If we are to optimise the benefits of proper management of all our naval bases, things will inevitably change. The hon. Gentleman has seen change. Plymouth has changed, and has benefited from that change. It is not only an area of supply for the Royal Navy; it produces equipment such as Jackals in what were recently naval base buildings.
The hon. Gentleman must expect change. I think he knows that there will be change, but under all the scenarios that we are considering, the work force would stay roughly the same size.
The
hon. Gentleman has asked a series of questions about whether decisions have
been taken, when they will be taken and when they can be known about. I am not
in a position to make a detailed announcement. I do not want to go to Plymouth
to be mauled because I
cannot make a detailed announcement. I would like to be able to put a bit more
information into the public domain, but there are many moving parts in the situation.
We must try to reach a long-term commercial arrangement with Babcock, which is a private company. Those negotiations are worth a lot of taxpayers’ money and we cannot do or say anything that would detract from our negotiating position. We want a long-term agreement with Babcock and we expect to be able to enter into one before the end of the year. We might be able to clarify some of the issues ahead of the terms of business agreement. Two issues have to be deconflicted: I cannot confirm things if it would weaken our position in our discussions with Babcock to do so, but I want to give assurances to the local community that things will be okay in the long term.
The hon. Gentleman talks about the leak a couple of weeks ago that spoke of all the frigates moving to Portsmouth. He said that he used to be a Minister, so he knows that it would be pretty stupid for a Minister to say that a decision had not been taken when it had. There is no final decision on moving frigates from Plymouth to Portsmouth. He should understand why that is. I gave a commitment that there would be no base-porting changes for five years. That was reinforced by the Secretary of State on a recent visit to Devonport. We were trying to give people a degree of assurance that there was no imminent decision.
The hon. Gentleman knows that a future service combatant—I get criticised for using the jargon—will replace the Type 22 and Type 23 frigates in the long term. However, that is still conceptual. We have not decided how many of what kind of variant there will be. We do not know where the new ships should be based because we do not know what complexities they will have. If all future service combatants had to be based elsewhere, it would make sense to move the existing frigates to the new location so that there was not a step change with the change of ship. There has been no decision on whether all the variants of the ship will be based in Portsmouth or Devonport. The guarantee stands that there will be no base-porting changes for five years. I hope to say more about that ahead of the terms of business agreement, and I am sorry that I cannot say more today.
Linda Gilroy: Many people in Plymouth say that Portsmouth simply does not have enough room for the frigates. Will there be a proper study of whether Portsmouth can take them?
Mr. Ainsworth: If we decide that all future service combatants and existing frigates will move to Portsmouth, we will have to study that and explain it, not least to my hon. Friend. We would have to give reasons for that decision. I would not shirk from that. I accept that we would have to do that if such a decision were taken. However, that decision has not been taken. I will clarify the situation as soon as I can. I am sorry that I cannot clarify it today.
The
hon. Member for South-West Devon tends to dismiss the amphibious force. The
number of ships that have sailed in and out past Plymouth sound in the history
of Devonport is an absolute glory. The amphibious element is an important part
of our force structure and it will stay in Plymouth. I will try to reinforce
the
amphibious element in Plymouth by moving the landing craft of the Royal Marines
there, along with the training. If that is possible, it will be done as soon
as possible. Those landing craft could then be collocated with Ocean, Bulwark,
Albion and the rest of our amphibious capability in Plymouth. That direction
of travel is an important guarantee to the city. Flag officer sea training will
also stay in Plymouth. Moving it has not been considered.
Mr. Streeter: The Minister has indicated that the time scale might be moving. He said he hoped that the deal with Babcock would be in place by the end of the year and that he might be able to give more information on base porting before then. However, on a visit to Plymouth in early March, the Secretary of State for Defence—the Minister’s lord and master—said that the decision on the future of the naval base would be made within weeks. The Plymouth Herald stated at that time:
“On a visit to Devonport yesterday, John Hutton said a decision would be made ‘very soon’.”
The Minister’s comments today seem to push that decision further away than the Secretary of State’s recent comments.
Mr. Ainsworth: I am not trying to do that, nor am I trying to be opaque. We might make further announcements fairly soon. If we can, we will. I accept the hon. Gentleman’s point that the situation is not just political, but economic. The city needs to be able to plan for the future. We want to be part of that future and help the city to be successful. We must plan with the city. If I can make announcements soon, I will do so. I cannot guarantee that I will because of the complexities of the situation. I believe that I will be able to give a degree of clarity ahead of the terms of business agreement negotiations, but I am not suggesting that nothing will be said ahead of that.
It is unfair of the hon. Gentleman to say that we do not talk with the city about these things. There has been a long-standing consultation process. My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Linda Gilroy) set up the strategy group that involves local businesses and the city council. We participate in it. I hope that some land will be released under Project Roundel. The hon. Gentleman should not dismiss that. Devonport naval base covers a huge tract of land. Under any scenario, much of that would not be put to good economic use for military purposes alone. Land should be released to the city so that it can make good use of it. That is what we want to do. My hon. Friends the Members for Plymouth, Sutton and for Plymouth, Devonport (Alison Seabeck) and the hon. Member for South-West Devon are constantly exploring what Government funding might be available for that.
Linda Gilroy: I agree with the hon. Member for South-West Devon that we need good quality consultation with the Department on decommissioning.
Mr.
Ainsworth: There is an ongoing consultation with
the city about the submarines and no decision has been taken. I do not anticipate
being able to take a final decision on decommissioning until next year. However,
there will be a consultation before that. We will produce a strategic environmental
assessment that will go out for consultation.
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Mr. Chris Mullin (Sunderland, South) (Lab): Given that the Government are a little strapped for cash at the moment, might this be the moment to reconsider our commitment to spend £20 billion on a new generation of nuclear weapons?
The Prime Minister: As my hon. Friend knows, that expenditure is over
more than 20 years. As he also knows, we wish to use the fact of our deterrent
to bring about non-proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world and
to persuade other countries to be part of a process of nuclear disarmament.
At the moment there is an opportunity for the major powers to reduce their nuclear
weapons and in return we could get agreements about non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons from some of the major powers, while at the same time offering them
the right that they should have to civil nuclear power. He may remember that
the non-proliferation treaty was based on two principles: first, that countries
with nuclear weapons would cut their nuclear weapns, and secondly, that we would
give non-nuclear states access to civil nuclear power. Given the pressures that
exist at the moment, that is an even more relevant position than it was 50 years
ago.
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Mr. Colin Breed (South-East Cornwall) (LD): What work is being carried out on Vanguard class nuclear submarine reactors at Devonport dockyard; and if he will make a statement.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Quentin Davies): We announced on 2 March the award of a contract to Babcock Marine to complete the overhaul of HMS Vigilant. This is the third of four planned overhauls, following the completion of those for HMS Vanguard and HMS Victorious. The overhaul for HMS Vengeance will follow HMS Vigilant’s.
Mr. Breed: The question concerned reactors, and I heard nothing about reactors in that answer. The Minister will know that there was a fairly large public consultation on the storage of old reactors from the T-class submarines, but that did not include the Vanguard class. There is concern that that plant will also be stored in Devonport, which is wholly against the purpose of the public consultation. It was about the temporary storage of T-class submarine reactors. It did not include the storage of any Vanguard reactors, which will now, apparently, take place.
Mr. Davies: The hon. Gentleman may be interested to know that the current overhaul includes refuelling the reactor with a new core, core H, which will fuel her for the remainder of her operational life. On the storage of reactors, it has always been our policy to store reactors in situ, in this case in Devonport, until the ISOLUS—interim storage of laid up submarines—programme comes into force, under which we will put forward a new policy for dealing with the long-term future of these nuclear reactors. We will make an announcement on that subject next year, after the strategic environmental assessment, which will take place later this year.
Linda Gilroy (Plymouth, Sutton) (Lab/Co-op): Can my hon. Friend confirm that the work referred to by the hon. Member for South-East Cornwall (Mr. Breed) has been accepted by the Environment Agency as in line with the licence that was granted when the work was extended to those submarines? Can he also confirm that the skilled work involved in the submarines is the anchor for ensuring that Plymouth will remain an important centre of naval engineering excellence in the future?
Mr. Davies: I can confirm my hon. Friend’s suppositions on both fronts.
It is right that all the work we do on nuclear reactors in Devonport is under
the regulation of the Environment Agency, the Health and Safety Executive and
our own defence nuclear regulator, so she can be reassured about that. The future
of Devonport is bright, and I cannot conceive of any scenario in which her assumptions
would not be correct.
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4. Mr. Andrew Pelling (Croydon, Central) (Ind): If he will hold discussions with the Secretary of State for Defence to draw up a contingency plan for defence policy in the event of Scottish independence.
The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Jim Murphy): I have no plans to have such discussions with the Secretary of State for Defence.
Mr. Pelling: Is that not a rather irresponsible position to take, bearing in mind the fact that it is clearly within the rights of the Scottish nation to decide to leave the United Kingdom, and bearing in mind the significant role that the Scottish nation has played over the years in the defence of the British isles? Surely it would be responsible of the Government to have such contingency plans in place.
Mr. Murphy: The hon. Gentleman is right to say that the defence footprint is significant in Scotland, where 17,000 service personnel and civilians are employed by the Ministry of Defence. The defence industry in Scotland generates about £2.3 billion. All I would say is that there has never been majority support for independence for Scotland. The fact is that the longer the Scottish National party Government are in power in Scotland, the greater the deficit in support for independence becomes. Support for independence in Scotland is, in percentage terms, in the mid-20s. There is not a mandate for independence, and it would not be appropriate to have such conversations.
Dr. Gavin Strang (Edinburgh, East) (Lab): I agree with my right hon. Friend. On the defence industrial strategy, will he take every opportunity to remind his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence of the huge Scottish and British asset right at the sharp end—the forefront—of manufacturing, namely Selex, owned by Finmeccanica? Aerospace and avionics are engineering sectors in which Britain still leads. Will he take every opportunity to remind his colleagues of the importance of that facility to our defence, our industry and all military procurement, including Eurofighter?
Mr. Murphy: My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. In Scotland, about 16,000 people are directly employed in the defence and aerospace industries, including in the areas to which he alluded. It is an enormous, important part of the Scottish economy, and it is a part of the Scottish economy that can continue to grow in the current economic downturn. It can fuel Scotland’s continued success in future years.
Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP): But in the past 12 years there has been a cut in service personnel, bases have been closed, regiments have been axed, and less than our share, in terms of population and tax contribution, is spent on procurement in Scotland. Those are the facts. Why should we put up with that? There is also the fact that Scottish service personnel were committed to illegal wars opposed by the people, and the fact that Trident was based in Scotland—a decision that was also opposed by the people.
Mr. Murphy: I recently had the great honour of meeting the Royal Scots
Dragoon Guards in Germany, and the whole House—certainly those on the Labour
Benches, and almost everyone in the Opposition parties—
4 Feb 2009 : Column 832
would talk with great pride of the work that they did, in a remarkable, brave way, to defend democracy in Iraq. The fact is that if the hon. Gentleman had his way, there would be no Royal Navy, no Royal Navy aircraft carriers, and no Royal Navy jobs on the Clyde, in Rosyth or anywhere else. He and his policies are putting in jeopardy thousands of Scottish jobs in the manufacturing base, so it is no wonder that support for independence for Scotland continues to fall.
Mr. Brian H. Donohoe (Central Ayrshire) (Lab): I speak as someone who gained from an apprenticeship in a shipyard in the west of Scotland. On shipbuilding, orders are being placed on the Clyde as a consequence of our having a United Kingdom, and that is resulting in more apprenticeships on the Clyde. Does my right hon. Friend agree that that is a good thing?
Mr. Murphy: My hon. Friend is absolutely correct. There have been recent announcements about recruiting more people to shipbuilding apprenticeships on the Clyde. If it were not for Royal Navy orders for the Clyde area and other parts of Scotland, there would be no ships on which apprentices could learn their skills. I could not put the matter any better than BAE Systems did when it gave evidence to the Scottish Affairs Committee: it said that without Royal Navy orders,
“There would not be a ship building business.”
If the Scottish National party had its way, there would be no Royal Navy orders because there would be no Royal Navy.
Sir Menzies Campbell (North-East Fife) (LD): The Secretary of State clearly knows the contribution that RAF Leuchars in my constituency has made to British defence for a very long time. He has told the House of the total contribution of defence expenditure to the Scottish economy. Will he consider a study into the contribution that individual defence installations make to their local economy, to include RAF Leuchars and also, perhaps, Faslane?
Mr. Murphy: The right hon. and learned Gentleman raises an important point about the specific contributions made by RAF Leuchars and Faslane. I am aware that, for example, in Argyll and Clyde about 6,500 defence jobs are reliant on MOD work. On Leuchars, I am happy to discuss with him what specifically we could do to raise the profile of the work of the personnel there and across Scotland, but it is a matter that I would have to discuss in more detail with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence.
John Robertson (Glasgow, North-West) (Lab): I thank my right hon. Friend and our right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence for all the thousands of jobs for people in my constituency on the Clyde working on the Type 45 and, hopefully, soon on the carrier. Will he not listen to Opposition parties, one of which would have closed the Clyde down before the last election, and the other which supported it in order to try to get rid of a Labour Government? They offer nothing to help the workers in Scotland or the workers in the defence industry.
Mr. Murphy: Again, my hon. Friend is typically correct when he talks
about the importance of the shipbuilding on the Clyde that he and other Glasgow
4 Feb 2009 : Column 833
Members have championed for some years. Our armed forces are part of our shared heritage—that of Scotland and the United Kingdom—and the Government will do all we can to protect and preserve that for many years to come.
Mr. Ben Wallace (Lancaster and Wyre) (Con): It is perhaps tempting to remind the House of the Scottish National party’s military adviser, Colonel Crawford, who once proposed chemical weapons as a cheaper alternative to the nuclear deterrent in Scotland. May I urge the Minister not to waste any time or money on making unlikely and unnecessary plans for Scottish independence, which would see the demise of the defence industry in Scotland, and may I remind the House that our Army is better because of Scottish soldiers, and Scotland is safer because of the British Union?
Mr. Murphy: The hon. Gentleman is correct: Scotland is stronger because
of the Union and the United Kingdom. There is remarkable pride and passion across
Scotland about the enormous contribution made by Scots as part of the United
Kingdom armed forces. We will continue to oppose plans by the SNP, of course.
Much more important is the fact that the vast majority of Scots refute the suggestions
from the SNP that we should break up Britain and destroy the UK armed forces.
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Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence from which budget the additional expenditure on the nuclear deterrent announced in the Comprehensive Spending Review is being drawn.
Mr. Hutton: Additional resources were made available to the Ministry of Defence to fund the activity necessary over the Comprehensive Spending Review 2007 period to implement the decisions set out in the December 2006 White Paper: “The Future of the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent” (Cm 6994). Those resources are allocated by central staff to Defence Equipment and Support, which is responsible for the acquisition and logistic support of all military equipment.
The Government have made it clear that the investment required to maintain
our deterrent will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities
our armed forces need.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090428/text/90428w0002.htm#09042850000021
John Mann: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much he estimates his Department will spend on the renewal of the Trident nuclear weapons system in each of the next six financial years.
Mr. Hutton: The estimated costs of the programme to maintain the United Kingdom's deterrent capability beyond the life of the current system, as set out in the December 2006 White Paper, 'The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent' (Cm 6994), and endorsed by Parliament on 14 March 2007, over the next two years are:
| £ million at outturn prices | |
Costs are greater in 2009-10 than previously announced due to the agreement
with the US to design and manufacture a Common Missile Compartment. However,
this is the result of re-profiling of funding rather than cost growth in that
year and the overall budgetary provision for the successor deterrent has not
changed.
Spending plans for 2011-12 and beyond will be set as part of the Government's
spending review process.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090428/text/90428w0003.htm#09042850000024
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent assessment he has made of the effects of reductions in the value of sterling on the estimated costs of the Trident replacement programme.
Mr. Hutton: The main part of the programme, covering the successor to
the Vanguard Class submarines, has yet to reach the Initial Gate approval stage.
In accordance with normal MOD procurement processes, a revised cost estimate
that is due in September 2009 will inform this decision and this will include
an assessment of the exchange rate risk.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090420/text/90420w0017.htm#09042111000040
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what collisions involving a UK nuclear powered submarine and (a) another submarine, (b) another naval vessel, (c) a private vessel and (d) a merchant vessel have taken place since 1979;
2 Apr 2009 : Column 1400W
(2) what grounding incidents involving UK nuclear-powered submarines have taken place since 1979.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Royal Navy has no records of collisions between nuclear powered submarines and other submarines and naval vessels, other than the recent incident involving HMS Vanguard and the French submarine Le Triomphant.
The full list of incidents of collisions involving Royal Navy nuclear powered submarines for which the Royal Navy holds records is as follows:
HMS Superb grounding in the Red Sea in May 2008.
HMS Tireless struck an iceberg while on Arctic Patrol in May 2003.
HMS Trafalgar grounded on Fladda-chuain in November 2002.
HMS Triumph grounded in November 2000.
HMS Victorious grounded, while surfaced, on Skelmorlie Bank in November 2000.
HMS Trenchant grounded off the coast of Australia in July 1997.
HMS Repulse grounded in the North Channel in July 1996.
HMS Trafalgar grounded off the Isle of Sky in July 1996.
HMS Valliant grounded in the North Norwegian Sea in March 1991.
HMS Trenchant snagged the fishing vessel Antares in the Arran Trench in November 1990.
HMS Spartan grounded west of Scotland in October 1989.
HMS Sceptre snagged the fishing vessel Scotia in November 1989.
HMS Conqueror collided with the yacht Dalriada off the Northern Irish coast in July 1988.
All the vessels, apart from HMS Superb, which was decommissioned in October 2008, were repaired and returned to service.
Information is not held centrally for the period 1979-88 and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what fires have taken place on UK nuclear powered submarines since 1979.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The records of fire incidents onboard UK nuclear submarines are not held centrally prior to 1 January 1987. Since this date the Royal Navy records provide the following information:
213 small scale fires, that are categorised as a localised fire such as a minor electrical fault creating smoke dealt with quickly and effectively using minimal onboard resources.
21 medium scale fires that were generally categorised as a localised fire such as a failure of mechanical equipment creating smoke and flame requiring use of significant onboard resources.
Three fires occurred while the submarines involved were in naval bases, requiring both ship and external resources.
Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many warheads have typically been deployed at sea on Trident submarine patrols since 1997.
Mr. Hutton: In the 1998 Strategic Defence Review we announced that we will have only one submarine on patrol at a time, carrying a reduced load of 48 warheads. Before the Strategic Defence Review, the announced ceiling was 96.
Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the typical duration of mid-life Trident submarine refits has been since 1997.
Mr. Hutton: Of the four Vanguard class submarines, two have already completed long overhaul periods (refuelling) (LOP(R)). The LOP(R) for HMS Vanguard started in February 2002 and was completed after three years and six months; the LOP(R) for HMS Victorious was started in January 2005 and was completed after three years and eight months.
Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what estimate he has made of the probable duration of major ballistic missile submarine refits when no mid-life refuelling of the reactor is required.
Mr. Hutton: All Vanguard class submarines have been, or will be, fitted with long life reactor cores that will last for the remainder of their operational life without the need for refuelling. These cores are being fitted as part of the submarines' long overhaul periods (refuelling) (LOP(R)s).
Vanguard class submarines with long life cores will subsequently undergo long overhaul periods (LOPs). Work is still under way to determine the composition of the work package for a LOP; it is therefore too early to-estimate their duration.
Mr. Alan Reid: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what steps he plans to take to ensure the compatibility of the new generation of Trident submarines with future generations of Trident missiles planned for entry into service in 2042; and if he will make a statement.
Mr. Hutton [holding answer 26 March 2009]: It is our intention that both the future UK and US submarines will share a common missile compartment within which the missiles will be carried. In the event that the US decides to develop a successor to the Trident D5 missile, there is no risk that it will be incompatible with this common compartment and hence with the future UK submarine.
Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the (a) missile launch tubes and (b) missile compartments in UK and US ballistic missile submarines have conformed to a common design since the adoption by the UK of a submarine-based nuclear deterrent.
Mr.
Hutton: Since the adoption by the UK of a submarine-based
nuclear deterrent, the UK has conformed to a common design for the missile launch
tubes for both the Polaris and Trident systems. Missile compartments for both
systems conform to US specifications necessary to incorporate the US-supplied
weapon system. There are, however, agreed variations to reflect UK-specific
requirements.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090330/text/90330w0015.htm#09033026000050
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when the Interim Storage of Laid-Up Submarines Group will commence its programme of dismantling the UK’s defuelled nuclear powered submarines.
Mr. Quentin Davies: No decisions on the dismantling programme will be made until completion of a Strategic Environmental Assessment and public consultation. It is the intention to make an announcement regarding the programme in 2010.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) when the strategic capacity for storing nuclear submarines in Rosyth Dockyard will be reached;
(2) when the strategic capacity for storing nuclear submarines in Devonport Royal Dockyard will be reached.
Mr. Quentin Davies: Any submarines leaving service with the Royal Navy are planned to remain at Devonport Royal Dockyard until there has been a decision on the dismantling solution.
Similarly, it is not intended to move any of the currently laid-up submarines until there is a decision on the dismantling solution.
Based on these plans, UK afloat storage capacity is forecast to run out before 2020.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether new facilities for defuelling and de-equipping submarines at Devonport Royal Dockyard will be completed by 2012.
Mr. Quentin Davies: Facilities for defuelling and de-equipping submarines at Devonport Royal Dockyard continue to be planned for completion in 2012.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what progress has been made in meeting the 2010 date for a storage solution for the nuclear waste from the seven UK nuclear vessels at Rosyth Dockyard.
Mr. Quentin Davies: We intend to make an announcement in 2010 regarding the proposed locations for submarine dismantling and the interim storage of the resultant nuclear waste. This is dependent on a number of factors, particularly the completion of a strategic environmental assessment later this year, and the intention to carry out further public consultation before any decisions are made. Good progress is being made towards this goal.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what other locations have been proposed as alternative storage sites for decommissioned nuclear submarines at Rosyth Dockyard.
25 Mar 2009 : Column 441W
Mr. Quentin Davies: No sites other than Devonport Royal Dockyard and Rosyth Dockyard are being considered as storage sites for laid-up submarines before they are dismantled.
We do not currently intend to move any of the laid-up submarines before a submarine dismantling site has been proposed. We plan to announce the proposed site in 2010.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will estimate the cost of moving the seven decommissioned UK nuclear submarines at Rosyth Dockyard to another site in the UK.
Mr. Quentin Davies: We do not intend to move any defuelled submarines until the completion of the strategic environmental assessment, public consultation and departmental approval of the dismantling solution.
Cost forecasts for any proposed movement would be developed as part of the preparation of the project’s Main Gate Business Case, which is planned to be completed in 2014.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when the next UK nuclear submarine is due to be taken out of service; and whether it will be berthed at Rosyth Dockyard.
Mr. Quentin Davies: The next UK submarine due to be taken out of service is HMS Trafalgar, scheduled for later this year. We currently intend to store HMS Trafalgar at Devonport Royal Dockyard until she has been defuelled. Its subsequent storage location will depend on the dismantling programme that is being developed.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether all decommissioned submarines in Rosyth and Devonport Dockyards have been surveyed for possible holes.
Mr. Quentin Davies: I refer the hon. Member to the answer my hon. Friend the Minister for Armed Forces (Mr. Bob Ainsworth) gave on 13 June 2008, Official Report, column 560W.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the effects on the environment of moving the seven decommissioned British nuclear powered submarines from the Rosyth Dockyard.
Mr. Quentin Davies: No decisions have been yet been made about when or how submarines will be moved.
The existing Interim Storage of Laid-Up Submarines (ISOLUS) Project Environmental Impact Assessment includes consideration of transportation matters. It is our intention to make this document available publicly in the near future.
More detailed assessments of the environmental impact of any planned movement of the submarines will be developed as required by relevant legislation.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was discussed at the seventh meeting of the Interim Storage of Laid-Up Submarines Group on
25 Mar 2009 : Column 442W
Wednesday 11 March 2009; and if he will make a statement.
Mr. Quentin Davies: The Interim Storage of Laid-Up Submarines (ISOLUS) Advisory Group is an independently chaired group that provides independent assessment of proposals and outcomes. It also acts in a scrutiny and advisory role to the Ministry of Defence ISOLUS Steering Group.
The meetings are open to the public to observe and notes of meetings are published on the ISOLUS website
A wide range of ISOLUS-related matters were discussed at the meeting on 11 March 2009. Notes from the meeting will be published on the ISOLUS website in April 2009 in line with normal practices.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) how many decommissioned UK nuclear-powered submarines with nuclear fuel in their reactors are at Devonport Royal Dockyard;
(2) where the UK nuclear-powered submarines located at Devonport Royal Dockyard will be housed after they have been defuelled.
Mr. Quentin Davies: There are four decommissioned UK nuclear powered submarines that have fuel in their reactors at Devonport Royal Dockyard.
The plan is that they will remain there until a decision on the dismantling solution has been made.
It is the intention to make an announcement about the dismantling solution in 2010.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when a decision will be made on the movement of decommissioned British nuclear powered submarines from Rosyth Dockyard.
Mr. Quentin Davies: The movement of submarines will depend on the dismantling programme that is being developed by the Interim Storage of Laid-Up Submarines (ISOLUS) Project. This will be confirmed when the project receives Main Gate approval, which is scheduled for 2014.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the collision with Le Triomphant resulted in damage to the torpedo tube hatches on HMS Vanguard; and whether torpedoes were unloaded from HMS Vanguard before it was docked in the Faslane shiplift on 20 February 2009.
Mr. Hutton: I am withholding information about any damage that may have been sustained by HMS Vanguard as a result of the collision with FS Le Triomphant on the grounds of national security. I can confirm that the nuclear safety and security of HMS Vanguard was not compromised. It is standard procedure to off-load torpedoes from an SSBN before it enters the Faslane Shiplift facility.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when HMS Vanguard will return to full operational capacity.
25 Mar 2009 : Column 443W
Mr. Hutton: I am withholding information about the operational capacity
of HMS Vanguard on the grounds of national security. I can confirm that the
requirements of the deterrent patrol cycle will continue to be met.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090325/text/90325w0018.htm
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what estimate he has made of the percentage of the defence budget which will be spent on running costs of the current Trident nuclear deterrent and the procurement of a successor system in the years immediately following the main gate decision to procure new submarines.
Mr. Hutton: As the December 2006 White Paper, "The Future of the UK's Nuclear Deterrent" (Cm 6994), made clear, our current estimate is that the total procurement costs of the new submarines and associated equipment and infrastructure will be in the region of £15 to 20 billion (at 2006-07 prices) for a four-boat fleet, mainly spread over the period 2012-27. The Main Gate decision is expected to be taken in 2014.
Spending plans for the years immediately following this decision will need be to be set as part of the Government's Spending Review process and as part of the Main Gate approval. It is not therefore possible to be sure what the size of the defence budget will be over the timescales involved, but procurement costs are likely on average to be the equivalent of around three per cent. annually of the current defence budget over the main period of expenditure. This is around the same as for the Trident programme.
Once the new fleet of submarines comes into service, annual in-service capital
and running costs of the deterrent, which includes the costs of the Atomic Weapons
Establishment, are expected to be similar to today (around five to six per cent.
of the annual defence budget.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090324/text/90324w0022.htm#09032470000121
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what estimate he has made of the proportion of spending on the replacement for Trident which will go to US companies.
Mr. Hutton: The work necessary to ensure the maintenance of the UK's
nuclear deterrent is still in the concept phase. The investment decision point,
Initial Gate, for the new submarine class to replace Vanguard class is not expected
until this autumn. As such, it is too soon for such an estimate to be made.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090323/text/90323w0004.htm#09032312000053
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when HMS Victorious is scheduled to visit the United States for missile tests and missile loading.
Mr. Hutton: It is our policy not to discuss individual submarine operations.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090323/text/90323w0004.htm#09032312000046
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his Department's estimate in its risk assessments of the probability of a British nuclear submarine colliding at sea with a foreign nuclear submarine was prior to 3 February.
Mr. Hutton: My Department was satisfied that the estimate of the risk
of a collision at sea between a British SSBN and a foreign nuclear submarine
prior to 3 February was extremely low.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090317/text/90317w0001.htm#09031766000017
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what collisions between Royal Navy submarines and other vessels took place between 1979 and 1997; and which vessels of which class were involved in each collision.
Mr. Hutton: The Trafalgar Class submarine HMS Trenchant and the Swiftsure Class submarine HMS Sceptre snagged fishing nets in November 1990 and November 1989 respectively. The Churchill Class submarine HMS Conqueror collided with a private yacht in 1988, as did the Oberon Class submarines HMS Otus and HMS Opportune in 1988 and 1992 respectively.
Information is not held centrally for the period 1979 to 1988 and could be
provided only at disproportionate cost.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090316/text/90316w0005.htm#09031619000067
Mr. Swire: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what recent assessment he has made of the (a) capacity and (b) capabilities of (i) HM Naval Base Plymouth Devonport and (ii) HM Naval Base Faslane in respect of submarines;
(2) what recent assessment he has made of the (a) capacity and (b) capabilities of (i) HM Naval Base Plymouth Devonport and (ii) HM Naval Base Portsmouth in respect of surface ships.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The capacity and capability of all three UK naval
bases (Clyde, Devonport and Portsmouth) are regularly assessed to ensure that
they individually and collectively meet the requirements of the Royal Navy.
The most recent assessment was carried out as part of the Naval Base Review
(NBR), which concluded in July 2007 that all three naval bases should be retained
but optimised. This optimisation work has begun at each naval base and forms
an integral part of the Maritime Change Programme (MCP). MCP is developing an
enduring maritime enterprise, commensurate with the Defence Industrial Strategy
(DIS), that delivers affordable, sustainable and efficient Maritime build, equipment
and through life support to meet the operational needs of the Royal Navy today
and in the future.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090311/text/90311w0005.htm#09031187000016
Mr. Swire: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects to announce the Government’s proposals for HM Naval Base Plymouth Devonport.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The scope of work carried out at the three naval
bases (Portsmouth, Devonport and on the Clyde) is currently being considered
as part of the Maritime Change Programme. This work is now reaching its conclusion,
although we need to ensure that final decisions are fully aligned with the changes
to the equipment programme announced in December 2008. An announcement on the
Maritime Change Programme will be made as soon as is practicable.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090310/text/90310w0007.htm#090310125000045
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he has to publish the Board of Inquiry report on the incident on HMS Superb in the Red Sea in May 2008.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: It is planned to publish the Board of Inquiry report
into the grounding of HMS Superb in the Red sea in May 2008 once all parallel
investigations are complete.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090310/text/90310w0007.htm#090310125000044
Ms Katy Clark: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the effect of his Department’s plans to build a successor to the Vanguard class submarine on the number of civilians employed at the Naval Reactor Test Establishment, Dounreay.
Mr. Hutton: The Department has not yet made any final decisions on the future role of the Naval Reactor Test Establishment (NRTE) Vulcan in delivering the
9 Mar 2009 : Column 179W
successor to the Vanguard class submarine. It is therefore too soon to assess
the effect on the number of Rolls-Royce employees who work there.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090309/text/90309w0038.htm#09030936000082
Ms Katy Clark: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence with reference to the answer of 21 July 2008, Official Report, column 848W, on Trident: Scotland, (1) how many of the 589 civilians at HM Naval Base Clyde whose jobs directly rely upon the Trident programme are employed in (a) engineering and science, (b) logistics, (c) security, (d) health and safety, (e) outfitting and steel work and (f) other areas;
(2) how many of the 589 civilians at HM Naval Base Clyde whose jobs directly rely upon the Trident programme are resident in (a) Argyll and Bute constituency, (b) West Dunbartonshire constituency, (c) elsewhere in Scotland and (d) outside Scotland;
(3) what the (a) skills requirements and (b) geographic distribution of the 250 indirect civilian jobs relating to support activities for the Trident programme in Scotland are.
Mr. Hutton: The information requested is not held by my Department in that format.
Action is ongoing, however, to update the December 2006 figures as part of
a broader package of work. I will write to my hon. Friend when this work is
complete.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090309/text/90309w0038.htm#09030936000082
Ms Katy Clark: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a) officers and (b) other ranks are employed at HM Naval Base Clyde as crews on Vanguard class submarines.
Mr. Hutton: As at 1 March 2009, 114 officers and 883 ratings were assigned
to Vanguard class submarines. Data are not held in the format that allows identification
of the numbers employed at HMNB Clyde. HMS Vigilant ships company will be based
at HMNB Devonport for a three-year period while she is undergoing a major refit.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090306/text/90306w0003.htm#090306103000052
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 23 February 2009, Official Report, column 17, on the collision of nuclear submarines, when Parliament will be informed of the findings of the inquiry; and if he will make a statement.
Mr. Hutton: I anticipate that the inquiry into the incident involving
HMS Vanguard and Le Triomphant will report to me shortly. I will consider what
and how to report to Parliament once I have received that report and bearing
in mind the need to protect information in the interests of national security.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090304/text/90304w0001.htm#09030473000013
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what steps are being taken to prevent collisions between Trident submarines and other submarines in the future.
Mr. Hutton: The MOD takes this incident very seriously and a thorough review is under way. We will act on any lessons that might be identified.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what collisions between Royal Navy submarines and other vessels have taken place since 1997.
2 Mar 2009 : Column 1374W
Mr. Hutton: There have been no collisions between Royal Navy submarines
and other vessels since 1997 other than the recent incident involving HMS Vanguard
and the French submarine Le Triomphant.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090302/text/90302w0039.htm#09030250000156
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much his Department estimates it will cost to repair damage to HMS Vanguard as a result of its collision with Le Triomphant in the Atlantic.
Mr. Hutton: It is too early to say.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how far HMS Vanguard was from other identifiable vessels at the time of its collision with Le Triomphant.
Mr. Hutton: I am withholding this information on the grounds of national security.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment his Department has made of the adequacy of sonar equipment on Royal Navy submarines as a result of the collision between HMS Vanguard and Le Triomphant.
Mr. Hutton: It is too early to say as we need to await the conclusions of the review of the incident.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how long his Department estimates repairs to the damage to HMS Vanguard as a result of its collision with Le Triomphant will take.
Mr. Hutton: It is too early to say.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many crew members were on board HMS Vanguard at the time of its collision with Le Triomphant; and what the (a) maximum and (b) minimum crew levels are for HMS Vanguard.
Mr. Hutton: I am withholding this information on the grounds of national security. The declared complement of a Vanguard class SSBN is 135.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the decibel sound pressure level (dBSPL) of HMS Vanguard’s nuclear reactors’ water pumps was (a) before and (b) at the time of the collision with Le Triomphant.
Mr. Hutton: I am withholding this information on the grounds of national security.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence at what speed HMS Vanguard was travelling at the time of its collision with Le Triomphant.
Mr. Hutton: HMS Vanguard was travelling at very low speed when it came into contact with FS Le Triomphant. I am withholding further information on the grounds of national security.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will undertake an investigation of whether the collision between HMS Vanguard and Le Triomphant has had any impact on the marine environment.
Mr. Hutton: The MOD takes this incident very seriously and a thorough review is under way. We will act on any lessons that might be identified. I can confirm that there has been no compromise to nuclear safety.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether his Department has begun disciplinary action as a result of the collision between HMS Vanguard and Le Triomphant.
Mr. Hutton: No disciplinary action has been initiated as a result of the collision between HMS Vanguard and FS Le Triomphant. However, the MOD takes this incident very seriously and a thorough review is under way. We will act on any lessons that might be identified.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions his Department will have with its French counterpart on investigation of the collision between HMS Vanguard and Le Triomphant.
Mr.
Hutton: It is too early to say as we need to await the
conclusions of the review of the incident. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090302/text/90302w0036.htm#09030250000150
Mr. Ancram: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many submerged collisions involving British nuclear submarines there have been since 2000.
Mr. Hutton: Since 2000 the following incidents involving submerged royal
navy submarines have taken place: HMS Superb in May 2008, HMS Tireless in 2003,
HMS Trafalgar in 2002 and HMS Triumph in November 2000. HMS Tireless hit an
iceberg while on Arctic patrol. The remainder were all grounding incidents.
All the vessels, apart from HMS Superb, which was decommissioned in October
2008, were repaired and returned to service.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090302/text/90302w0037.htm#09030250000152
Mr. Alan Reid: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what reports he has received from the First Sea Lord on the recent collision between HMS Vanguard and Le Triomphant; whether the crew of HMS Vanguard sustained any injuries; whether he plans to commission an inquiry into the incident; and if he will make a statement.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Two submerged SSBN, one French and the other UK, were conducting routine national patrols in the Atlantic Ocean. The two submarines came into contact at very low speed. Both submarines remained safe and no injuries occurred. I can confirm that the UK’s deterrent capability has remained unaffected at all times and there has been no compromise to nuclear safety. HMS Vanguard returned safely to Faslane under her own power on 14 February.
As you would expect, the MOD takes this incident very seriously and a thorough
review is under way. We will act on any lessons that might be identified.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090225/text/90225w0011.htm#09022629000109
Mr. Mullin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent consideration he has given to the future of the UK's Trident nuclear weapons system; and if he will make a statement.
Mr. Hutton: We laid out the Government's decisions on the nuclear deterrent in the December 2006 White Paper, ‘The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent’, which the House voted to support, by a large majority, in March 2007. We expect to reach the Initial Gate approval point for the programme to replace
23 Feb 2009 : Column 17W
the Vanguard-class submarines in autumn 2009. This will signify the end of
the concept phase. We are also participating in a programme to extend the life
of the Trident II D5 missile until around 2042.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090223/text/90223w0004.htm#09022316000010
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what discussions he has had with ministerial colleagues on measures to retain (a) skills and (b) employees vital to the defence industry in the current economic climate;
(2) what recent assessment he has made of the effect of the economic climate on the defence industry, with particular reference to the industry's capacity to (a) retain skilled workers and (b) meet procurement deadlines.
Mr. Quentin Davies: The Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) promotes a
sustainable and competitive UK defence industrial base. This ensures the retention
of the specialist skills necessary to deliver the capabilities needed by our
armed forces. Defence Ministers have regular discussions with representatives
from the defence industry both individually and in the forum of the National
Defence Industries Council on a wide range of issues including the effect of
the current economic climate on the industry.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090209/text/90209w0002.htm#09020935000019
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many Trident II systems his Department is planning to build; and what estimate he has made of the likely length of time between the delivery of each Trident II.
Mr. Hutton: I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 12 January
2009, Official Report, column 111W.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090119/text/90119w0015.htm#09011914000096
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence with reference to the answer of 1 July 2008, Official Report, column 754W, on nuclear submarines, on what date the number of operative submarine berths at Southampton was increased from one to two; and when such berths were redesignated from Z to operational submarine berths.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The number of berths, as determined by the Port Authority
at Southampton, has always been two; but they are only cleared to support one
submarine at any one time. With respect to when berths were re-designated from
Z to Operational submarine berth, I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave
on 17 June 2008, Official Report, column 849W.
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Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much his Department is planning to spend on submarine safety, with particular reference to (a) hull structure, (b) hydromechanics and (c) maritime life support in each of the next five years.
Mr. Quentin Davies: Maintaining safety is an integral part of all aspects of submarine development, procurement, operation and support, whether carried out by the MOD, its contractors or the Royal Navy. The total MOD expenditure on submarine safety cannot therefore be distinguished from the wider costs of the submarine programme.
Information about expenditure that relates only to safety is not held centrally
and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
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Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what estimate he has made of the maintenance cost of Trident submarines in (a) 2013-14 and (b) each of the next five years.
Mr. Quentin Davies: The estimated maintenance costs of Vanguard class submarines in 2013-14 and each of the next five years, which cover fleet maintenance and capital expenditure incurred as part of the Long Overhaul Period (Refuel) maintenance programme, are:
| Total (£ million) | |
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what budget line was used for the £227 million expenditure on Astute overheads identified in the Ministry of Defence Major Projects Report 2007 from the Committee of Public Accounts, HC 433; and what effect this allocation had on expenditure on the UK nuclear deterrent programme in each year from 2005-06 to 2007-08.
Mr. Quentin Davies: The MOD Major Projects Report 2007 (HC433) noted the transfer of £227 million from the Astute budget line to another within the Submarine Production Integrated Project Team. This funding, which was used for the generation and sustainment of nuclear skills necessary to support the submarine-building industry, was not additional expenditure but an existing part of the Astute programme.
The transfer had no direct effect on spending on the UK’s nuclear deterrent.
A sustainable submarine industry is, however, essential for the effective delivery
of the future submarine programme, so this expenditure will have indirect benefits.
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Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of how the building process of the Trident II will affect the building process of the Astute-class SSNs.
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Mr. Hutton: Current departmental plans expect that construction of the successor to Vanguard class submarines will occur in parallel with construction of later Astute Class Submarines. The lessons learnt from the Astute programme are being applied to the design and build phase of the successor programme. Any opportunities arising from the successor programme that may benefit the Astute Class will be considered as part of normal business between closely related programmes.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many Trident II systems his Department is planning to build; and what his estimate is of the interval between the delivery of each Trident II.
Mr. Hutton: The Trident II D5 ballistic missile is the delivery system for the UK’s nuclear deterrent that is carried by our Vanguard-class submarines. It is an evolutionary development of the Trident IC4 missile that the UK originally planned to procure but was superseded by a decision in 1982 to procure the Trident II D5 missile. As we made clear in the December 2006 White Paper: “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent” (Cm 6994), we are participating in a programme to extend the life of the Trident II D5 missile until around 2042.
With regard to the new class of submarines to replace the Vanguard-class, as
we have previously stated, the first of class is forecast to enter service in
around 2024. Also, as explained in the December 2006 White Paper, a final decision
on the number of submarines that will be procured will be made when we know
more about their detailed design. That decision will determine the timetable
for entry into service of further submarines.
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