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Back to Proliferation in Parliament, Spring 2009
Witnesses: Bill Rammell MP, Minister of State, Paul Arkwright, Head of Counter Proliferation Department, and Mariot Leslie, Director-General, Defence and Intelligence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.
Q<213> <Chairman:> Good afternoon. Before we begin, can I ask members of the public to switch off their mobile phones or put them on silent?
Minister, it is good to see you again. You have been before our Committee in several guises on several different subjects, and we are pleased to see you once again. Your colleague, Mrs Leslie, has been before us on previous occasions, but I do not know whether this is Mr. Arkwright's first appearance.
<Paul Arkwright:> No. I gave evidence to the Iran inquiry.
Q<214> <Chairman:> Of course. So you will know the procedures and how we are all very friendly.
Can we begin by referring directly to the context of the document that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has just published-"Lifting the Nuclear Shadow: creating the conditions for abolishing nuclear weapons"? Is this a change of approach by the Government or is it just a reaffirmation of our existing national security strategy policy?
<Bill Rammell:> I think it is a reinforcement of our existing strategy. In terms of nuclear weapons, we have a very good track record. We are the most forward-leaning of the existing nuclear weapons states. We have reduced the explosive capability of our own arsenal by 75% since the height of the cold war. But we also want greater momentum internationally, and we want concerted action on the part of the P5. We want to tackle proliferation-in many senses, this is the most serious threat that we face internationally. We are coming to a critical period in the run-up to the review conference next year, and we want, bluntly, to engage the public in the most critical challenge that we face.
It is probably fair to say that there is nothing new in the document. We have probably set out in greater detail what we are doing in the document. I think it is right that we use it as a tool, one, to engage with people, but two, to generate increased momentum internationally.
Q<215> <Chairman:> So this is written for a public audience, not a specialist audience? In defence White Papers over the years, you had a series of essays, and Michael Quinlan, who came before us a few months ago, was one of the authors. Is this the popular version of what used to be an essay?
<Bill Rammell:> It is certainly not a populist version.
<Chairman:> I did not say populist.
<Bill Rammell:> It is an attempt to do a number of things. One is to genuinely engage the public. Two, it has, as I say, a level of detail in it that we have not committed to before, and I think for the specialist audience that would be important. It is also a tool in international diplomacy, registering and underlining our commitment, which can, in some way, increase the momentum towards disarmament.
Q<216> <Chairman:> Our existing approach, set out in the national security strategy, is referred to as a rules-based approach to international affairs. How successful has that been?
<Bill Rammell:> It has had some considerable success, but the scale of the threat and the challenge is enormous. Just a few years before the establishment of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1968, President Kennedy had said that by the 1970s we would have in excess of 20 nuclear weapon states-that was not the reality. In that sense, the NPT has worked. We need stronger verification mechanisms and greater universality, but it has worked. If you look at the chemical weapons convention, you will see that we are making progress towards the eradication of stockpiles, and there are similar moves under the biological and toxins weapons convention.
Given where we started, again going back to the NPT, our track record, and that of the US-50% down on its arsenals from the height of the cold war-progress has been made. But bluntly, given the scale and the seriousness of the challenge, we must do more, and that is why we want a re-invigorated NPT to come out next year, a comprehensive test ban treaty and an urgent start to negotiations on fissile material cut-off.
Q<217> <Chairman:> But even if you have a treaty and people sign up to it, there has always been a problem about whether they comply with it. We have the debate at the moment about Iran; we had the issue with the North Koreans in the past; and-it will be controversial to say this, in some quarters-the Iraq question, including its clear attempts to develop nuclear weapons in at least one period. How do we ensure compliance with that treaty?
<Bill Rammell:> Are you talking specifically about the NPT?
<Chairman:> You referred to the NPT.
<Bill Rammell:> Specifically on the NPT, in the review conference next year, we must generate political commitment to re-invigorate the bargain that is at the heart of the NPT-so, while the nuclear weapons states continue to make real progress on multilateral disarmament, we rein in rogue states that are seeking to get around the treaty. We need a stronger International Atomic Energy Agency and a number of different initiatives to try to get greater adherence.
But the blunt reality is, yes, you can establish an international treaty, have sanctions-which is part of the debate that we are looking at-and have activity at the level of the UN Security Council to focus on states of concern, but you still run the risk that some people will try to get around it, and that is what we have to ward against.
Q<218> <Chairman:> We will have some more detailed questions on the NPT later, and I will just keep in the general area for now. Is there a case for saying that we should not categorise weapons into specific boxes, and that there should instead be a more holistic view on disarmament and arms control? Otherwise, you end up in a place where you deal with certain areas, but some systems fall between the gaps, or there are people who are interested in one category of controls when the real threat to them is something that only a few states have developed.
<Bill Rammell:> That point has not been put to me in that way before. You do need separate regimes to focus on each of the threats, and there must be a dialogue on an international level to ensure that there is no means of slipping between the categories. But if you want real focus on the issues, you have to look at them in their own right.
Although there are ongoing, significant challenges, the track record of the NPT is relatively good. If you look at chemical weapons, leading up to the 2012 deadline, you see that real progress is being made there. So I think that merit of a rules-based approach, but one that focuses specifically on the different types of disarmament that is needed, is the right one.
Q<219> <Ms Stuart:> Forgive me, but I have not had the time to actually read this document. Given your opening comments about trying to take the debate further, and given that the people with whom we have to do that are the Chinese, the Russians and the Indians, who, in a sense, do not publish, it just struck me, flicking through the document, that it mentions Albert Einstein, two former American Presidents, one former American vice-president and a former Secretary-General of the UN. If I was Chinese, or from any of those countries, and saw this document, I would feel pretty much left out of the debate, other than being told what to do.
<Bill Rammell:> That is certainly not the intention. If you reflect on the whole of the document, you see that that is certainly not what we are arguing. If you look, for example, at the strategic arms reduction treaty, you will see that there have been significant reductions in nuclear capability by both the United States and the Russians, which should be very welcome. We will come to talk about the comprehensive test ban treaty, and I think that it is very welcome that President Obama has committed to ratifying that. I had some interesting discussions in Beijing two weeks ago, and you may find that there is a similar response from the Chinese. So it is certainly not that we are on our own and we know best. Bluntly, to make the desperately needed further progress, it is going to take agreement right across the board.
Q<220> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> I think I heard you say, Minister, that the NPT had a good track record. I wonder if you would maintain that in the light of the experiences of both 2000 and 2005 at the review conferences, where there were very substantial difficulties all around. Is there not a sense that the 2010 review is of enormous importance? If it were seen to be a failure in any sense, that would make the sustainability of the NPT very difficult to achieve.
<Bill Rammell:> I agree with that and, bluntly, at the last review conference there were too many empty seats. I need to get the balance right here in that I do think the NPT has achieved progress; if you look at President Kennedy's predictions back in the 1960s, we have reined back what was the accepted wisdom at that stage of how far nuclear proliferation would go. But the challenges are daunting, and that is why we have got to make further progress.
I think I am justified by the evidence in saying that there is a concern among some non-nuclear weapon states that there has not been sufficient progress in terms of disarmament by the nuclear weapons states. We need to do more to get across the evidence of the progress that has been made, but also to set out a trajectory of how we want to, and, indeed, how we can, go further. I also worry that some non-nuclear weapon states simply do not see proliferation as a concern and a challenge, so we have to engage on that level as well.
In summation, I absolutely agree with you that next year's conference will be critically important to reinvigorating the NPT. Yes, it has made progress, but given the scale of the challenge that we face it has got to go further.
Q<221> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> The treaty is essentially a bargain between the declared nuclear powers and the non-nuclear powers. Do I understand from what you say that you accept that there is a sense of disappointment on the part of some of the non-nuclear powers that the bargain has not been kept?
<Bill Rammell:> To state the obvious, you could go around the world and find people who articulate that-
Q<222> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> But if I asked whether it was justified?
<Bill Rammell:> I am not sure it is justified. Has it achieved all that we want it to achieve? No, but the Government and I remain committed to trying to create the conditions where we can have a non-nuclear world in terms of nuclear weapons. Have we done enough? No, we have not. Have we made progress? I think we have. Take examples like South Africa and Libya, which voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons-I think that has been very positive progress. There are concerted efforts within the international community, through the treaty, to tackle states of concern like Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. On the back of what has already been substantial disarmament by the recognised nuclear weapon states, I think there is an ambition to go significantly further.
Q<223> <Mr. Horam:> There are obviously specific issues in this area, such as Iran and North Korea, but some of us who were in Vienna and Geneva recently discussing the broad issue of non-proliferation and disarmament were told by many of the ambassadors there that, in their view, the whole issue had dropped away significantly in the last few years. The non-governmental organisations no longer had a great interest in it; they had switched their attention to things such as climate change and human rights. You talked about this document being designed to engage the public and get some momentum going, but that is extremely difficult, because apart from these one or two specific problems, people think it is all over. Would you agree with that?
<Bill Rammell:> There is a grain of truth in that. At one level, it is a demonstration of the success that has been achieved in terms of the reduction of nuclear arsenals that people think the threat and the danger have gone away. I think this is still the most significant challenge that we face. You have still got-even with the reductions-enormous arsenals that exist. You have got rogue states that clearly have an intent to develop nuclear capability. You have terrorists-
Q<224> <Mr. Horam:> What is the key to getting momentum going though?
<Bill Rammell:> One, I think you need political leadership and I think the-
Q<225> <Mr. Horam:> Is it all about President Obama?
<Bill Rammell:> I would be lying if I did not say that I think his election provides a genuinely positive re-injection of commitment and momentum into this process. But it not just about him; it is about political leadership right the way across the board. It is also about engaging with people and convincing them that, despite the progress, there is a real threat here. In part, that is what the document is about. I was going to say you have also got al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks that have made their desire and their intent to develop nuclear capability explicitly clear. They do not have that capability as of yet, but this is a serious ongoing challenge.
Q<226> <Mr. Horam:> On a slightly separate point, one of the things which struck us in Vienna and Geneva was the enormous number of overlapping organisations in this field. You have, for example, the IAEA and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation-even though the test ban treaty has not even been ratified-doing similar work and you have the Zangger group and the Nuclear Supply Group doing similar work. Is there not a case for some rationalisation and co-operation in this whole area? I nearly said minefield, but you know what I mean.
<Bill Rammell:> At one level, it is about a coalition of the willing. What you need to ensure is that there is not competitive overlap between the different approaches and not friction between them, and you have to spend and work a lot to ensure that that is the case. Take the example of the nuclear fuel cycle and how we can ensure that civil nuclear power is not being diverted into nuclear weapons. There are about 12 different international initiatives at the moment. On one level you might say that is too much-
<Mr. Horam:> It is.
<Bill Rammell:> In an ideal world, you would probably say you need one initiative that everybody agrees on, and you pull together on. However, the world is not quite like that. What you need to ensure is that initiatives do not detract from each other, and I do not believe they do. If different states are working in different areas and actually make progress, I do not think that is necessarily a bad thing.
Q<227> <Chairman:> Witnesses have said to us that the use of the term "weapons of mass destruction" is not helpful and that it blurs the fact that nuclear weapons are a category that should be dealt with in a separate way. Do you agree?
<Bill Rammell:> I am not sure I do. I agree that you can have a chemical or a biological attack that is clearly survivable in terms of the whole of mankind, but I find it difficult to envisage a nuclear conflict that is, in the main, survivable. However, it has been used as a generic term to describe and underline the threat we face on all these fronts. Undoubtedly, however, I think the nuclear threat is the most significant challenge that we face.
Q<228> <Chairman:> I do not want to reopen history, but in 2002 and 2003, there was all this stuff in the media about WMD and it was not clear whether people were talking about a chemical shell or a nuclear bomb. You are talking about popularising and making things clear for the lay person. One of the difficulties is that if you use that broader term in a debate, it conceals the differences between the categories and their ability to have very different effects on the battlefield.
<Bill Rammell:> I will reflect on that. We are in danger of going back over the Iraq conflict.
<Chairman:> I am not trying to do that.
<Bill Rammell:> I was at the Foreign Office at the time, at the heart of it, and if you look back on all the statements that were made, certainly in terms of what we were saying as a country and a Government, we were very clear that this was a chemical threat that we were taking, notwithstanding the fact that Saddam may have had a desire to develop nuclear capability.
Would it help us to come up with a new terminology? Perhaps it would. However, I think we might then spend a great deal of time negotiating on the terminology-you need to get a consensus internationally-rather than making real progress on what matters in terms of disarmament.
Q<229> <Mr. Purchase:> One of the main, if not major, scientific narratives of the 20th and 21st centuries has been miniaturisation. Everything is getting smaller and more portable, which is reflected in our concerns that it is not so much countries that may attack one another by using of nuclear weapons, but terrorist organisations. As miniaturisation processes advance, what assessment have the Government made of the risk of it becoming easier and easier almost to conceal nuclear weapons to the point where they can operate in just the same way as suicide bombers are operating now?
<Bill Rammell:> Clearly such a risk exists. I referred earlier to terrorist networks-what al-Qaeda has said on the record, and the fact that Osama bin Laden has talked about an Islamic duty to develop nuclear capability-and there was a call to arms, as it were, and they were seeking to recruit physicists and others to come forward and help. They clearly have that intent.
We have to ward against their developing that capability, which means that we need a number of instruments internationally to try to tackle the problem. Things like the proliferation security initiative help us, and we need to work with individual countries of concern. We are doing that with a number of countries to ensure that there is not the dispersal and the spread of nuclear weapons technology. In a sense, it is about ongoing attention and vigilance.
Q<230> <Mr. Purchase:> I have not really got an answer from you, Minister. Is there any work taking place that might prevent religious fundamentalists from using or getting hold of this technology to miniaturise and to become an even bigger threat, because of their religious convictions, than is possibly the case now?
<Mariot Leslie:> The Government are extremely worried about the capabilities of terrorist groups, but I know of no technology that could make it possible to make a viable nuclear device that did not use many kilograms of nuclear material. A miniature nuclear device is not something that we should be worried about. The acquisition of fissile material by terrorist groups is a serious concern and the Government have programmes to address that with our allies. Other attempts by people to get their hands on advanced technology is a serious concern, but the spectre of a miniature nuclear bomb is not something that we should be worried about.
Q<231> <Chairman:> Can I take that a step further? Getting back to WMD categorisation, how do you assess the relative risks of chemical or biological weapons being used by a terrorist group and by a state? Would it be fair to say that states are less likely than terrorist groups to use such weapons because of the general international climate between states?
<Bill Rammell:> My instinctive answer to that is yes. Mariot, do you agree?
<Mariot Leslie:> There is always a risk-if I have understood your question correctly, correct me if I have not-with biological and chemical materials that have dual use that it is relatively easy to make something crude that would have a big impact on members of the public. The risk is obviously an extremely serious one with nuclear materials, but they are much more difficult to deliver in an effective form. Rather than saying that we worry about one more than the other-it is rather like your question about WMDs-we need to work on all the components and have a coherent policy that looks at the risks for each element.
Q<232><Mr. Illsley:> Minister, I have seen the memorandum that you supplied in relation to this inquiry, which talks about the need for "meaningful and valuable incentives" to be a key outcome of the NPT conference and treaty obligations. In the evidence that we have received so far, it has been suggested that if the issue is the weaknesses of the NPT, then there are weaknesses in enforcing it. In view of that, and given the need for consensus at the review conference, and given what my colleague just referred to as a lack of enthusiasm around the conference as a whole, is there a legal or political instrument that could introduce automatic sanctions for violation of, or withdrawal from, the treaty?
<Bill Rammell:> In an ideal world, in advance of a particular cause for concern in respect of a specific state, I would want an agreement through the UN Security Council-and certainly through the NPT-for generic sanctions in respect of a generic breach. Bluntly, if I am honest, we would not get agreement on that at the moment, so we have to approach it on a case-by-case basis. When those instances occur, we have to take real, concerted, co-ordinated action. One would always like it to be stronger, but if we take Iran as an example, we have now had four successive Security Council resolutions, indicating that there is a degree of concerted pressure and agreement internationally. Similarly, through the six party talks, there has been a real focus on the DPRK. Ideally, I would like to say that, yes, we ought to have generic sanctions that kick in when there is a concern with a particular state. That is the endgame-we are not there at the moment, so we have to make efforts on a case-by-case basis.
Q<233><Mr. Illsley:> My next question is going to be about Iran: is there anything in prospect in relation to the Iranian situation? Are you saying that that is not likely to be the case?
<Bill Rammell:> The threat and challenge with Iran is a real and genuine one. Looking at the track record, one can see concealment for 20 years and refusal to engage adequately with the IAEA. Our estimate is that Iran could develop capability in years, not decades. The next year is going to be critical. There is a substantial offer on the table through the E3 plus 3 process that meets all of what Iran, on the face of it, says that it wants on civil nuclear capability . At all levels, we are urging Iran to engage with that. The new US administration have indicated that this will be a priority, and they have indicated that they will talk directly to the Iranians, but within a context that makes it clear that a nuclear weaponised Iran is not acceptable. There is a choice for Iran: either to engage and receive all the benefits that are available through the E3 plus 3 process, or to face a significant ratcheting-up of further sanctions.
Q<234><Mr. Illsley:> Is there a comparison between this issue in relation to the NPT and the chemical and biological conventions? Is there a similar issue of a lack of enforcement provision in those conventions as well?
<Bill Rammell:> If you look at the chemical weapons convention, a verification regime is available-that is less the case with biological and toxin weapons conventions. Our strong view in respect of all three is that you need universalisation, with everybody signed up. You need as much verification as possible to ensure that the progress stated as being made is genuinely being made, and that we are not facing a threat from proliferation.
Q<235> <Mr. Hamilton:> Continuing on the theme of Iran, one of the problems we have is that they signed up to the NPT, and they told us when we were there in November 2007 that the development of nuclear weapons was unIslamic, but we have plenty of evidence to suggest that covert work is going on there. They want to develop a civil nuclear power programme and we in the West-holders ourselves of considerable stocks of nuclear weapons-are telling them they may not have them. At the same time, their arch-enemy, Israel, which has never signed up to the NPT, has a civil nuclear power programme and also, as far as everybody is aware, a military nuclear weapons programme. There is a problem for them and they are trying to sell to their own public the fact that they have abided by all the world's treaties and conventions, but are being deliberately targeted, because the world hates Iran. How do you deal with the view that we are trying to stop them having what is rightfully theirs-their civil nuclear power programme? That is what this is all about, and it is certainly the way they are selling it to their population.
<Bill Rammell:> In respect of Israel, we consistently argue that it should sign up to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.
<Sir Menzies Campbell:> As a non-nuclear weapons state?
<Bill Rammell:> We have also strongly argued that we would like to see a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. However, to say that Iran has been abiding by its commitments is not borne out by the evidence. First, for 20 years, they were concealing their activities from the international community. Secondly, if you are going to sign up and operate properly and effectively under the auspices of the NPT, you need to agree to the safeguards agreement. In our view, you should agree to the additional protocol. Iran has not been doing that.
As I have said, four successive Security Council resolutions have asked Iran to engage with the IAEA and they have not been doing that. There have been the alleged studies for military purposes. If you look at what Dr. el-Baradei said in November, he said that the information he had received from a number of countries about what was taking place was derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, that it was detailed in content, and appeared to be generally consistent. I think Iran is not operating in the way anyone would expect it to. If we say this is about its civil nuclear power desires, the E3 plus 3 process makes it abundantly clear that that civil nuclear resource is available to Iran if it will simply engage. I just cannot see on the evidence before me that there is a defensible position that says this is just about Iran trying to get civil nuclear power.
Q<236> <Mr. Hamilton:> How do we get that message to the Iranian public? I know it is not for us to do that, but there is no real free press there-any free press gets shot down pretty quickly. So how do you get the message across that it is not the NPT signatories, and it is not the rest of the world that is trying to stop them having a civil nuclear power programme? We are simply trying to make them abide by the rules as everybody else must. Clearly, the Government of Iran do not tell their own public that for 20 years it was deliberately trying to hide information from the IAEA. How do we do that?
<Bill Rammell:> The honest answer is you keep trying. Through all the channels that are available to us, we try to get that message across to the regime. Although there is an issue about communicating with the Iranian public, I think we need to be realistic, because the regime, given the structure of the society, will make those decisions. We need to try and get that message across.
We also try to engage-I met an Iranian parliamentary delegation last week, and I think a number of Committee members met it, too. Although I would not for a minute say that it was a meeting of minds, it was actually one of the more constructive discussions that I have had on this issue. We take the opportunity through radio and television-I was doing some interviews with al-Jazeera and others just before Christmas-to try and communicate directly.
<Mr. Hamilton:> We will have to see if the BBC Persian language service will help.
<Chairman:> I think that is a plug for an event later today.
Q<237> <Andrew Mackinlay:> Part of our problem is rogue states or terrorists, along with states which we are uncomfortable about. Iran would certainly be in the last category at least. We have sanctions against Iran, and I assume their purpose is twofold. One is to show our disapproval, and the other is to frustrate them in their nuclear weapons ambitions. Also, after 11 September, the UK Government, through the good offices of Greenstock at the UN, drove United Nations countries to have full transparency-full disclosure of financial institutions-to home in on resources which could be made available to purchase weapons of mass destruction and/or embark on other terrorist activities, which cost money.
I received a reply yesterday from the Prime Minister, who said that in the United Kingdom, the sanctions regarding the disclosure of moneys relating to the Iran regime have only existed in respect of Iran and the UK for a year or two. I find that quite astonishing, and it is against a backdrop-we have written as a Committee to the Government about this-of Lloyds TSB admitting in the United States courts that they falsified documents to ensure that moneys were available from Sudan and on behalf of the Iranian Government of $300 million. If you look at all the available evidence on the web, it appears that the intent was to get money into the United States to buy at least dual-use materials illegally. They have been rumbled in the United States, but what I am concerned about it is whether our sanctions and statutes are sufficient for us to control and, if need be, prosecute people who are putting money through London either as terrorists or as rogue states and dodgy countries? I found the Prime Minister's reply quite astonishing. Can you throw some light on just what we are able to do in the UK? Are we up to speed on this? Are we up to muster? You know about this, don't you?
<Bill Rammell:> Yes, I do. Let me go back to the beginning of your question. What is the purpose of the sanctions? Bluntly, their purpose is to bring Iran to the table. It is a stick and carrot approach. In respect of what we have done, it is fair to describe us as being at the leading edge of the European debate on sanctions. For example, in the UK, Iranian banks no longer have access to sterling clearing facilities.
Q<238> <Andrew Mackinlay:> Since when?
<Bill Rammell:> About 18 months or two years ago.
Q<239> <Andrew Mackinlay:> That was partly my point. Why just 18 months ago? I think we were under the impression that there were constraints on them for a long time. We are a bit slow on this, aren't we?
<Bill Rammell:> Ultimately, if necessary, we will go further on our own, but we are trying to get international consensus because, bluntly, that will be the most effective way of dealing with the regime. That is why we have been working in the Security Council, and why we have been working in the European Union. We have made it clear that, if necessary, we will go further on our own. I can assure you that there is a very strong message going from the Government to banks and British industry about the undesirability of investing in Iran.
<Andrew Mackinlay:> This was handling money from Iran.
<Bill> Rammell: Yes, absolutely. I think we have been at the leading edge of the argument. We have certainly been implementing sanctions, which are having an effect. I am sure that the delegation I met last week, which a number of you met, too, raised their concerns about sanctions with you. That is all for a purpose: to bring them to the table. If that does not happen, then we will go further. Ideally we would like to do that globally and multilaterally, but if not-
Q<240> <Andrew Mackinlay:> I used Iran as an example, but are you comfortable that we have sufficient powers in statute law to be homing in on the three categories to which I referred? Those are terrorists, rogue states and other states. I am not arguing this thing. It shows a flaw in our powers does it not? We have boasted around the world-we bash people's heads around the world-saying it must comply with the United Nations, the Greenstock committee and so on, yet we have been found to be flawed.
<Bill Rammell:> If you look at our track record compared with other states, we have a good record. Does that mean that it works in every circumstance? Arguably not, and we constantly need to keep under review whether we need to go further.
Q<241><Sandra Osborne:> Minister, you suggested that the IAEA needs to be strengthened. Should the additional protocol be implemented on a more widespread basis? Given the likely increase of the use of civil nuclear power to secure energy supply and climate change obligations-an independent commission of experts suggested last year that they would need £80 million up front with £50 million increases in real terms on a yearly basis-what commitment are the British Government going to give to increasing the resources as part of their contribution to the IAEA's budget?
<Bill Rammell:> Let us look at the track record. We are the fourth largest contributor to the IAEA at the moment-I think I am right in saying that we are the second largest contributor to the non-statutory funding stream. So, we are substantial contributors to areas such as the technical co-operation fund and the nuclear security fund. We contribute thousands of IAEA safeguard inspectors, we have been undertaking that process since 1981-the IAEA is certainly very appreciative of the support that we give.
Across the board-as MPs around this table will know-we face a tight fiscal environment. We have a general policy of zero real growth towards the budget of international organisations-I think most of our constituents would say that that is the right approach. It is also the case that if you look at the 2020 report commissioned by Mohamed el-Baradei, it recommends that the IAEA should place more priority on those areas that it works in and that there was further scope for efficiency savings. We want the IAEA to be resourced to do the job, and we will help in any way we can, but to say that we will commit greater resources than we are at the moment is not realistic.
Q<242><Sandra Osborne:> May I ask you about the al-Kibar facility in Syria? The IAEA was not aware of that-it did not pick up on it-and the US did not divulge the information that it had about it in advance of the attack on the facility. What do you think that says about the IAEA's role in effectively monitoring compliance with the NPT?
<Bill Rammell:> The IAEI-I always have problems with that terminology-the International Atomic Energy Authority has argued that states should make available the intelligence information that they have about Syria, We have done that and other states have done that. If you look at the presentation that the US made in April last year, in our estimate that did provide compelling evidence to support the assessment that Syria was building a nuclear site with North Korea's co-operation. Undoubtedly we want positive interaction between states that are party to the NPT and the IAEA.
Q<243><Chairman:> The Syrians vigorously denied the allegation that that was a nuclear site. Neither Syria nor Israel has been prepared to co-operate with the IAEA to answer how the uranium traces found at the site got there. Why do you think that is?
<Bill Rammell:> I am not sure that I know the answer to that in detail. Certainly we have spoken directly to the Syrians-you will know that for the last 18 or 20 months we have been developing a dialogue with the Syrians-and we have strongly urged them to engage with Dr. el-Baradei. If you look at his report from last November, that concluded that the building that was destroyed and its related infrastructure was similar to that which may be found at a nuclear reactor site-although he could not rule out a non-nuclear use. He went on to call explicitly for Syria to agree to a further IAEA visit. That is what we have urged and asked Syria to comply with. Similarly, if Israel has information that can help Dr. el-Baradei get to the bottom of that problem, it should do that.
Q<244> <Chairman:> The Syrians are claiming that the uranium traces were introduced when the Israelis bombed the site. Presumably the Israelis could provide information that would make clear that that was not the case.
<Bill Rammell:> And that is what we have said, publicly and privately, that we want the Israeli Government to do. Also, from Syria's point of view, I think that if there is genuinely nothing to hide, there is a way of reassuring, and that is to bring the IAEA in and allow them unfettered access to reach a conclusion.
Q<245> <Mr. Horam:> Do the Government have any dialogue with Israel on its assumed nuclear capacity?
<Bill Rammell:> I said to you earlier that we have consistently made it clear that we want Israel to sign up as a non-nuclear weapon state.
Q<246> <Mr. Horam:> But it cannot, of course, if it has got nuclear weapons.
<Bill Rammell:> Yes. Mariot, do you want to talk about dialogue on that front?
<Mariot Leslie:> I think that the simple answer is no.
Q<247> <Mr. Horam:> We do not have such dialogue. Moving on to India, how does the Government's support for the US-India civil nuclear co-operation initiative advance the aim of bringing India into the NPT?
<Bill Rammell:> Ideally, I would like India to be in the NPT now as a non-nuclear weapon state. In the short term, that is unlikely to be achieved. One of the advantages of the US-India deal was that it brought India into the broader non-proliferation framework. The fact that, unilaterally and publicly, India declared that it would not test further was a positive step. The fact that it said that it was willing to engage in negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty was a positive indication. Short of getting India to do what we ideally want, it was a step to pull it in within the broader non-proliferation target.
Q<248> <Mr. Horam:> Do you think that we have got as far as we can?
<Bill Rammell:> No. I would still like to get to the position where India signs up as a non-nuclear weapon state. In the short-term, however, this is better than where we were.
<Paul Arkwright:> The Indians have now signed the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which I think is a very important step following the separation of the civil and military nuclear facilities in India. We are pressing them hard to continue their negotiations on signing up to an Additional Protocol, which would be another further step of confidence that they can take. We would like them to pursue those negotiations energetically.
Q<249> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> If the policy is that Israel should sign up as a non-nuclear power, then that could only be effective if Israel was a non-nuclear power. Accepting for the moment, as most people do, that Israel is a nuclear power, it is very difficult to foresee circumstances, in the medium or even the long term, where that is likely to happen.
<Bill Rammell:> That remains our position. However, realistically, short of a substantive agreement in terms of the Middle East peace process, that is unlikely to happen.
Q<250> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> If there is no dialogue, then how do you progress the policy? Is it raised? The Prime Minister told us-I think at Prime Minister's Questions today-that he had had a conversation with Mr. Olmert. When he has conversations with Mr. Olmert, do you understand that that issue may be raised?
<Bill Rammell:> Certainly, the Israeli Government are aware of our position. In terms of discussions with the Israeli Government, I think you will understand that, over the recent periods, the 100% focus of that has been about trying to secure a ceasefire in Gaza. But the Israeli Government are certainly aware of our view and position.
Q<251> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> The truth is that, for the foreseeable future, Israel is going to retain its nuclear capability.
<Bill Rammell:> There is an assumed capability.
<Sir Menzies Campbell:> Mr. Mordechai Vanunu, I think, tells us a little bit about that when he is allowed to from time to time.
<Bill Rammell:> I do not resile from the position at all. The Government and I would like to see a nuclear-free Middle East and we would like Israel to sign up as a non-nuclear weapon state. That is our position. However, if one is realistic, until there is much greater progress in terms of peace within the Middle East, the auguries for that are not optimistic.
Q<252> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> I wonder how realistic it is to have a policy which, on the face of it, is incapable of achievement.
<Mariot Leslie:> You can perfectly well have a position that you are working to achieve through other means, notably the great effort the Government are putting into the Middle East peace process, into dealing with Iran, and into improving security in the region. Those are the conditions that would make it possible to have a Middle East that was free of nuclear weapons.
Q<253> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> Is this not more a hope and a prayer than a policy?
<Bill Rammell:> No, I do not think it is. Our position is clear. As with a lot of these issues-and I find this a lot in terms of the foreign policy debate-it is not the case that we can just say something and make it happen.
Q<254> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> We all understand that. But there are questions of credibility about how realistic policies may be. Do you not feel any reservations about articulating that as being the Government's policy, when the prospects of achievement are as limited as I think you concede?
<Bill Rammell:> Let us turn it on its head. The alternative to that would be to say that we are comfortable accepting states that are not parties to the NPT possessing nuclear weapons. That is emphatically not our position, which is why we hold the position that we do. However, does that mean that I think it is realistic that we will make progress on that in the short term? No-I am being straight with you-I do not think the prospects for that are good.
Q<255> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> I am personally comfortable with that last answer, but that would, in my mind, trigger the importance of seeking dialogue.
<Bill Rammell:> I hear what you are saying, but there is a very great awareness of our position.
Q<256> <Chairman:> May I take you back to India and Pakistan? The Americans have signed the deal with the Indians, which has run into difficulties. What is the British Government's assessment of the prospects of that deal actually coming to fruition? Also, what are the implications of that deal for Pakistan, given that the memorandum from the FCO says that co-operation with Pakistan on civil nuclear power is "not under consideration"?
<Bill Rammell:> In terms of the prospects to get the deal through, I think that ultimately they are still good, but there are issues and challenges that need to be addressed; I believe that those can be. In respect of Pakistan, I think our position is more accurately described as "not now"-in that the conditions are not appropriate-"but not never".
Q<257> <Chairman:> So, it could be under consideration next month, or the month after?
<Bill Rammell:> We are not talking about that time scale. I think you would need to see a number of other changes within Pakistan. But certainly-as an indicator of the efforts we are making in this regard-we are at the moment working with the IAEA in assisting Pakistan in implementing its nuclear security action plan. If, over an extended period of time, we made progress on that and on other fronts, we could envisage circumstances in the future where that may be possible, but, certainly, that is not the position at the moment. We would not contemplate that at the moment, but, as I said, it is not now, but it is not never.
Q<258> <Chairman:> May I put it to you that India and Pakistan nearly went to war five or six years ago and that would have been a nuclear conflict? It could happen at any time over Kashmir or other issues, including the very bad relations that there currently are as a result of the terrorism in Mumbai. Is this not one of the most urgent priorities-to deal with this potential nuclear conflict between two countries which still have very bad relations, closed borders and lots of potential sources of friction?
<Bill Rammell:> The answer to that is yes. That is why we strongly support the composite dialogue between the two countries-
<Chairman:> Which has been broken off.
<Bill Rammell:> Yes, but I still think that that is the best route to make progress. It is very positive that, between the directors general of their respective militaries, there is a continuing channel of communication. In terms of our efforts, I agree with your assessment that there have historically been real concerns about the balance of power and the potential conflict between these two countries. We invest a lot of time and effort in working with both sides to ensure that we do not get to the position of ultimate conflict.
<Chairman:> We will come back to this later in the year. I think we should move on.
Q<259> <Mr. Hamilton:> Successive British Governments have insisted on retaining an independent nuclear deterrent. Within the last two years, this Parliament has voted on the continuation and reconstruction of Trident submarines. The memorandum, which I think was submitted to the Committee by the FCO, accepted that there is a possible linkage between non-proliferation efforts and progress in wider nuclear disarmament. It says, "Counter-proliferation efforts risk being undermined if other states perceive, rightly or wrongly, that the Nuclear Weapon States are not delivering on their side of the bargain and actively pursuing nuclear disarmament".
Last December, the Foreign Secretary said, "The UK is committed to working actively to create a world free from nuclear weapons", and that international action against proliferation needed to include "re-energised action on multilateral nuclear disarmament" in order to be fully effective.
Do you accept, Minister, that the Government's decision to renew Trident-which Parliament endorsed-is problematic? Surely in terms of public perception, the fact that we continue to build submarines and have a nuclear deterrent, while telling other countries that they may not have them, is a little embarrassing?
<Bill Rammell:> No, I do not think that is the case. However, I preface that by saying that it is a statement reflecting the reality that, in terms of our international posture, no subject has been more divisive, particularly in this country, for decades. People on either side of the argument hold very strong views.
Part of our challenge politically is to get across our track record on disarmament and the fact that our explosive capability in nuclear terms has been reduced by 75% since the height of the cold war. Our missiles are not targeted and they require several days' notice to fire. Those are de-escalatory measures. We are among the strongest advocates for the universal ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty, and we are energetically pursuing a fissile material cut-off treaty. All those measures indicate that we are not only strong advocates of nuclear disarmament, but that we practice what we preach. We are rightly seen by international partners and by non-governmental organisations as the most forward leaning of the nuclear weapon states in terms of disarmament.
However, to come to the nub of your question, despite that track record, and even with the reductions that have taken place elsewhere, substantial arsenals still exist internationally. There are rogue states which, according to all available evidence, are clearly seeking a nuclear capability, and there are terrorist networks that would like to develop that capability into the bargain. Given all that, and given the projections about the time span over which the submarines and equipment would become dysfunctional, we faced a choice. Had we not taken the decision at that stage, we would have effectively been committing future Parliaments and generations to unilateral nuclear disarmament. Although I genuinely want to arrive at a world that is free from nuclear weapons, I do not think that it would have been the right decision to take at that stage.
Q<260> <Mr. Hamilton:> But here we are, we go to Iran as parliamentarians and sit before the members of the Majlis. We tell them that they have no right to have nuclear weapons and that they must not develop those weapons-which of course are un-Islamic anyway. They will turn round to us and say, "You are just renewing the vehicles for your own independent nuclear deterrent. Who are you to tell us that we should not have these weapons? If you have them because it is important for your own defence and security, why is it not equally important for ours?"
<Bill Rammell:> I will turn that argument on its head. There is an argument that comes across implicitly on the liberal left-I am not saying that that is your view-which almost says that because some states have got these weapons, how do we have any moral basis not to say that everyone should have them? At one level we could argue that, but it is an extraordinarily dangerous proposition to advance. If we were making the case against proliferation in the context of increasing our level of nuclear capability, that argument, even though I would still reject it, would have more plausibility. Taking our example of a state that has reduced its arsenal by three quarters and is one of the strongest advocates internationally for the treaty-based approach to get genuine further reductions in nuclear capability, I do not think that that argument is justified.
Q<261> <Mr. Hamilton:> What further steps can we now take? You said that we have reduced our arsenal by 75 per cent. What more can we do to reduce it further, as is our obligation under the NPT? Furthermore, if we continue to retain these weapons, as the Government and Parliament have agreed we should, what use are they against not the rogue states particularly but the terrorist groups that would wish to acquire them? How on earth could we defend ourselves with nuclear weapons against that kind of attack?
<Bill Rammell:> Given the range of threats that exist at the moment it would be wrong, and certainly not prudent, for us to unilaterally give up that capability. In terms of further action-and this is where the NPT conference next year is so critical-we want a coming together of the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states to re-inject energy into that process. The fact that Barack Obama has committed to ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty is a very positive step forward. We want to commence down the path of the fissile material cut-off treaty and we want further multilateral efforts to reduce the number of nuclear warheads. A reinvigorated strategic arms reduction treaty process to see further major reductions between the United States and Russia would be very positive in that regard as well.
Q<262> <Mr. Hamilton:> Finally, how do you react to the suggestion that cancelling the Trident programme, not building these incredibly expensive vehicles to transport these weapons around and dismantling our nuclear arsenal would make us safer because we would have far more resources to spend on conventional weapons, ships, submarines, vehicles, men and equipment, which would make our Army and our armed forces a lot more effective both in the UK and worldwide?
<Bill Rammell:> I remember putting forward that argument as a Labour activist on the doorsteps in the 1983 general election. It was not convincing. The prevailing view now is still that given the scale of the risks that we face, yes we need to push as strongly as we can for disarmament, but to take that step now to unilaterally disarm would be wrong. I am not accusing you of this, because I know your views and we have talked about this, but in some quarters there is an underlying dishonesty in this debate. People say that we should do that, with the underlying knowledge that we would still be protected by the American nuclear umbrella. I want to see progress across the board. I do not think that we could achieve that at the moment by that unilateral gesture.
Q<263> <Mr. Purchase:> You were unembarrassed by the dilemma or paradox that my colleague presented to you. Let me tell you that every time we have asked this question on our travels from the United Nations in New York and Geneva to many other places, they are all quite perplexed by Britain's decision to renew, improve and modernise the platform. I agree entirely with my colleague: the likelihood of any of the rogue states or anyone else targeting Britain with a nuclear weapon is almost beyond belief. However, it is likely that at some stage terrorists-religious fundamentalists, as they should truthfully be called-will obtain a means of attacking other countries with nuclear weapons of some kind. We will not have, and no one else will have, any serious defence in terms of a response, because there is no country to attack with anything. The colossal expenditure that we are now entering into should be spent more properly-if it is to be spent on defence at all-on improvements to the conditions of our armed services. We hear all the time that they do not have the right equipment on time, in the right way, and that they often do not even have decent living conditions in our military bases here in Britain.
The Government have a very serious problem. It is true that on the doorsteps in 1983 no one was convinced by Labour's arguments, and the Conservatives had the finest propaganda ever of Labour's defence policy-a soldier with his arms up. It is absolutely true that we could not compete with that. But I do not think that this is 1983 and, besides which, even if all the press barons are warmongers in disguise, people are getting smarter. We face a genuine dilemma in both the Ministry of Defence and foreign policy, and we appear to be in what I would call "a bugger's muddle" over this whole business of whether or not we should be developing-[Interruption.] I will finish in just a second. Should we be developing further our capabilities when pleading with everyone else to reduce them? It is simply is not principled, and at best it could be called eclecticism, but at worst it could be described as totally unprincipled.
<Chairman:> We will not get through the rest of our business if we have long speeches, rather than questions.
<Mr. Purchase:> I just thought-
<Chairman:> I know. You have made yourself feel better, now the Minister can respond.
<Bill Rammell:> You and I have talked about this long and hard before, and I know and respect your view. I acknowledge that we are not in 1983. I could be wrong, but my gut instinct is that ultimately, in a debate, a majority of British people, despite wanting disarmament, will not conclude that the circumstances are right, even now, to unilaterally disarm. The ongoing costs, with renewal, are about 5% or 6% of the overall defence budget, which is roughly what it is costing at the moment.
On your point about equipment, the Ministry of Defence makes strenuous efforts to ensure that our military is properly equipped. I also do not agree with you that the threat from rogue states is negligible. I think it is much more substantive-
<Mr. Purchase:> It is nil. By the way, I have never been a member of CND, Bill.
<Bill Rammell:> Neither have I, for the record.
Q<264> <Mr. Keetch:> Just for the record, Minister, you suggested that if Britain gives up its nuclear weapons, we would somehow be shielding under the American umbrella. Let us be clear: every NATO country that does not possess nuclear weapons is in the same position-effectively protected by the American nuclear umbrella. If there was a nuclear attack from Russia on Lithuania, for example, then America would be obliged to respond.
<Bill Rammell:> Yes, but those countries did not take, rightly or wrongly, the historic decisions that this country took to be a nuclear weapons state. You cannot uninvent the reality. We do have that capability and there is an issue about integrity-that we can give it up in the full knowledge that we will still be protected.
Q<265> <Mr. Keetch:> I would perhaps disagree. I want to talk about the Obama Administration, and I would also like to come back to something that Ken Purchase said because it follows on from what we have just been discussing. Am I correct in interpreting what you said earlier-that the biggest threat of chemical or biological attack on Britain, at the moment, comes from a terrorist organisation and not from a rogue state or an actual state? Is that effectively what you said?
<Bill Rammell:> Yes.
Q<266> <Mr. Keetch:> Secondly, did you say that if a terrorist organisation possessed a nuclear weapon, then the biggest threat we would face from a nuclear attack would come from a terrorist organisation, and not a rogue state or an actual state?
<Bill Rammell:> In terms of nuclear capability, we are projecting too far forward. However, your analysis in terms of chemical or biological is accurate.
Q<267> <Mr. Keetch:> To follow on from the questions of my two colleagues, how would we use Trident against al-Qaeda? I am the commander of HMS Vanguard, you are the Secretary of State for Defence, or the Foreign Secretary. The Taliban plants a nuclear weapon and blows up Hereford. How would we respond?
<Bill Rammell:> It is much more challenging, but it is not the only threat that we face.
<Mariot Leslie:> I was perhaps just going to remind the Committee of what was said about Trident in the 2006 White Paper, because it is sometimes misquoted or misinterpreted. What the Government said then about the rationale for wanting to retain the nuclear deterrent was that terrorists have an aspiration to get their hands on nuclear materials. The only route by which they would acquire that capability would be via proliferation from a state, and what we would be holding to account would be the state that might be tempted in the direction of that sort of proliferation. The only route by which they would acquire that capability would be via proliferation from a state, and what we would be holding to account would be the state that might be tempted in the direction of that sort of proliferation. The Government have never said that they intended to direct nuclear weapons against a terrorist; they were simply setting out a wide range of ways in which they might want to retain a nuclear deterrent against the possibility of a nuclear state misusing its own nuclear weapons.
Q<268> <Mr. Keetch:> To be clear, al-Qaeda launches a nuclear attack on a UK city, and we believe that it has acquired that nuclear technology from say, pick a country-
<Mr. Hamilton:> Russia.
<Mr. Keetch:> We will then respond by launching a nuclear attack on Russia.
<Mariot Leslie:> The Government have never said under what circumstances exactly they would use their nuclear deterrent-that ambiguity is part of the deterrent. We do not believe that al-Qaeda has the capability to launch a massive attack with a normal militarised nuclear weapon on this country, as we sit at the moment.
Q<269> <Mr. Keetch:> Let me move on to the Obama Administration-slightly happier news, we hope. Minister, you said earlier that you believed that the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would be ratified by the Obama Administration. Are you confident of that? Do you think that it would go though the Senate?
<Bill Rammell:> The prospects for disarmament under President Obama are much greater and stronger than they were under President Bush. How do I adduce that in evidence? You can look, for example, at Hillary Clinton's confirmation hearings, when she talked about the importance of rebuilding staffing and financing the relevant bureaus within the State Department. Obama has made it clear that he wants to ratify, and have negotiations on, the fissile material cut-off treaty. All that I see and hear is very positive and I have belief in President Obama, but there is a caveat: in the American system, you have to get those treaties through the Senate as well. I think that with the degree of support that the President has and the political make-up of the Senate at the moment, the grounds for that are optimistic, but it is not as simple as saying that the President decrees and it happens.
Q<270> <Mr. Keetch:> I am sure that our excellent embassy in Washington would help to achieve that. Do you think that China would then follow?
<Bill Rammell:> I would not want to presume to state Chinese intentions, but certainly when I was in Beijing a couple of weeks ago interesting discussions were taking place and there was a desire to know what the intentions of the Obama Administration were. I would hope that in those circumstances China would follow.
Q<271> <Mr. Keetch:> We read in The Times today that the President will establish a non-proliferation office, which I am sure we would support, and there is a suggestion of a new treaty with Russia to cut their warhead numbers to 1,000 each. Presumably the UK Government would want to support that and do everything possible to encourage it.
<Bill Rammell:> I have not seen that confirmed. I understand that it is based on a leak, and I do not comment on our leaks or anybody else's. Our very clear position is that we want a renegotiation of START and further efforts and impetus towards disarmament. If that means substantial further reductions in the arsenal of both the United States and Russia, we would welcome that.
Q<272> <Mr. Keetch:> Presumably the situation of the missile defence programme, particularly the siting of radars in the Czech Republic, would look to remove one of the obstacles that possibly was there under the previous Administration. The new Administration seems to be moving in the correct direction on that.
<Bill Rammell:> No, I think that that is a different issue. I know that there are different views. I think that missile defence has some merits. It was interesting when Obama's nominee for the policy Under-Secretary at the Pentagon went before the armed forces hearing. She articulated the view that co-operation with Russia might be a way forward on this issue. The record of what President Obama said shows that he supports ballistic missile defence but would want to ensure that it is developed in a way that is pragmatic and effective and does not divert resources from other national security priorities until it is clear that the technology works. What does all that mean? We will clearly talk to the Americans and work with them. My gut instinct is that they probably will go ahead, but maybe with a slower time frame.
Q<273> <Chairman:> We will come on to John Stanley in a minute with more questions on this. Before we move away from President Obama and the strategic arms reduction proposal, if the Americans and Russians get to 1,000, does that not mean that the several hundred warheads in British, French, Chinese, Israeli, Indian, Pakistani and-question mark-North Korean and Iranian possession will become a big problem? Is there not, therefore, an argument that at least the fellow NATO countries' nuclear warheads should be taken into consideration within the US total, or at least be added in, as part of a negotiation on a wider, strategic agreement?
<Bill Rammell:> I am not going to get drawn into the detail of a front- page newspaper article.
Q<274> <Chairman:> Whether that newspaper article is true or not, the principle of reductions by the Americans and the Russians going ahead to such low levels, without having an impact on other states, is a problem, is it not?
<Bill Rammell:> We have always said that our long-term aim remains to create the conditions where we could establish a nuclear-free world. If substantial, genuine, multilateral progress is really being made, we have made it clear that we would be willing to look at our weapons within those multilateral negotiations.
Q<275> <Chairman:> Given that we have only one system, and that there is a certain minimum number of missiles and warheads that you have to have before it becomes completely ridiculous, there is the question-not to take Mr. Hamilton's line-that at some point, potentially in the foreseeable future, we could move down the road whereby neither Britain nor France have national nuclear weapons systems because the total global stockpiles have been reduced so much.
<Bill Rammell:> I am going to restate what I have already said. We have substantively reduced our arsenals. We want further multilateral reductions. We have made it clear that, in the future, if those multilateral negotiations are genuinely taking place, we would consider involving our weapons as part of them. I am not in a position to commit.
Q<276> <Chairman:> I know that you are not in a position to do that, but I am interested to know what point we are moving to. Potentially, in the next few years, this is a dilemma-a choice-that the British Government will have to confront.
<Bill Rammell:> Our long-term aim remains to create the conditions for a nuclear-free world, and there are all sorts of difficult decisions that we will have to face up to in getting there.
Q<277> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> It comes to this: if your avowed policy, as set out in the document, is successful, then a point will arise at which our weapons will have to be on the table.
<Bill Rammell:> I have made it clear that, in future multilateral negotiations, if the circumstances were right, we would include those weapons as part of those multilateral negotiations.
Q<278> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> The more successful we are, and the quicker we are successful, with this policy, the sooner the British deterrent would have to be a part of the discussion.
<Bill Rammell:> With respect, I will restate what I have said. We have made it abundantly clear that we want a world free of nuclear weapons. We have a very good track record-probably acknowledged to be the best, internationally-in terms of reducing our nuclear arsenals. If there is genuine, multilateral progress, we would consider putting our weapons on the table as part of that.
Q<279> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> I have some sympathy with you on the point that we have been pretty good at getting rid of systems. I just wrote down, "nuclear artillery", "depth charges", "no short-range weapons", "freefall bombs"-the WE177. These are all unilateral actions taken by successive British Governments. In that regard, I think that you are quite right to claim that our record in this matter is a pretty good one.
May I just ask you this last question? You have Kissinger, Shultz, Perry and Nunn on the other side of the Atlantic; you have Hurd, Rifkind, Robertson and Owen on this side-no shrinking violets any of them. This debate is moving on very, very fast, and that critical moment of decision, as you have agreed with my colleague, Mr. Keetch, may come rather more quickly than many of us anticipate. In that case, policy formulation is a matter of urgency, not of leisure.
<Bill Rammell:> Absolutely. And the fact that all those eminent people that you mentioned are putting forward the views that they are, indicates a view that we share-and that I strongly share-that this is a critical and fundamental challenge. One of the original questions, from Mr. Horam, I believe, was whether this has gone off the boil in terms of international opinion and NGOs. Nothing could be further from the reality. We must re-inject urgency into this matter, which is why the NPT review conference next year is so critical. That is one of the reasons why we published the document today. It underlines the huge importance of the issue and is an attempt to engage people in that debate.
Q<280> <Mr. Illsley:> On what Ming said, the article about Obama seeking to cut nuclear warheads has been referred to. Thursday's press carried the headline "Russia ready to shelve missiles plan in conciliatory gesture to Obama". There is no reduction, but a commitment not to deploy more. The point is that there seems to be a consensus breaking out. In the light of what Ming said and with the Americans and others signing up to the initiatives, does our decision on Trident look a little premature? I am not arguing that we should or should not have Trident, but that our decision to renew years before we needed to was a bit premature.
<Bill Rammell:> I desperately hope that the multilateral process works and that we can get to the stage of a world free from nuclear weapons. If we had not taken a decision on Trident, we would have been deciding on unilateral disarmament if the multilateral process does not work. If in 13 or 14 years the multilateral process had not worked, we would have been left with an ineffective and inoperable nuclear deterrent.
Q<281> <Sir John Stanley:> Minister, when you refer to the multilateral process, will you confirm that you are saying that Government policy is that British nuclear weapons will be put on the table in that process only if every other nuclear weapon-holding state-including the French, Americans, Israelis, North Koreans and Iranians-also puts its nuclear weapons on the table at the same time?
<Bill Rammell:> Mariot, do you want to pick up on the context for that?
<Sir John Stanley:> I would like a ministerial answer to my question.
<Bill Rammell:> Okay, I will restate for you what I have said previously. Such negotiations will be detailed and challenging and it is difficult to prescribe in advance how the process will work. However, if there was genuine multilateral progress on disarmament, we would consider putting our nuclear weapons into the mix as part of the negotiations. In advance of such circumstances, it is difficult to go beyond that.
Q<282> <Sir John Stanley:> I am sorry Minister, you have not answered my question. Are you saying that British nuclear weapons go on the table when, and only when, every other nuclear weapon-holding state puts its weapons on the table?
<Bill Rammell:> Multilateral progress and negotiations that will get to the situation where we can eradicate nuclear weapons will require action on all fronts.
Q<283> <Sir John Stanley:> By all fronts do you mean all other nuclear weapon-holding states?
<Bill Rammell:> Yes.
<Chairman:> Can we move on to some questions on ballistic missile defence?
Q<284> <Sir John Stanley:> Minister, I think that you will agree that as far as we and Europe are concerned, the most important arms control agreement was the intermediate nuclear forces agreement in the 1980s, which led to the removal of thousands of nuclear weapons from European soil. You will be aware that the Russians have threatened that if the European component of ballistic missile defence goes ahead, they will repudiate that agreement. You will also be aware that the European deployment constitutes only a very limited protection against Iranian ballistic missiles. There will be 10 interceptors in Poland. I was briefed at the Missile Defence Agency in Washington last week that each warhead requires two interceptors. It was repeatedly stressed that ballistic missile defence represented a net and not a shield. Given those circumstances, why are the British Government so committed to the European component of ballistic missile defence, which they have already made clear through their commitment to carry out the crucial radar upgrading at RAF Fylingdales, when the European deployment will have only a very limited additional defence capability against Iran but could leave Europeans hugely worse off in terms of nuclear weapons deployed against European soil by the Russians?
<Bill Rammell:> First, we need to be clear, as you have underlined, that there are 10 interceptors compared with an arsenal the size of Russia's-the Americans have repeatedly made it clear that is not where it is directed. Secondly, the evidence in 2007 was that the number of non-US ballistic missile launches was 100, which was 30% more than the previous year. There is genuine concern about the spread of capacity in terms of ballistic missiles. I think that the solution to this, to ensure that ballistic missile defence can genuinely help us in defence terms and that it does not lead to the kind of escalation that you are talking about, is the kind of arrangements with the Russians that Michèle Flournoy, the Under-Secretary of Policy at the Pentagon, talked of in terms of US-Russia co-operation. Already there has been a more accommodating response-for want of a better phrase-from the Russians to the comments and views that the Obama Administration have been setting out. There clearly needs to be intense dialogue and discussion, but if we could end up in a situation where there was co-operation between the US and Russians on this issue that would be a positive outcome for both those countries and also for us in Europe.
Q<285> <Sir John Stanley:> Yes, but is it not the case that the Russians have so far been wholly unimpressed and unconvinced? You may say "entirely irrationally" and I would agree with you, but the public posture is that they do not believe the Americans when they are told that the situation does not represent any degradation of their nuclear capability. Given that is the case, surely it can make no sense for those of us in Europe to have a fractional improvement in our defences against Iran at the expense of a very major reduction of our security against Russia?
<Bill Rammell:> I genuinely do not believe that is what it should come to. If you look at the dialogue that has taken place between the US and Russia and the Russia-NATO dialogue, there have been detailed discussions about how you might reassure Russia on this front-maybe, for example, in terms of federating Russian sensors into the overall ballistic missile defence structure. That might be a way forward.
I do not want to overstate things, as I think Barack Obama has enormous hopes-probably too great-resting on his shoulders, but the fact of his election has injected possibilities and new ways forward in a number of different areas. Already, based on what he and his appointees have been saying and the response from Russia, I think the prospects are greater of reaching a situation where those concerns on the part of Russia can be addressed and we can still go forward with a system that would give us some greater defence.
Q<286> <Sir John Stanley:> May I turn to the key element behind ballistic missile defence? As you rightly pointed out, the key issue is the huge proliferation of ballistic missile technology. At the start of your evidence you rightly said that our worst expectations about nuclear proliferation had not occurred, but I think you will agree that our very worst expectations about ballistic missile technology have occurred and we now have 20-plus states with operational ballistic missiles. What is the Government's policy to try to halt the proliferation of ballistic missiles, all of which are potentially able to take conventional, biological, chemical or nuclear warheads? What are the Government going to do to try to reverse the incredibly dangerous large-scale proliferation of ballistic missiles throughout the world? As there is also a terrorist dimension, what are the British Government doing to try to enhance the security given to existing ballistic missile holdings?
<Bill Rammell:> One response is what we have just been talking about, in terms of ballistic missile defence. We also need to work through the relevant international forums, whether it is the missile technology co-operation group-a co-operative arrangement whereby states declare what they are doing and that it can be verified-or another initiative. We need to do more on that front. The issue is about competing priorities, however, and the NPT is an absolute priority, but we need to do more on conventional weapons and I am sure that we will come on to that. It remains a priority for us, but I cannot say that we have automatic solutions on every front to deal with the threats and challenges. One strong reason why we have argued as we have on missile defence, however, is that, potentially, it does give us a defence.
Q<287><Sir John Stanley:> Would you not agree that the proliferation of ballistic missile technology is one of the major cancers in terms of proliferation? Would you also agree that, at the moment, no significant international structures have any prospect of introducing an element of control? Should not that be given far higher priority not only by the British Government but by other Governments? Unless that is gripped, 30-plus countries may have ballistic missiles at their disposal-alongside the serious risk that, sooner or later, some could fall into the hands of terrorist parties.
<Bill Rammell:> First, the missile control regime, of which we are strong supporters, provides a way forward, but arguably it needs strengthening and we are looking into that. The defensive system that we have discussed is also part of the solution, but there is some merit in what you say. We are focused on a range of threats and challenges, and that is a significant one. By telling you that the missile technology control regime needs strengthening, I accept your point that we need to do more in that area.
Q<288> <Mr. Moss:> Minister, may I take you back to your answer to an earlier question, about the international dimension of civil nuclear power? Will you outline to the Committee the operation of the Government's proposed nuclear fuel bond and tell us how it would complement other proposals in the field?
<Bill Rammell:> We have stopped calling it a bond, because there was-
<Mr. Moss:> A financial implication?
<Bill Rammell:> Yes, we felt that there was a financial implication. The commitment to nuclear fuel assurance is absolutely firm, however. It is an attempt to produce a creative response to the worldwide civil nuclear renaissance, and it is about guaranteeing the sourcing and disposal of nuclear fuel, which will bluntly undermine one of the reasons why states seek proliferation. We remain absolutely committed to that, we will take a proposal to the IAEA board of governors later this year, we have engaged with other countries on it, and we will shortly-on 17 and 18 March-host a conference on a range of multinational initiatives to deal with the nuclear fuel cycle. Through the European Union, we are also committed to the nuclear fuel bank, under IAEA auspices, which would create a real fuel bank that countries would be able to access if they experienced fuel shortages for reasons other than proliferation.
I said earlier that there are about 12 different initiatives. I do not have the sense that they are contradictory or competing with each other, but we work actively at ensuring that all those approaches can work. In our view, the nuclear fuel assurance still has real merit and that is why I shall be taking it to the IAEA board.
Q<289> <Mr. Moss:> Is it incompatible with any of the other proposals that you mentioned? I thought you said earlier that there were 13.
<Bill Rammell:> There are 12. I thought that I said 12 earlier.
Q<290> <Mr. Moss:> Okay. Is there a risk with the proliferation of all the different proposals that we will sign up globally to a key component?
<Bill Rammell:> No. You face difficulty in international relations in a number of areas. We are dealing with sovereign states, all of which have their own views and their own determination to find ways forward. That sometimes means that different initiatives come forward from different states or groups of states. I do not perceive at the moment that there is a contradiction between those approaches, but we certainly need to watch the position carefully to ensure that that is not the case.
<Chairman:> Let us be brief on this one, and then we must move to other areas.
<Andrew Mackinlay:> You have not heard from me much.
<Chairman:> No, and that is good.
<Bill Rammell:> I should like to hear from a fellow Essex MP.
Q<291> <Andrew Mackinlay:> On what used to be called the enrichment bond, it would be done commercially, but nation states would have an interest in the commercial aspects because it could mean enormous wealth and power. The Russian Federation first canvassed the idea, so perhaps copyright should go to it. Surely the idea is that, geographically around the world, there would be four or five centres of excellence. If not, what is in your mind's eye? Clearly, everyone could sign up and say that it was a good idea, but the $64,000 or more question concerns where the places are located. There would be potential for enormous wealth generation for the states in which either that facility or facilities are located. There is also a powerful, logical case for it to be in four places around the globe.
<Bill Rammell:> The difference between our nuclear fuel assurance and the nuclear fuel bank is, first, that the first element of guarantee within the nuclear fuel assurance is the market, and the market actually has a good track record of delivering. The second difference is a guarantee on the part of the signed-up states whereby in extremis that support would be provided. I am not ducking the question, but it is also the case that we are working on the detail of the matter through discussion. It will be part of the discussion that takes place at the conference in London in a few weeks' time to take the proposal to the IAEA board. The issue is about getting the maximum number of countries signed up to the principle, so the content and the detail will evolve.
Q<292> <Chairman:> May we now move briefly to the other areas of WMD? In an earlier answer, you touched on the relative importance of chemical and biological weapons, but can I ask you specifically about the chemical weapons convention? There are 184 signatories to the convention, but only 177 national authorities and 126 state parties have informed the central organisation of what they are doing legislatively and only 82 have introduced the key legislation in their national Parliaments, so clearly there is a long way to go to make it universal. What are the Government doing to strengthen the chemical weapons convention and ensure that other countries fully implement it?
<Bill Rammell:> First, we are one of the strongest supporters of the chemical weapons convention and, through all forums and particularly bilaterally, we are urging states to sign up. The recent support from and signing by Iraq, given the history, was a very positive step forward.
In terms of the commitment to eradicate chemical weapons stockpiles by the 2012 deadline, we have been doing a lot financially to support states in achieving that. For example, specifically, with Russia we have committed about £23 million to help develop the necessary facilities for destroying chemical weapons stockpiles. We also, across the board, advise and help states with the legislative requirements necessary for them to comply with the convention.
Q<293> <Chairman:> You have referred to the 2012 deadline-in just three years' time-but it is quite clear that both the United States and Russia are not going to comply with that timetable. What are we doing to deal with that problem?
<Bill Rammell:> There is a risk of self-fulfilling prophecies. Our intention remains that every state should get there by 2012. In respect of the United States and Russia, there is commitment and there has been considerable progress. Russia has reduced by about 25%; I cannot recall the exact figure for the US, but certainly it has made significant progress-there is the sheer quantity for both countries, in terms of the volume. There are difficult issues to overcome in both those countries. For example, setting up chemical weapons destruction facilities in what are both democracies, given the environmental concerns, is a challenge that needs to be overcome. Nevertheless, our strong view remains that we need to get there, and we shall provide whatever support we can-as I said, with Russia we have used £23 million to try and help. I do not want to get into the realms of what happens if in 2012 the deadline has not been achieved, but the end game has to be the eradication of all the stockpiles.
Q<294> <Chairman:> Is there not also a problem in the United States with the presidential veto, and the presidential record in the past? Is that likely to change with the new Administration?
<Bill Rammell:> My instinct is that the Obama Administration will be very strong supporters of the chemical weapons convention.
Q<295> <Chairman:> So, the difficulties that we had with the US under the Bush Administration are likely to be removed?
<Bill Rammell:> With the caveat that support in Congress is required, as well as in the presidency.
Q<296> <Chairman:> Presumably-hopefully-our diplomats in Washington are doing all they can to influence the US, not just the Administration, but also the key players in the Senate and the House of Representatives.
<Bill Rammell:> Certainly.
<Chairman:> Good. Now let us touch on the biological and toxin issues.
Q<297> <Sir John Stanley:> As we know, biological weapons are infinitely more difficult to detect than chemical weapons, which are usually stockpiled, and they have the capacity to cause loss of life on a hugely greater scale than chemical weapons, yet we have a verification regime for the chemical weapons convention but, sadly, none as yet for the biological weapons convention.
We did of course spend seven years negotiating a verification protocol. Sadly, that was torpedoed by the Bush Administration and their arms control Minister, Mr. John Bolton, with whom the Committee had a number of interesting and vigorous exchanges, so we still have no verification regime for this critically important arms control convention. What are the British Government doing to try to establish a verification regime? Should we be going down the route of inspections or of the Canadian alternative of accountability regimes?
<Bill Rammell:> Both have a role to play. In terms of the decisions taken, we have are long-standing supporters of a verification regime. As I said at the beginning about our treaty-based approach, we would want both universality and effective verification regimes.
In terms of the proposals that were put forward, the United States took the view that it did. It was not only the US-China, Libya, India and Pakistan also objected to that approach. Our view remains that in the longer run-or in the short run if we could achieve it-we need a verification tool. However, we should not underestimate the difficulty that because of the dual-use nature of virtually all the know-how, materials and equipment used in biological weapons, getting a verification regime and compliance measures in place is fraught with real intellectual, scientific and political difficulties. Nevertheless, that is what we have to remain focussed on.
The 2011 review will give us an opportunity to make further progress. The fact that since the last review, seven additional states have become party to the convention is progress, as is the fact that the implementation support unit has been created, which gives us further impetus. However, this is a difficult and challenging area-and I am being absolutely straight with you-to establish the kind of verification regime that we want.
Q<298> <Sir John Stanley:> I understand all the difficulties, but I am asking whether the British Government have a policy as opposed to just generalities? Do they have a proposal? What are they rooting for? What type of verification regime are they going for? Do they still want to try to go for inspection, or do they want to go for some of the alternatives that have been offered, such as the Canadian alternative based on accountability?
<Bill Rammell:> Certainly we are in favour of inspection, and we promote that. You asked me specifically what we are doing to try to push this agenda forward. We are supporting financially legislative analysis and assistance to states that do not have comprehensive national implementing measures in place to help them comply with the regime as well.
Inspection has a key role to play. I have set out for you the challenges and the difficulties, which are real but, nevertheless, there is still a determination to find a way through. I hope and believe that we can do that in the foreseeable future. Certainly moving forward to the next review in 2011 has to be a priority.
Q<299> <Sir John Stanley:> Are the British Government considering adding to the arrows in their quiver a policy of name and shame? Should the UK not be doing more to highlight those countries that we believe are holding biological weapons stocks, or researching to try to achieve a biological weapons capability? Should not such countries be pilloried publicly?
<Bill Rammell:> Part of me is instinctively attracted to that proposition. However, given the difficulties and political challenges, ultimately with this kind of issue, if you want states to move with you, you have to provide the right framework to achieve that. I am open to debate, but I am not sure that that approach would get us there sooner than the routes we are pursuing at the moment.
Q<300> <Chairman:> Thank you. Can we move on to the conventional area? The British Government have played the leading role with the arms trade treaty progress so far. However, it has been put to us in evidence that we have received from witnesses that an arms trade treaty, however welcome, could set international standards that are lower than those of current national regimes and some other national agreements. For example, it would make no difference to UK policy on arms sales to countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. It would be weaker than the current Wassenaar agreement. Is that true? If so, does that mean that we would wish to retain our own national criteria and the Wassenaar voluntary arrangements in addition to an arms trade treaty, or would those all be subsumed within such a treaty?
<Bill Rammell:> We have some of the strongest arms export control regimes internationally. What we are seeking to do through the arms trade treaty-you rightly described the leading position that we have taken in driving it forward-is to get the highest standards possible to stop the spread of conventional weapons and the abuse of human rights. We are certainly not looking for the lowest-common-denominator approach.
Let me be clear: there is no intention and no sense in any way, shape or form that we would let the arms trade treaty dilute what we are committed to in our arms export control criteria. However, in taking it forward-and we are making progress-there is a balance to be struck between the strength of the treaty on one hand and, on the other, the number of states willing to sign up to it. Clearly, a key judgment for us will be ensuring that we do not concede too much in negotiations and end up with a universally adopted treaty with very little impact.
That is what we are determined to do. We are not looking for a paper tiger; we are looking for a legally enforceable instrument. That is one of the differences with the Wassenaar arrangement. I am not a critic of the Wassenaar arrangement; in terms of establishing a framework and a forum for sharing information and best practice, it has been positive. However, if we can get a legally enforceable treaty through the ATT, that must be a step forward.
Q<301> <Chairman:> But the Wassenaar arrangement has a quite comprehensive list, whereas it has been put to us that in the so-called seven plus one negotiations, certain things would be excluded. For instance, categories of police and internal security equipment, and other equipment that can be used in human rights violations, would not be covered in an arms trade treaty.
<Bill Rammell:> Given that we have not got to that detailed stage-we are trying to engage people, make progress and get international support-I am not sure how people have reached that conclusion. Our determination is-
<Chairman:> Read the transcript of our evidence session with the people from the UK Working Group on Arms.
<Bill Rammell:> Sure. People can have all sorts of fears and concerns-
<Chairman:> They are experts in the area.
<Bill Rammell> What I am telling you very strongly is that we want as strong a treaty as we can possibly deliver. The fact is that we have strong NGO support from Oxfam, Amnesty International and others for what we are doing. We also have welcome industry support. We have some strong support and some resistance internationally, and we must overcome that.
Q<302> <Chairman:> What about dual-use items? Should they be included in such a treaty?
<Bill Rammell:> Ideally, in our view, yes, but we would need to ensure-this will be part of the detailed negotiations-that we do not frame it so as to choke off legitimate trade. Ideally, yes. We would like dual-use items to be part of it.
Q<303> <Chairman:> And what about the crucial debate about human rights? It perhaps reflects wider international problems with countries that do not wish to discuss human rights issues. Clearly, the European and British approach is much more focused on human rights than that of some countries in the rest of the world. How is that likely to shake out in the end?
<Bill Rammell:> We have made it clear that human rights are part of the rationale for pushing this forward. I do not underestimate the difficulties and challenges, but when I was last at the Foreign Office, back in 2003 or 2004, we launched the proposal and led the way on it, and I think that we are in a stronger position now than we were then.
A significant number of international states have indicated support for the concept. Some states are more reluctant, but in the coming year, work will be undertaken twice in the open-ended working group, and we hope to get to the stage of the UN General Assembly by October or November. In first committee, we would get agreements to a resolution that would set in train negotiations on the treaty during 2010. We are making progress, but there are challenges to be overcome.
Q<304> <Chairman:> One of those challenges is that countries such as Russia and China have abstained, and the position of the United States has not yet changed. Do you envisage any changes in those three countries so that they will be brought on board?
<Bill Rammell:> I choose my words carefully, because if you want people to move, telegraphing that you are convinced that they-
<Chairman:> Take the easy one: talk about President Obama.
<Bill Rammell:> The US did not support the United Nations General Assembly resolution in December but, interestingly and encouragingly, the US delegation took part in the UN Preparatory Committee meeting on 23 January, which I think is a sign that the US remains engaged in discussions. Certainly, we are encouraging their attendance at the forthcoming open-ended working group. There are hopes of movement, but we have to keep working and negotiating.
Q<305> <Chairman:> And are Russia and China still sitting on the sidelines?
<Bill Rammell:> Yes, but I do not think that we are in the position of outright hostility; rather, we are in the position of needing to persuade and convince those states to move.
Q<306> <Chairman:> Is every EU country on board? Are they all pushing in the same direction, or are some dragging their feet?
<Paul Arkwright:> There is an EU common position on the arms trade treaty, which is fully supportive.
Q<307> <Chairman:> I know that there is a common position, but EU common positions sometimes reflect a spectrum of views. Are any of our EU partners not really helping us?
<Paul Arkwright:> No. All our EU partners are helping us, some extremely enthusiastically, if I may put it that way-
Q<308> <Chairman:> Some but not all?
<Paul Arkwright:> Not all have the resources to put behind it, but the French, for example, have been extremely helpful in supporting us.
Q<309> <Chairman:> Are any EU countries with an arms export industry reluctant?
<Paul Arkwright:> Not to my knowledge.
Q<310> <Chairman:> That is helpful.
Finally, you said that you assessed the outcome of the third biennial meeting of states in 2008 as reasonable in regard to small arms and light weapons rather than the arms trade treaty. Do you think that that process will continue, or will it accelerate, because of the changes in the US to which we referred?
<Bill Rammell:> First, there has been progress and, other things being equal, I think that it will continue, with this caveat: I think the Obama Administration is very good news, but they are not going to stop every challenge that we face in the world. However, that instrument is making progress, and it is likely to continue to do so.
Q<311> <Sir John Stanley:> Those of us on this Committee who went to southern Lebanon after the last war, when Israel again invaded, and saw for ourselves the cluster munitions in the fields, on trees, in the bushes, and lying around all over the place after they had been rained down in extraordinary numbers in the 72 hours between the signing of the ceasefire and its coming into effect, were left in no doubt about the terrible danger that they present to the civilian population. We welcome the Government's success with others in getting the Oslo convention against cluster munitions. We might be allowed the say that that success owed something to the Committee's consistent prodding, and indeed to the Arms Export Controls Committee.
Will you clarify the Government's policy on trying to get more widespread adherence to the ban on cluster munitions? On the radio this morning, they talked about cluster munitions being used in Sri Lanka at the moment, so they remain a serious worldwide threat.
Can you explain why you believe that getting a watered-down cluster munitions protocol to the UN convention on certain conventional weapons might undo the gains of the Oslo convention?
<Bill Rammell:> I think that the Committee and the Quadripartite Committee played positive roles. In December, we joined more than 90 countries in signing the convention and, internationally, we have played a leading role. In terms of our own actions, we will ratify as soon as possible. In the meantime we have begun implementing the key provisions and have taken immediate steps to prevent proliferation by making cluster munitions subject to the most stringent trade controls. However, signing the convention is just the beginning. Our aim is a global treaty on munitions, and we are looking to work with international partners to secure principle and practical sign-up and the widest possible adherence to the convention. We will continue to work for meaningful action, including on tackling transfers of weapons under the UN disarmament framework and the convention on certain conventional weapons.
Could you repeat the question about the protocol?
Q<312> <Sir John Stanley:> We would like to understand why the Government do not consider it a risk that going down the UN route to achieve a protocol on cluster munitions within the UN convention on conventional weapons might lead to a seriously watered-down UN protocol, which would seriously undermine what has been achieved in the Oslo convention.
<Bill Rammell:> The protocol is, if you like, a step along the road and a rung up the ladder for those countries that cannot yet sign up to the convention for financial reasons. For a number of states, that is a legitimate concern. In those circumstances, it must be better to get some controls-on exports, for example-rather than none, on major producers. That is what is driving our approach. Ultimately, we want universal adoption, but if we can help some people along the way, it makes sense.
Q<313> <Sir John Stanley:> There seems to us to be a risk that you will undermine the effectiveness of the Oslo convention by going down a halfway-stage route. What are you doing to try to ensure that that watering-down process does not occur? Countries given the option of either signing up to the tougher Oslo convention and having on offer a nice, comfortable, watered-down UN protocol will say, "Oh yes, we'll sign up to the UN one, and forget about Oslo."
<Bill Rammell:> Our track record of supporting the Oslo convention has been very strong.
<Sir John Stanley:> I know. I am thinking about other countries around the world, such as Sri Lanka.
<Bill Rammell:> Absolutely. And in all our bilateral and multilateral contacts, we make it clear that that is a short-term step towards eventual adoption of the Oslo convention. The alternative is that you have a significant number of states that, for financial reasons, cannot get to that signing position. I think, therefore, that it makes sense, as a short-term measure, to get them part way along. However, we continue to argue forcefully that everyone has to get there.
Q<314> <Sir John Stanley:> A "best is the enemy of the good" policy then?
<Bill Rammell:> That is not quite how I would put it, but I understand where you are coming from.
Q<315> <Chairman:> I have one final question about the commitment to clear the mined areas on the Falkland Islands. There was some criticism of the fact that we have asked for another 10 years to do that. Will we meet that 10-year target? More importantly, do you not think that, for whatever reason-it might be understandable-it has damaged our credibility and reputation internationally on such issues?
<Bill Rammell:> No, I do not, objectively. For the record, we remain committed to the Ottawa convention and its aims. Via an extension, we now have until March 2019 to de-mine the Falkland Islands. On any objective analysis, we are among the strongest supporters. For example, through the Department for International Development we are contributing about £10 million per year to humanitarian de-mining activity in the most dangerous and heavily mined developing countries, such as Afghanistan, Angola, Laos and Sri Lanka. Like you, I have visited the Falklands, where there has not been an incident or accident in 25 years resulting from this. We are going ahead. Detailed studies have been undertaken and the contracts are now in place for three de-mining area activities on the Falklands. In Angola, Laos and Sri Lanka, the population say, "For God's sake, do something about this." People risk being injured and killed. I did not meet one person or elected representative on the Falklands who said, given the very clear signage and that everybody knows where they are, that they thought that this was a priority. In fact, Falkland Islanders and representatives have said to me, "Of course, you should be spending it on those other areas."
Q<316> <Chairman:> We understand the argument, and we have had the same conversations with Falkland Islanders, but the problem is the international propaganda argument. If we argue vociferously for a global programme within a certain time scale, but then ask for an extension, other people will be able to use that same argument for less legitimate reasons than those which you have cited.
<Bill Rammell:> First, I misspoke-the contracts are not yet in place, but they will be. There is a plan to put them in place. Secondly, we were not on our own. My memory is that the deadline came up for 18 states this year, 15 of which applied for an extension. All sorts of people will make all sorts of cases, depending on the circumstances, but you have to look at the evidence. Our very strong support for an international mechanism to tackle land mines and our very strong financial support, in putting our money where our mouth is and supporting de-mining activities, means that one cannot credibly-people will advance all sorts of arguments when they are in a tight corner-make a case that this country and this Government are undermining that.
Q<317> <Sir John Stanley:> I am glad to hold up my hand to the fact that, when I was a Minister, I ordered the halting of anti-personnel mine clearances outside Stanley after the Falklands war. After the third bomb-or ordnance-disposal soldier had his legs blown off, I was not prepared to see any more casualties among our servicemen, so I endorse what you have said. The technological difficulties of clearing that one remaining sandy beach, with constant tide changes, and of clearing the boggy area between Stanley and the beach, which is a heavily mined peat bog, without damaging our personnel were insuperable. I think you are entirely right to be extremely cautious and to give first priority to the preservation of life and limb.
<Bill Rammell:> I will simply say that the whole thrust of the Ottawa convention is about saving life, and I do not think that that comes into play in the Falklands.
Q<318> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> Will we meet the 2019 deadline?
<Bill Rammell:> As I said earlier, we remain committed to the Ottawa convention and its aims, and that is what we are working towards.
Q<319> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> When will the contracts be placed?
<Bill Rammell:> I thought that they already had been for the three areas, but my understanding is that it will certainly be in the near future. I will write to you setting that out.
<Chairman:> Mr. Rammell, Mr. Arkwright and Mrs Leslie, thank you very much for coming. We have covered an enormous area, but we might write to you about one or two areas to seek further information. I am grateful to you all. We will now conclude.
Witnesses: Roy Isbister, UK Working Group on Arms, and Dr. Dan Plesch, Director, Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, gave evidence.
Q<137> <Chairman:> This afternoon, we are taking evidence for our inquiry on proliferation and weapons. We are very pleased to see Dr. Dan Plesch and Roy Isbister here for the first session of evidence. Gentlemen, thank you for coming. Can I begin by asking a general question? Dr. Plesch, what lessons can we draw from what has happened in previous decades about arms control and efforts at non-proliferation in the international community and the systems that have been developed?
<Dr. Plesch:> First, thank you very much to the Committee for the invitation. It is a great honour and privilege to be here.
Over the past 15 years, and certainly over the past 40 or 50 years, the world has done far more to control weaponry internationally than at any other point in recorded history. It is easy to lose sight of that when we look at the individual problems of particular agreements, weapons systems and so on. There have been huge achievements. I think particularly of what I would call the golden decade, between the Russian-American intermediate nuclear force treaty in 1987, and the chemical weapons convention and the comprehensive test ban in the mid-1990s a decade later, when almost every variety of weapon was addressed forthrightly in a verified manner and, on some occasions, with lightning speed by the international community after decades of logjam. I think particularly of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe, which had a huge impact and which people such as Robert Cooper would describe as underpinning the development of the European Union. In the end, the political will was found to carry out implementation in a very rapid, dramatic and highly effective manner.
Q<138> <Chairman:> Mr. Isbister, do you wish to add anything?
<Roy Isbister:> I come at it looking at conventional rather than nuclear, biological and chemical weapons but I would second what Dan has said. If you look at that area-the development of national legislation, regional agreements, the beginnings of a move towards an arms trade treaty and work in the small arms field through the programme of action-a lot to has happened in the past 10 years. When you are involved in it day to day, it is easy to get lost in the difficulties but, if you step back and look at the grand scheme of things, there is a lot still to do but a lot that has been done.
Q<139> <Chairman:> The United Nations was talking years ago about an aspiration for general and complete disarmament. Is it realistic to have that kind of level-taking in all categories of weaponry and having a grand scheme-or do we need to take an incremental approach that looks at particular categories and areas, as has happened in some treaties?
<Dr. Plesch:> We need to do both. I think traditionally we have lost sight of the big picture. People in the United Nations and elsewhere did look at the picture as a whole. Now we look at individual pieces and, generally speaking, politicians and interested parties have lost sight of even the achievements that we had. What I have put forward in SCRAPP-strategic concept for the regulation of arms proliferation and production-grew out of a discussion group with a number of international and UK advisers. If you look at how much was done during the period at the end of the cold war-indeed when it was still very difficult, as this was not after the fall of communism-we can see that the question is how can we build on that. Rather than looking at the fragments that we are now left with in the present debate, one can look, from a technical perspective, at doing it very rapidly.
After all, the hard work has mostly been done. The conventional armed forces in Europe treaty engaged all the OSCE countries. Yes, we have had problems with the Russians recently, and with NATO, but those processes have been very well developed, and rather than looking at these agreements as relics that may, or may not, be in need of repair, one should look at them as platforms. On that basis, one could look at getting the job done in the course of a decade. If we have timetables for global warming, and if we think that it is practical to get to grips with the entire climate of the planet, we should also see that it is practical to get to grips with weaponry.
<Roy Isbister:> Again, looking at it from the perspective of the work done on conventional arms, there is a balance to be struck between working on bite-sized chunks and keeping the perspective of the big picture. A lot of discussions take place on conventional arms-perhaps it is not spoken about at the time, but the issue of the relationship between nuclear arms, or the non-conventional arms, and conventional arms is in there somewhere and cannot be ignored.
Q<140> <Chairman:> You have referred to this relationship. Clearly, when we are talking about the dangers of proliferation, and when there are delivery system which are possible for use with both conventional systems and nuclear systems, how much should we concentrate on stopping countries possessing major conventional arms, or should we just concentrate on the dangers of proliferation of those weapons which are the most serious or the most destabilising on the nuclear side?
<Dr. Plesch:> I think that there is a problem overall in having a policy of "Do as we say, not as we do". Proliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin, and one sees all the time in international dialogue that one should not just have, as it were, a proposal implemented by the most powerful. One example is the welcome idea to globalise the intermediate nuclear forces treaty, which we, with a number of other countries, have put forward in Geneva. However, this would, of course, remove the main strategic system from regional powers, which typically rely on ballistic missiles. In Geneva, this is, treated with a certain amount of humour. We are not globalising the US-Russian strategic arms reduction treaty and we are not globalising some other treaty. We are not involving naval forces, which these countries would regard as a threat to them. At the moment, we are just suggesting a weapon that is there-their equivalent of Trident. I would like to pick that up, as I have done in this paper, and say that it is a very good idea to think about globalising some of these key agreements from the Reagan-Gorbachev era, but let us see what more we can do to be more holistic.
The problem with just picking off one area is, of course, that we all know that, for example, nuclear weapons are considered in a conventional and regional security context by most countries. At the other end of the spectrum, we also know, when we are looking at small arms or the arms trade, that countries are looking at major systems and, from the perspective of sustainable development, weapons production and wars involving major conventional weapons are a problem along with small arms.
<Roy Isbister:> From our perspective, there are two different things here. One is the potential harm that the weapon can do, and the other is the harm that weapons are actually doing at the moment. Looking from the conventional weapons side, what we are focussed on is addressing the issue of weapons that are causing harm at the moment. As a rule, we do not talk about stopping countries from getting these kinds of weapons. It is about access based on potential use-looking at things on a case-by-case basis and judging transfers by certain criteria, and deciding whether it is a reasonable transfer or not.
<141> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> I was very attracted by Dr. Plesch's reference to a period when more things were possible than appeared likely. I was trying to think what factors contributed to that: political will, obviously; the cost of keeping up; the relative economic weakness of one of the major parties-Russia. Dr. Plesch may have more factors. How far are those present, or not present, in 2009?
<Dr. Plesch:> Well, we are all looking at the unfolding economic crisis. Of course, one even hears the rhetoric of the 1920s depression, leading to world war. We have to understand, first of all, that the generation that fought and won the second world war regarded comprehensive measures through the United Nations to control conflict as a realist necessity, not as some sort of liberal add-on, and weapons control was critical to that. We are now seeing a period of retrenchment of weapons spending, and there are countries that cannot afford it. You can find yourself in some sense in a re-run of one of the tragedies of the interwar period, in which Britain, France and the United States backed away from disarmament, and German and Japanese social democrats went home disillusioned. They were discredited at home-and we saw what happened-then the British and the French did not have the political will. They did the worst of all worlds: they did not do the arms control-disarmament track, and they did not have the political will to prevent the build-up of the dictators. That would be the worst case that we might follow. Right now, we have the opportunity to get ahead of the game by picking up where we left off in the mid-1990s.
Q<142> <Mr. Purchase:> The Chairman asked whether or not we could realistically do the whole thing, and you remarked a few moments ago that non-proliferation and disarmament were two sides of the same coin. The British Government take the view that non-proliferation is the most urgent priority, and that the disarmament proposals come later. Of course, the British Government have already agreed that we should modernise the nuclear platform. In your mind, there may be some contradictions in the way in which Government policy is being applied. Would you like to comment?
<Dr. Plesch:> I have not seen the full text, but there was a remark attributed to the Secretary of State for Defence, who said in Scotland that we needed our weapons for the long term in respect to terrorism. A colleague of mine was immediately confronted with this at an embassy in Washington by one of our closest allies, saying, "How on earth can we take seriously anything the British Government say about developing a good relationship and about disarmament if they are coming out with this sort of stuff?" I have not read the original-I think it was maybe said in respect of the domestic situation in Scotland-but the more one talks about our needing it indefinitely, the less one has an audience in other states. It is common to say: "Oh, other countries' decisions are not reflected in what we do." That is not the experience one has in talking to people in those states. There is a relationship, for example, between the Indian decision to go formally nuclear, and pressing ahead without them with the nuclear test ban and the non-proliferation treaty, which they saw as needing a real disarmament component.
Q<143> <Mr. Purchase:> You have opened up another question, but given that this whole area has been fraught with contradiction for many years, do you take serious issue with the British Government's view that non-proliferation really is at the top of the agenda? Ideally we would like to do everything all at once, but what can we do in practical terms?
<Dr. Plesch:> In practical terms, getting disarmament, and the world seeing that we are serious ourselves, is the best way to get countries to buy into our objective on proliferation. So I do think they are two sides of the same coin, and that is said very commonly around the world. They should be pursued in parallel: a twin track, to hark back to another era.
Q<144> <Mr. Horam:> On the arms trade treaty, can you answer some of the views of the sceptics about the process? Either one of you will do on this one. The previous US Administration argued that the arms trade treaty would lower the bar, because to get in all the serious exporters of arms, you have to make it less comprehensive. What is being done now by voluntary means will have to be watered down. It will not, in practice, tackle the illicit and irresponsible arms trade transfers, which are half the problem. So, it will not do much good. How do you respond?
<Roy Isbister:> I respond by disagreeing. For a start, if you get the world's largest exporter, the one country that is exporting more than 50% of the arms moving around the world, on side, then you are going a long way to not lowering the bar. It seems like a weirdly circular argument that the US was employing there. You need them on board-
<Mr. Horam:> You mean the US?
<Roy Isbister:> Yes, the US. You need them on board, so that they are pushing for the highest possible standards.
I think that I speak for the entire NGO community-if I may-in that an arms trade treaty without high standards is not worth pursuing. It has to address some of those key issues. That is what we are championing. As I have mentioned, there are now a number of regional agreements, so there are a lot of states that have signed up to certain standards. If we could extend those into the global environment-
Q<145> <Mr. Horam:> How do you see the Wassenaar arrangement in that respect? Is that the sort of thing that you are thinking of when you talk about voluntary and regional agreements?
<Roy Isbister:> The Wassenaar arrangement is a dangerous area to get into with the arms trade treaty, because it is not regarded well by a lot of states. It is seen as a political and excluding instrument-if you are not in, you are out. For regional agreements, there is an obvious sense to that-if you are in a certain region, you are in; if you are not in that region, it is perfectly sensible that you are not involved. So, Wassenaar is seen by a lot of states as politically charged. Wassenaar has a contribution to make in how it responds to technical problems-for example, in developing the military list-but to introduce it to the debate on standards would not be helpful.
Q<146> <Mr. Horam:> Okay. Suppose you get what you are shooting for-a legally binding agreement with high standards. How will you enforce it?
<Roy Isbister:> That is clearly a complex question, and it is sometimes frustrating in that people will look at it in isolation from other international law. You will have all the normal problems and, hopefully, solutions involved in enforcing international law.
Q<147> <Mr. Horam:> You mean sanctions, or what?
<Roy Isbister:> You would need that in the treaty, ultimately. You need to be setting out how it is going to be implemented. That would cover a range of issues, such as record keeping, information sharing, transparency, capacity building, then monitoring the implementation, right down to disputes settlement, and further development of the treaty.
With a lot of the mechanisms used for implementation, it is more useful to look at this in a positive sense. If you had an arms trade treaty-the way we see it at the moment-a lot of states would not be able to implement it, because they do not have the capacity to do so, willing or not. So, you would use the implementation framework of the arms trade treaty to develop people's capacity to improve or develop shared understandings. You would have those difficult cases, but they should be used as a way of developing the case law, so that people understand what an arms trade treaty involves and how they are supposed to live by that.
<Dr. Plesch:> When we look at how we related to central and eastern Europe in developing and exporting standards and norms, a lot of that was voluntary-"You want to be part of a larger club, it makes huge sense for you to get involved." At the other end of the spectrum, we can look at what was done in UN Security Council resolution 1540, on proliferation, where we can talk about mandating national laws in particular areas. What is significant in the bigger picture is the momentum generated by states towards that effort in, historically speaking, an incredibly short time with a huge amount of leadership from the UK. Therefore, yes, there is a good reason to pick up on particular problems and issues, but the central trajectory is very positive, which is starting be focused on.
If I may say so, it is also a question of looking at some key elements-for example, the verification of end-use certificates-to focus on the things that will really matter on the ground.
Q<148> <Mr. Horam:> You mentioned the UK Government. If an arms trade treaty of the kind that you want had already existed, do you think that it would it have made any difference to the UK policy of selling arms to Israel, Saudi Arabia or Indonesia?
<Roy Isbister:> We have issues with a number of the sales that the UK has been involved in. The arms trade treaty, as we conceive it, would have had implications for some of the UK arms sales.
<Dr. Plesch:> In terms of how we would like to see it, yes, it would and it should. However it was cast, you would certainly have more debate on the issues and more pressure then we have at present. If you look at UK policy towards Israel, for example, there is dispute about items going to Israel, but not the sort of platforms that were regularly sent a few decades ago.
Q<149> <Mr. Hamilton:> What would be the best basis for an arms trade treaty? Should it be based on generic categories of weapon or on a comprehensive list? If it were a list, where would you start? Would you use the Wassenaar arrangement list or another kind of list?
<Roy Isbister:> I think that the Wassenaar list is probably not a bad place to start. As I said before, it is a technical list. In a way, it is separate from the political agenda of Wassenaar. A lot of experts, such as licensing officials, have been involved in building it up over years, so it has a very solid technical base. One other factor to take into account is what states do nationally. There are differences around the fringes but there is a lot of common ground over what states currently control nationally. Currently, debates are about narrowing the scope of what states control nationally as things stand.
At the moment, one of the main ideas is called seven plus one, which is the seven categories of the United Nations register of conventional arms, plus small arms and live weapons. I think that it would be a mistake to end up with that. If you look at it historically, the register came out of the end of the cold war, and was intended for the key cold war items. It was seen as a confidence-building measure to address the trade and holdings in those kinds of weapons. Different kinds of military aircraft, vehicles and vessels are not included in the register. Attack or fighter aircraft are in the register, but the support craft are not. Fighting vehicles are included, but not the other vehicles. Those other types of equipment have become critical in the kinds of wars that are currently being fought, so their control is critical. The list needs to have a very broad scope and to include components that would not be included in seven plus one.
Q<150> <Mr. Hamilton:> In other words, a detailed list is far more useful and would be far more effective with an arms trade treaty than the broad categories.
<Roy Isbister:> How it actually ends up working in practice and whether you use a list that is as technically detailed as the Wassenaar list is still up for grabs. It certainly needs to be clear in its comprehensiveness so that it covers the full range of military equipment. Ideally, we would like to see that move into the area of dual-use weapons as well.
Q<151> <Mr. Hamilton:> I was going to move on to that, but perhaps Dr. Plesch would first like to comment on that list.
<Dr. Plesch:> I have two comments on that. First, you have to be aware that the Wassenaar arrangement grew out of COCOM as a cold war device and that there are old memories around that process, although it has proved extremely useful. Secondly, if I may hark back to an earlier part of our discussion, many states-you can already see it in the UN debate-are starting to ask, "Well, will there be no monitoring among those states that hold those weapons as it is just about transfers, and what happens to states that produce their own?" Those lists could be used not only for the reduction, removal and scrapping of weapons, but possibly for the monitoring and verification of holdings as part of a separate process. I do not think that we need to overburden the arms trade process, but if we look at the earlier part of our discussion, we will see that there is a read-over on the work being done in the ATT for concerns about our actual holdings.
Q<152> <Mr. Hamilton:> Mr. Isbister, earlier you touched on dual-use items, but how would you deal with those under an arms trade treaty?
<Roy Isbister:> Ideally, we would like to see dual-use items included, and we would then move on to technical questions about what we would base the list on. The UK has talked about extending into the area of dual-use items by controlling production equipment for producing items on the military list, so that might be an intermediate way forward. Also, we would hope that the arms trade treaty will develop over time and imagine that procedures will be included for review conferences and so on. If that cannot be addressed in the immediate term, it might be addressed further ahead. It is a complex area.
Q<153> <Mr. Hamilton:> Finally, how would you deal with transhipment?
<Roy Isbister:> We argue that all states with jurisdiction over any part of a trade or a transfer should have a say in that. With regard to the scope, it is not just the type of equipment that is important, but the type of transfer, so we would be talking about export and import, transit and brokering, and that would be not only when there is a change in ownership, but when there is a potential change in control. You would also need to cover aspects such as leasing arrangements, gifts and those kinds of things. It needs to be comprehensive in scope with regard to not only the type of equipment, but the type of transfer.
Q<154> <Mr. Purchase:> The whole issue of voluntary agreements is not to be scorned, as valuable work has clearly been done. We hope to see a change soon in the American standpoint on legally enforced agreements, so maybe they will come around a little. In the case of Britain, I recall that the late Alan Clark, when giving evidence to the Trade and Industry Committee, said, "What's the problem? If we don't sell arms, the French will." That was indicative of a culture that existed at the time. How closely is that culture tied to a political viewpoint? If we had another change in the American Government and the British Government, have you any confidence from the work that you do that we could overcome the culture that says, "Comme ci, comme ça: if we don't do it, someone else will."? It seems to me that unless you change the culture seriously, without a legally enforced and properly policed agreement, we will go no further forward than Wassenaar has already taken us.
<Roy Isbister:> That is a very fair point. Part of the process of getting towards an arms trade treaty involves changing the culture from one that says, "If we don't sell arms, someone else will," to one in which we agree on it. At the regional level, using the EU as an example, there has been a change in the EU code, which has just become a legally binding common position. We have seen a shift in attitudes. It is not perfect, so what we are talking about is a work in progress. If it is a work in progress at the level of the EU, it is obviously going to be a slower work in progress at the global level. Nobody that I know thinks that the ATT, once agreed, will be a panacea to the problems of irresponsible arms transfers but it is a critical step on a path to finally coming to grips with it.
Q<155> <Mr. Keetch:> Coming back to dual use, this to me is a minefield, if I may mix my metaphors. A Land Rover can be used as an offensive vehicle if it has someone with an RPG in the back, or it can be used as an SUV. The trouble is that almost anything potentially has a lethal content. Am I right?
<Roy Isbister:> Yes.
Q<156> <Mr. Keetch:> So how do you limit that export? Do you say to Land Rover, "Sorry, we will let you sell long wheelbase Land Rovers but not short wheelbase"? What do you do? How do you make that happen? I can understand with weapons, with aircraft and all of that, but when you come to the dual use argument of limiting exports, if a contractor in my constituency is making parts for Land Rover, for example, why can they not sell that abroad?
<Dr. Plesch:> It also depends who they are selling to and what the end-use certification is. If they are sent directly to a militia group or a corporation working in eastern Congo, your constituents might well think-
Q<157> <Mr. Keetch:> Say, the Israeli Government, for example?
<Dr. Plesch:> In present circumstances, many people would say they should not be selling them.
Q<158> <Mr. Keetch:> But to a Government we have diplomatic relations with?
<Dr. Plesch:> There have been some calls for an arms embargo on Israel.
<Roy Isbister:> You do have to make judgment calls and you will have to draw a line somewhere at some point. On some occasions you would be looking for end-use assurance. Using the example of selling Land Rovers to the Israelis, you would be looking for an end-use assurance. If you included that within your dual-use products you would look for an end-use assurance as to what that was going to be used for. But you might not include that in an ATT on a global scale. You may not be able to go as far in a global context as you can in an EU context, for example. We have to be awake to that. You are trying to put forward something that would be realistic and enforceable. Within the EU, given the capacity and like-mindedness of the states, you can probably achieve more than on a global level.
Q<159> <Andrew Mackinlay:> Either or both of you-is your expertise in weapons? What about materials? Is that an area you can comment on?
<Dr. Plesch:> Materials tend to come into play with weapons of mass destruction production, industrial production and weapon-system production. The Wassenaar arrangement has a long list of these sorts of sensitive technologies. As industrialisation progresses, they become more and more accessible and one of the problems with Wassenaar is that there are a number of significant countries, including Israel, that are not part of it.
Q<160> <Andrew Mackinlay:> So you have traditional arms and weapons of mass destruction and chemical and biological weaponry. Presumably, once you have the template or the brand, a lot of things today can be done under licence-both ordnance and weapons themselves?
<Dr. Plesch:> The short answer is that it depends on the type of system. It is not as easy as anyone might think. It depends on the system. Taking something as simple as an ammunition factory for small arms, while some of the main chemicals are cordite, which is our standard industrial production, if you start looking at detonators and the precursor chemicals with the detonators in the bullet, some of those chemicals are somewhat rarer. So even there attention to detail can take you further than you might think.
<Andrew Mackinlay:> Thank you.
Q<161> <Chairman:> May I return to something that you said, Mr. Isbister? You referred to the European Union having a more rigorous regime than you would get with an arms trade treaty. As I understand it, quite a debate is going on between the EU collective position and some other states on the nature of the ATT. The EU countries-presumably the UK is playing a significant role-want explicit references to issues such as human rights law and international humanitarian law. In your assessment, what will be the outcome of those discussions? Will the treaty be narrowly focused, or will it include wider issues such as humanitarian law?
<Roy Isbister:> If it is a narrowly focused treaty in the way that you have described, it will be a failure. If the protections of human rights and international humanitarian law are not included, it will be a failure. We need those elements. A debate is going on now. The debate on international humanitarian law is easier to win than the human rights debate. In general, more states are comfortable with the international humanitarian law side than with human rights. The open-ended working group of the UN on the ATT will have its first substantive session on 2 March. This is one of the hot topics that will be debated.
<Chairman:> No doubt we will get further information from the Government in due course on the outcome of that.
Q<162> <Mr. Moss:> Can the open-ended working group that is due to start meeting be an effective mechanism for advancing the negotiations on the ATT? Will it help or hinder those negotiations that the consensus approach seems to have been replaced by the overwhelming majority approach, which the US is strongly against?
<Dr. Plesch:> We do not quite know what the US position will be now. Susan Rice is making positive noises. The first technical meeting of the group has taken place and a large number of states attended-getting on for 140 if I remember correctly. The debate about the chair was very useful.
There is a dilemma with the consensus rule. As we mentioned in respect of India and nuclear weapons, if key states are left out, there can be negative unintended consequences. On the other hand, you must ensure that you get momentum. It has been reassuring that the doctrine of the General Assembly principles has more or less been adopted as a means of advancing the process. That at least means that the process cannot be stopped in its tracks for ever because of one state.
<Roy Isbister:> On what has been said about the US, an organisational meeting was held last week. There was a one-dayer to choose the chair and to set the rules of procedure. The debate was left open on whether the group should operate under consensus or majority decision. The General Assembly rules, under which the open-ended working group was convened, are for majority decisions. The US said that it had a preference for consensus. However, it talked about rule 104 of the annexe of something-or-other, which says that in the last resort there can be a majority decision, but that the reservations of states should be recorded. That is an encouraging shift in the US position, which is all to the good.
The open-ended working group should not be considered in isolation. Other things are going on during the course of the year. The open-ended working group is tasked in 2009 with looking at the areas closest to consensus and so will deal with the easy asks or low-hanging fruit of what can be agreed. At the same time, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research will be running a series of regional meetings funded by the EU around the world, getting regional perspectives on the issue. One anticipates that those meetings could be a bit more progressive and faster moving than the open-ended working group and could then feed back into the process. Of course there will be the P5, the G20, all kinds of bilateral discussions, the EU, the Troika meetings and so on, in all of which progress can hopefully be made and fed back into the UN process.
Q<163> <Mr. Moss:> Both of you alluded to a slight shift in the position of the US. Would you like to say more about that? Will you give the Committee an idea of how far the new Administration of President Obama might go on that? Would a major shift in the US position have a knock-on effect on other abstainers, such as China and Russia?
<Roy Isbister:> Dan might know more than I do, but it is very early to say what that shift will be. What Susan Rice has said is encouraging, as is the position in the open-ended working group organisational meeting, and we have seen some encouraging statements on small arms issues from President Obama, so the signs are good. In terms of a knock-on effect, certainly if you have the main exporter falling into line then everybody will have to reassess their relationship to the process. Obviously, some of the other more sceptical states have their own issues that are not US issues, but I think that most of the ones that I am aware of can be addressed.
<Dr. Plesch:> I do not think that anyone should predict too much at this stage. However, in a related area, I noticed that within days the US submitted instruments of ratification for four amendments to the agreement on certain conventional weapons, which had been sitting on hold for a very considerable period of time in the last Administration, and then moved very quickly to deposit those instruments. That says an awful lot about changing the mood in the diplomatic community and among the specialists. If the Administration can get their act together to move that quickly on what one might argue is a very obscure issue for most people and not exactly a high priority, I think that we will get a very high level of determination and professionalism, which we may not always like, and serious engagement with these processes such as we have not seen for at least a decade.
Q<164> <Sandra Osborne:> You sounded optimistic about getting agreement on majority voting. Some of us are just back from the UN in Geneva, where it was clear that many aspects of the negotiations on disarmament and non-proliferation have been talked about every week for years and the conversations never seem to move forward. It was suggested to us by some journalists that the frustration about never getting anywhere resulted in an alternative group on land mines and cluster bombs being set up, and that civil society, rather than the conference itself, had been instrumental in that. What are your views on that? Is the same thing likely to happen with the arms trade treaty?
<Dr. Plesch:> It may. There is a change of climate, but one does not know how long it will last. We have seen this before. For example, the Clinton Administration boded well before they were crippled by the Republican majority in Congress. Clearly, global citizenship-civil society in all its forms-had a huge part to play in the landmines convention. I can recall being in groups discussing the development of work on land mines, and, a few years later, on small arms. The received wisdom was, "This is completely unrealistic: you can't do anything about land mines; don't even try." After land mines, the same thing was said about small arms.
The message I would try to convey is that these measures, particularly the effort on small arms and the ATT, have been carried forward in a very hostile political environment, with the deterioration of relations with the Russians and a poor view of these matters generally in Washington. If we have been able to get that level of progress in these areas over those years, how much more should we be prepared to try to achieve in a better climate? Now, it behoves us not to sit around waiting, but to think about how to maximise this moment, particularly bearing in mind some of the negative economic developments, which will last for some years to come, at a minimum.
<Roy Isbister:> If I can follow up on that looking specifically at the ATT and the progress that we have made in the past four years, if you had asked me this time four years ago where we would be now, I would not have said that we would be this far on. Given that we have made progress and are still making progress, it would be remiss to suggest that we should move outside a UN formula at this stage. The process is still going forward and we are foursquare behind it, and we will continue to support it for as long as we can make progress.
Q<165> <Mr. Horam:> My colleague, Sandra Osborne, was referring to the Conference on Disarmament, where nothing much has happened for 13 years. One of the points made to us in Geneva and Vienna was that the international non-governmental organisations-I am not talking about yours in particular-seem to have switched their attention from the big disarmament issues, perhaps in favour of things like climate change, which has taken over the topical fashion. Some organisations, such as the Conference on Disarmament, would welcome more interest from NGOs and would welcome NGOs in the negotiating chamber, where they are not allowed at present, whereas the human rights organisations do allow them. How do you react to that?
<Dr. Plesch:> There has been a great falling off in public and political interest in arms control and disarmament. After the cold war, people generally thought that the job had been done; they are starting now to realise that it has not been completed and that a job half done is a dangerous place to leave it. We are not in a position to conjure up virtual NGOs, but there is a crying need for much greater public awareness.
I find it odd that you can say anywhere in this country that you are engaged or believe that we should change the world's climate and that that can be done, but if you start talking about world or international disarmament, people look at you as though you are rather strange. Actually, that is very unhistorical because for most of the last century-except when we were actually killing each other-disarmament held central stage in international politics. At the end of the cold war, no one would have predicted, "Well, one thing that will happen afterwards is we'll stop bothering about doing disarmament any more." People would have assumed that we would have the gumption to get on and finish the job.
Q<166> <Mr. Horam:> Is there anything that you would like to add, Mr. Isbister?
<Roy Isbister:> No, not really.
<Mr. Horam:> Yours is a campaign organisation in this field.
<Roy Isbister:> We are not a public campaigning organisation. We are not an Amnesty or an Oxfam, with a large public membership that campaigns, but we do advocate for change.
Q<167> <Mr. Horam:> Do you get funds from the UK Government?
<Roy Isbister:> Yes.
Q<168> <Mr. Horam:> Do you think that that is acceptable? Are you quite happy with that?
<Roy Isbister:> The relationship is constantly evolving in that we set our agenda of change that we would like to see, and then we take that to people who might be willing to fund it. Obviously, the UK Government have their agenda, so we have to keep our integrity and stick to our guns about what we are promoting.
<Chairman:> That is perhaps not the best phrase to use in this context.
Q<169> <Mr. Horam:> Our job is to have a running critique of UK Government policy in this foreign policy area. From your point of view, how should the UK Government handle situations such as financing groups such as yours, or initiatives funded by groups such as yours?
<Roy Isbister:> One of the things that they need to do is to be fully transparent. I am not sure how transparent it is at their end, but there is full transparency at our end. That is the key. With transparency comes accountability. If people want to raise the issue of the way we are working and what we are doing, we are quite happy to engage in that debate. We do not go solely to the UK Government or other Governments; we get money from foundations and we have some private members. We retain our editorial independence.
Q<170> <Mr. Purchase:> Thinking of the EU and NATO dimensions, how do you rate the performance of the EU and its member states in terms of support for the arms trade treaty?
Secondly, given that NATO has in recent years been considerably constrained in saying anything at all about the nuclear question in particular, do you think a change of American Government might cause NATO to reassess its position, break its silence and be a little more forthcoming?
Given that there is a considerable overlap with your membership in NATO and the EU, are they going to be replicating one another's work? Is it a recipe for argument and dissent? Will it have a positive bearing on the negotiations and how big could the EU become in this whole process?
<Dr. Plesch:> Are we just talking about the ATT or can we take it a little broader?
<Mr. Purchase:> You can take it a bit broader but I am looking at the ATT, although I understand that there is a broader dimension.
<Dr. Plesch:> NATO, in a sense, has to rediscover that political arms control dimension.
Q<171> <Mr. Purchase:> Is that the same as backbone?
<Dr. Plesch:> Going back to the '60s, with the Harmel report, NATO decided that it needed to have a political arms control dimension alongside its military arm. Over the past eight or 10 years, that has been very much sidelined, but there is clearly institutional memory. There was a brief moment, with Lloyd Axworthy, when then was a strong push to get NATO moving on a, dare I say, comprehensive approach to arms control and disarmament-you have heard that from me before. For it to look favourably at the arms trade treaty would be useful, but because it deals with trade and NATO is not a trading organisation, there are limits to what it can do in that respect, but more broadly, there is huge scope for NATO to be more active in this area.
It is ironic that, for both institutions, the internal security arrangements that provide a peace dividend for European citizens ensure that these arms agreements are about the only ones that neither the EU or NATO exports as part of either's programmes. That is a significant irony and a gap that we ought to look to fill with the opportunity of new Government.
<Roy Isbister:> On the EU side of things, the EU is behind the arms trade treaty: it has nailed its colours to the ATT mast. It is not unique in that there are other countries and a predominant number of states and other regions who also support an ATT. As I mentioned, the EU is funding a series of regional seminars around the world over the next 15 months to look at this. The problem is that because the EU has a capacity that a lot of other states struggle to match, it is easy for the treaty to be seen as an EU baby. They can be more active in promoting it than can other states without the same capacity, and therein lies the danger: the ATT can be seen as something that has been cooked up by the EU, which is now trying to extend the EU code of conduct, now the common position. That is unfortunate because there are plenty of other states around the world that are showing just as much support for the treaty as the EU is.
On the NATO side of things, with the US being the leader of NATO and given the US position on the arms trade treaty until now, it has been quite a difficult area. I mentioned the political dimension to Wassenaar, but that can be written even larger when you talk about NATO, which some states consider, rightly or wrongly, to be actively threatening. There is a dimension to the NATO component where you have to be careful about having NATO in the lead.
Q<172> <Mr. Purchase:> Colleagues referred earlier to visits to Geneva and Vienna. You will both have a good grasp of what all of these organisations-the UN, NATO, the EU, the OSCE-do. It has become difficult for us to avoid the conclusion that there is considerable overlap and that it is not always clear what the particular duties of these organisations are. I am especially interested in how the EU might develop as a more powerful voice in these negotiations, but I fear at the same that the blurring around the edges and the other voices may undermine that. Do you have a comment to make?
<Dr. Plesch:> I sympathise about the organisations. Things like the Wassenaar arrangement or the Zangger committee sound like airport thrillers. Clearly all these institutions are developed over time. There is some competition between the EU and NATO: you have generations of officials engaged in EU-NATO dialogue who are playing out a ritual, much as we used to with the Warsaw Pact in some ways.
We have to ask: are we better off? Which ones do we want to get rid of? Top of the list might be the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe but I think it is one of the more critical bodies, the Cinderella of the European institutions, which could do with more enforcement. I do not think that in the course of this discussion we can get into picking them off.
When we developed the first EU code of conduct in the early 1990s and we talked to Labour in opposition and to other parties here it was a pipedream. Then it was, "Oh well, it does not matter because it will not be binding." Now here we are and it has got finally to the level of being legally binding. It is easy to be impatient-I am impatient-but if you look at the trajectory over the past 20 years or so, you see it is quite unprecedented.
<Mr. Purchase:> At any time, we would have expected to see Harry Lime appear again in Vienna.
<Chairman:> Okay. We will not go there. I will just bring Ming in quickly and then we have to move on.
Q<173> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> I think what you last said owes a great deal to the efforts of Robin Cook.
<Dr. Plesch:> Yes, indeed.
Q<174> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> Can I take you back to the NATO question? In the past 10 years, or since the break up of the Warsaw pact, NATO's emphasis has been on enlargement. Along with that has gone the question of capability and persuading new members to maintain capability and to add to it. It may be that that function of NATO has inevitably stood in the way of disarmament. On the face of it, it would be inconsistent to say that we want to increase the capability of NATO, but at the same time we want a process of disarmament.
<Dr. Plesch:> As you might expect, to some degree I entirely agree with that. In some specialist areas, such as the management of munitions stockpiles and destruction of munitions, where NATO has played an effective role and the US has as well-the Bush Administration did a number of useful things in this area, and we should not forget that. But yes, as I alluded to earlier, there is a huge problem globally in that Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community did not export the arms control and security confidence building measures that brought peace to the continent and enabled a huge peace dividend. We have not exported them either through the EU or through NATO. If we are talking about the sustainable development agenda, one key way to do that is to export these things.
There was some talk, for example, during Malcolm Rifkind's time at the Foreign Office and by the first Bush Administration, of having an OSCE for the middle east and taking these processes into the middle east. In the present climate we need to see a renewal of that. We have a programme of annual conferences at my centre on this with people from the region. We are starting to see a better climate.
<Chairman:> We have to move quickly to two other areas and then conclude this session, because we have another witness waiting.
Q<175> <Mr. Hamilton:> Can I move us to the illicit trade in small arms and the UN programme of action, which, as we know, is a non-legally binding informal political agreement? Do either of you have a view on whether the move towards an arms trade treaty has in some way put the programme of action on the back burner? How do you see the relationship between the two?
<Roy Isbister:> I do not think that it has put that on the back burner. I think that the process itself almost put it on the back burner. Going up to the review conference in 2006, which effectively ended in failure, I do not think it had anything to do with the arms trade treaty. It was resurrected in 2008 with the last Biennial Meeting of States, which produced an outcome document that was more tightly focused on the implementation of existing ideas. The arms transfer component was only one part of the programme of action. One of the key issues for discussion in 2008 was stockpile security. A lot of work was done to develop the idea of good stockpile security and how states can assist others to get hold of their stockpiles.
We are now in a better position with the programme of action than we were a couple of years ago. I think there was a period when there was confusion among states wondering whether if they had an ATT, it meant that they did not need a POA, or asking why they needed an ATT when they were looking at a POA. Obviously, the POA is about only small arms, whereas the ATT is about conventional arms-there is quite a difference between them. I think that we have now separated the two and are comfortable that both can move forward. There is still a lot of value to be had from the programme of action.
Q<176> <Mr. Hamilton:> You mentioned the Biennial Meeting of States that took place last year. The Government said that there was a reasonable outcome to that meeting. Would you agree?
<Roy Isbister:> Yes.
Q<177><Mr. Hamilton:> Do you think, therefore, that non-legally binding political processes, such as the programme of action, have had their day, or is the future purely in a statutory treaty such as the arms trade treaty? Can we have both? Are they mutually compatible?
<Roy Isbister:> Yes, I think it is horses for courses. There is a real need for an arms trade treaty to be legally binding-to have some teeth-so that there is the possibility of enforcement. The programme of action is more about getting a large number of states to improve the small arms environment in their own countries. I would have to look at this in more detail, but I think that, in many ways, a political commitment is an appropriate way forward. A broad and expansive programme of action allows states to pick and choose where they need to prioritise and what they need to focus on. I think it would be unreasonable to say to a state with little capacity, "Bang, you are legally obliged to do all of this stuff, regardless of how relevant it is to your circumstances."
Q<178> <Mr. Hamilton:> Given what you said about the political nature of the programme of action, what difference do you think President Obama will make?
<Roy Isbister:> It is too early to say. The US has done a lot on the small arms issue, but its priority has been on bilateral action and it has tended to be dismissive of the programme of action as a big international talking shop where nothing gets done. I think that there is a lot of validity to that criticism, which is why the BMS last year focused on just a few key issues with the idea that there has to be a move to implementation, rather than just a rhetorical agreement.
Q<179> <Chairman:> Is there any prospect of action on the question of brokering at an international level and action against people who operate internationally outside of the role of national Governments, or is there no consensus on that?
<Roy Isbister:> On the small arms side of things, the BMS recommended to states that they implemented the recommendations of the group of governmental experts on brokering, which include putting national legislation in place to control the activities of brokers. The vast majority of states still have no controls, but all states have made a political commitment to do that. That is one area that would be positive.
In terms of looking at the arms trade treaty stream, we see an arms trade treaty as covering brokering. Such an ATT would mean that states would be legally obliged to control the activities of their brokers for all conventional arms.
Q<180> <Sandra Osborne:> Taking you back to the mine ban treaty and the convention on cluster munitions, what is your assessment of the value of the convention on certain conventional weapons process? Is it becoming marginalised? What do you think of the UK Government's proposal for a new protocol under the convention on certain conventional weapons?
<Dr. Plesch:> I shall say a couple of things before handing over to Roy. First, I think it is a very useful forum, particularly as a safety net if we see science producing unexpected new types of weapons. You can bring up something like that in the forum. Secondly, in terms of momentum, I would say that it was encouraging to see the Obama Administration immediately putting down these instruments of ratification to amendments. However, you have to be wary of there being moves for some sort of watered-down version of the agreement on cluster munitions coming from that.
<Roy Isbister:> Yes, just to back that up, I think it would be a crying shame if the CCW introduced its own instrument on cluster munitions that could be in competition with what has already been agreed in the Oslo process. That would give recalcitrant states the opportunity to say "Well, the cluster munitions treaty does not apply here; we are following the terms of the CCW." The chances of the CCW producing something that could compete with the cluster munitions treaty would be pretty low, so I would be very nervous about that.
Q<181> <Sandra Osborne:> Do you think that they would have been better to stay in the UN process in the first place, rather than going for an alternative process?
<Dr. Plesch:> Given the political circumstances, no. I do not think that we have to be an absolute prisoner of those processes, and they will, in the fullness of time, come back into them. You were also asking about the landmine ban. Did you want to follow up on that?
Q<182> <Sandra Osborne:> I wanted to ask about the failure of the UK Government to de-mine in the Falkland Islands. What is your take on that? What are the implications, and does it undermine the landmine ban?
<Dr. Plesch:> As a director of the HALO Trust-I am not speaking for HALO but I should declare an interest-I think that HALO would love to have the ability to go and do that job and that it has the ideas to do it. I think that some of our diplomats in Geneva feel slightly embarrassed about the lack of compliance. More broadly, there is a concern in HALO that, in these UN processes, there is a danger, which we saw in Kosovo, of declaring an area mine-free too rapidly when, in fact, it is not. Similarly, there is a danger of having bureaucratic processes that do not get the mines out of the ground so that people can get back to farming, which is really the nitty-gritty of what de-mining is all about.
Q<183> <Sandra Osborne:> Yes, but the Falkland Islands Government are not particularly keen to have the area de-mined. How much account do you think that the UK Government should take of that?
<Dr. Plesch:> They certainly should take account of it. They also have to take account of their international legal obligations and allow other states, to put it crudely, to make fun of them for going on about these issues without having cleaned up their own back yard-some people say, "It should not be your back yard." I know my colleagues at HALO would be very keen to do the job and probably could do it moderately effectively, to put it at a minimum.
<Roy Isbister:> There is a difficult clearance issue. You raised the point of what the locals were saying. It is also, from an environmental point of view, quite a complicated job-there is possible environmental damage there. However, we would hope that the UK would lead by example, so it is more than just a case of being made fun of. The UK had 10 years, did nothing, and then asked for a 10-year extension. There should be at least something about the steps they will begin to take to address this, even if that for the long term. It is easy to imagine other states looking at the situation and saying, "Well, okay, if this is good enough for the UK then it is good enough for us."
<Chairman:> Thank you very much for coming, Mr. Isbister and Dr. Plesch. It has been a very useful session.
Examination of Witness
Witness: Mr. David Hayes, Chairman, Export Group for Aerospace and Defence, gave evidence.
<Chairman:> Mr. Hayes, you heard the previous witnesses, so that should reassure you. We will not ask you the same questions that they were asked-perhaps just one or two. Thank you for coming along and giving your organisation's perspective. For the record, introduce yourself and say what you do.
<Mr. Hayes:> I am David Hayes, a director of David Hayes Export Controls and chairman of the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence.
Q<184> <Chairman:> You are known to at least some of us through the Committees on Arms Export Controls, which used to be known as the Quad. Can we start with some questions about the nature of the arms trade treaty? In the previous session we touched on whether the treaty would lower the bar of countering proliferation because it would be so weak and general. What is your view?
<Mr. Hayes:> Industry is generally supportive of the ATT. We do not see it as lowering the bar. If you look at the continuum of export control systems in terms of their efficiency, we see the case more as raising the bar at the lower end of the continuum and bringing those countries with rudimentary export control systems, or no such systems to speak of, up to a higher level, without detracting from the higher level export control systems that already exist.
Q<185> <Chairman:> Speaking on behalf of the manufacturers and exporters, you are in favour of a treaty?
<Mr. Hayes:> Yes.
Q<186> <Chairman:> Any treaty, or one with tight and enforceable rules?
<Mr. Hayes:> To be credible, the treaty needs to be enforceable. The tightness of rules is important, because a loose treaty would achieve little more than to bring export controls into disrepute. Coupled with that, the use of existing, established definitions from the export control world, which are already clearly understood concepts in a lot of the countries involved, would make it easier for industry to comply. Yes, industry is supportive of the treaty, but at the same time we have to keep an eye on the proliferation of controls, and the cost associated with having several different systems.
Q<187> <Chairman:> What about dual use systems, which we also touched on earlier? Do you have a view?
<Mr. Hayes:> Yes. Dual use is an important area. There are legal competency issues, as we found in the progress towards the US-UK defence trade co-operation treaty. The UK cannot itself negotiate a treaty on dual use items, because that is an EU legal competence. At the same time, as industry, we are concerned that, at least on a prime facie basis, there are severe problems with dual use compliance. A lot of the prosecutions that are taking place are focused on the arms industry. A lot of the publicity is focused on the defence industry. We see the occasional prosecution on dual use, which is welcome, but at the same time we are concerned that, for an industry that is generally accepted to account for 2% of gross domestic product, it does seem peculiar that the defence industry accounts for more than 60% of export licence applications.
Q<188> <Chairman:> But that might be because of the type of things you are selling.
<Mr. Hayes:> If you look at the control list and at the breadth and scope of the dual use list, it seems inconceivable that an industry that accounts for 2% of GDP can account for 60% of export licences. It is particularly worrying when we are being told that one of the biggest security threats facing us is a non-state actor using something like a dirty bomb. Most of the ingredients for a dirty bomb are controlled on the dual use list, not the military list. It prompts the question, why is the focus apparently so much on the military list?
Q<189> <Mr. Purchase:> Carrying on with the subject of the dual use list, I looked at the applications approved in the first six months of this year for Israel. Trying to understand how we might control that better is truly bewildering. It occurs to me that trying to define what can and cannot be dual use is an impossible task. What we could do is determine that we should not export to certain countries that are involved in any kind of internal or external conflict. That is already our position, but so much of this stuff still appears to find its way to end users who were never intended to get it.
<Mr. Hayes:> It depends what you mean by "end user". There are probably a lot of apparent exports to Israel that are not actually for end use by the Israeli defence forces. Israel is a major exporter of defence equipment, and you will probably find that the ultimate end user of the final piece of equipment could be anywhere around the world, including our own Ministry of Defence.
<Mr. Purchase:> Exactly.
<Sir Menzies Campbell:> That makes my colleague's point.
Q<190> <Chairman:> We had a discussion with the Minister Ian Pearson a few days ago, and it was quite clear that the Government are going to look at these matters with some urgency. Have you as manufacturers and employers in the area had any recent discussions with the Government about definitions and how difficult it is to get them?
<Mr. Hayes:> Are we talking about definitions of pieces of equipment or of what is an end user?
<Chairman:> Both.
<Mr. Hayes:> Discussions about definitions go on all the time, but I am not aware of any particular discussions going on around the end user, although we have previously expressed the view to the Committees on Arms Export Control that perhaps there should be some way of identifying within the annual report which exports are in fact for incorporation and onward export or incorporation and return, rather than end use in the apparent country of export.
Q<191> <Chairman:> That would cover things such as microchips and liquid crystal display units that might then be incorporated in some other system which was then sent back or forwarded on to another country.
<Mr. Hayes:> Absolutely, but I would not underestimate the difficulty of doing that.
Q<192> <Mr. Horam:> Would you enlarge a little bit on the area we have been skirting round-enforcement? When we put that question to the people who preceded you-Dr. Plesch and so forth-they seemed to say that it is extremely difficult, but if you get an ATT, you will get other countries complying to a degree, you will get a momentum going, and you may be able to build capacity in various organisations in different countries. Is that your answer, too, or do you see this area as inherently so difficult that it is almost impossible to monitor and police? You talked about dirty bombs from a terrorist organisation-that is where it ends up. Who can do anything about that?
<Mr. Hayes:> It helps to try. I do not regard it as impossible, but there will be differing degrees of commitment and success, just as there are in any other area of enforcement. Presumably, countries will continue to use current resources to police export controls or normal border activity-predominantly the customs service. They will decide what level of priority they attach to policing the arms trade treaty within their other operational priorities such as anti-drugs interdiction and general anti-smuggling activities.
Q<193> <Mr. Horam:> Do you think that what has been called the "global civil society"-a rather pompous term, but you know what I mean: the NGOs and so forth-has a role to play in getting this up in front of public opinion and getting some effective action?
<Mr. Hayes:> Again, it will vary from country to country. Logically, I would expect civil society and NGOs to have a greater impact in countries with more open democracy than in those which lack that.
Q<194> <Mr. Horam:> That is where the problem is, of course.
<Mr. Hayes:> Yes.
Q<195> <Mr. Hamilton:> Talking of more open countries, in your view are the new US Administration more likely to move in support of an arms trade treaty? Have you had any discussions with your counterparts in the USA?
<Mr. Hayes:> I have, but I have to revert to my NGO colleague's previous answer that it is just too early to say.
Q<196> <Mr. Hamilton:> You have called on the UK Government to expand their outreach activities in support of the arms trade treaty in other countries. How much co-operation has there been between your group, similar groups in other countries and the UK Government themselves? Can you give us any specific examples?
<Mr. Hayes:> Yes, we have meetings with our own Government and we have had contact with similar groups in other countries. Generally speaking, UK industry is willing to support this activity by talking either to other Governments or to industry in other countries. At the same time, we are mindful of the fact that we do not want to create the impression that this is a purely UK or EU initiative.
Q<197> <Mr. Hamilton:> Do you have any future plans for greater co-operation?
<Mr. Hayes:> Not specifically, no. However, we are prepared to help with the outreach activity to any extent that a Government think is useful.
Q<198> <Mr. Hamilton:> Are you confident that there will be an arms trade treaty in the near future?
<Mr. Hayes:> Yes, the momentum is such that a form of treaty will be agreed.
Q<199> <Mr. Hamilton:> Would you like to give a time scale on that?
<Mr. Hayes:> No, thank you.
<Mr. Hamilton:> Understood.
Q<200> <Chairman:> If there was such a treaty, do you think it would have made any difference to current UK policy on selling arms to particular countries?
<Mr. Hayes:> Probably very little. There is an EU embargo of sorts against China, for example. Yet if you look at the UK statistics, most of the export licence refusals for military equipment in relation to China have been made under the EU consolidated criteria, not under the arms embargo. If an arms trade treaty were in existence today, probably the preponderance of licence refusals would still be made under the consolidated criteria, not under the treaty.
Q<201> <Chairman:> What about countries such as Israel, which we have touched on, or Saudi Arabia, where we sell quite a lot of arms? Do you think that the arms trade treaty would have influenced that?
<Mr. Hayes:> It is hard to say until we have an approved treaty and we see what the terms are. Fundamentally, we see the concept as being one of raising the bar at the lower end of the continuum of export control systems, rather than adding another layer on top of systems that are already fairly rigorous. I would not think, therefore, that an arms trade treaty would make a significant difference in that area.
Q<202> <Chairman:> To summarise, then, and correct me if I have got this wrong, you are saying that the UK already has a rigorous system of controls on arms exports?
<Mr. Hayes:> Yes.
Q<203> <Chairman:> The arms trade treaty will raise the international standard to somewhere below that level, but higher than it is currently in the world as a whole?
<Mr. Hayes:> Yes.
Q<204> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> In response to an earlier answer, you said that you had spoken to your American equivalents. Did they share the same constructive attitude towards the treaty that you have described other members as having?
<Mr. Hayes:> As you would expect, some do and some do not. You cannot draw a logical distinction between them and say that one end of the political spectrum is more in favour or that certain sectors of industry are more in favour. It boils down to the individual preference of the person to whom you are speaking. As and when the political climate in the US changes and the new Administration give a lead in one direction or another, I would expect to see a shift in what might be called corporate positions on the arms trade treaty. I do not expect to see it until that point.
Q<205> <Sir Menzies Campbell:> Do you think that they are waiting to see which way to jump?
<Mr. Hayes:> Yes.
Q<206> <Chairman:> May I take you back to some questions that were touched on earlier on the programme of action on small arms and light weapons? Do you have any view on whether the discussions on an arms trade treaty have influenced that process? Has your organisation had a role in engaging with that process?
<Mr. Hayes:> Our organisations have very little engagement with that process when compared with the arms trade treaty. Again, I echo Roy Isbister's comments on business. I can see the two running in parallel, because the arms trade treaty has a much broader potential scope than the other activity.
Q<207> <Chairman:> Within that programme, there is a so-called international instrument to enable states to identify and trace illicit small arms and light weapons in a timely and reliable manner. In other words, it is an international tracing instrument. Has that had an impact on the UK defence industry?
<Mr. Hayes:> Not really, because the UK already identifies and marks weapons. That is enforced rigorously, so I would not expect such a requirement to have any impact on the UK industry.
Q<208> <Chairman:> Do you have a view on the issue of brokering, which we have touched on?
<Mr. Hayes:> Brokering is a complex area. As you know, UK legislation on brokering is, among other things, under review. It almost becomes an issue of brokering controls versus export controls. If we lived in an ideal world where every country had an efficient, rigorous, well-enforced export control system, there would be no need for brokering controls by definition, because nearly every act of brokering is also an export or an import somewhere. If those systems were working correctly, there would be no need for brokering controls. It could almost be said that the need for brokering controls is a measure of the failure of export controls. Should we be looking to plug the gaps in other countries' export control systems by exercising extraterritorial control over activities that are difficult to police or should the focus be on bringing other nations' export control systems up to speed, so that the need for brokering controls is reduced?
There is little or no consensus around the world on what constitutes an act of brokering or what is controlled by brokering. The American definition of brokering under the international traffic in arms regulations is completely different from the UK definition of brokering under the Export Control Act 2002. The Germans do not control everything on the German military list for brokering purposes; they control only a subset of it. You end up with a proliferation of different control regimes, which could be absolutely horrendous for a global company.
Q<209> <Chairman:> Is that not an argument for stronger international institutions and regimes, rather a reason to say that it is too complicated and that we cannot do anything about it?
<Mr. Hayes:> That is the argument that I am making, but the argument I am making is for stronger regimes for export controls, as distinct from brokering controls.
Q<210> <Mr. Hamilton:> There has been some discussion about ATT and whether dual-use items would have been exported to Israel. You said yourself earlier that a lot of the dual-use items that may be exported to Israel are exported back to the United Kingdom and other countries as finished products. What is your view of an arms trade treaty? As well as raising the bar internationally towards the kind of standards that we have in the UK, surely it is not aimed at democratic and open countries such as Israel, but at those countries with oppressive regimes that might be using those weapons against their own people. Is that not one of its purposes?
<Mr. Hayes:> Yes.
<Mr. Hamilton:> Thank you.
<Chairman:> We do not have time now to go into a discussion of Gaza and all the other things-
<Mr. Hamilton:> No, I just wanted to make the point about democratic and oppressive regimes.
Q<211> <Chairman:> All right. Can I finally raise the issue of the cluster munitions and the land mines treaty? What is your assessment of that issue?
<Mr. Hayes:> They have both been successful in different ways, but at the same time, they have thrown up some unexpected problems for industry. For example, I am aware of an issue where a company ran into difficulties demonstrating its mine clearance equipment because of the restrictions of the anti-personnel landmine convention.
Q<212> <Chairman:> They could not actually export a landmine in order to show it in practice?
<Mr. Hayes:> Exactly.
<Chairman:> That is interesting. Perhaps you could send us a note on that. Mr Hayes, thank you very much for coming. It has been very valuable as a complement to what we heard in the previous session; it will be extremely helpful to us as we do our report. Thank you very much.
<Mr. Hayes:> We appreciate the opportunity.
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