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Back to Proliferation in Parliament, Spring 2009
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North) (Lab): What his most recent estimate is of the cost of the replacement of the Trident nuclear warhead system.
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Hutton): We published our initial estimate of the costs for the possible refurbishment or replacement of the warhead for our future nuclear deterrent capability in the December 2006 nuclear White Paper. This is in the range of £2 billion to £3 billion at 2006-07 prices. We have not yet made a decision to develop a new UK nuclear warhead. However, work is being undertaken to inform decisions, likely to be taken in the next Parliament, on whether and how we might need to refurbish or replace our current warhead.
Jeremy Corbyn: Will the Secretary of State assure the House that there will be no expenditure on developing a new warhead without the specific approval of the House of Commons, and that he is satisfied that the development of a whole new warhead system is legal within the terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which comes up for review in 2010?
Mr. Hutton: Yes, I believe that it certainly would be within the framework of the non-proliferation treaty. The NPT did not require unilateral disarmament on the part of the United Kingdom, and we are able to maintain very properly within the terms of the NPT our minimum nuclear deterrent; and, yes, I believe that there should be a vote in this House before such a decision was taken.
Mr. Mark Harper (Forest of Dean) (Con): The opposition of the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) to this policy is well known. The Secretary of State has made it very clear that renewing our current system is within the terms of the NPT, and that we are able to do that. He, like us, supports a multilateral disarmament approach. Can he give the House any idea about the time scales, not only for the development of the submarines, but about how well they are meshed in with the development of the warhead system?
Mr. Hutton: We have made it clear that we believe that the replacements for the Vanguard class submarines would be needed for 2024. An extensive time is needed to design, construct, build, test and operate the new submarines, which potentially will be very capable, and I think that that will take us up to 2024. As I said in my answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn), a decision to renew the warhead will have to be taken by the House of Commons during
30 Mar 2009 : Column 652
the next Parliament. I believe that the programme that we set out in the 2006
White Paper is coherent and joined up.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090330/debtext/90330-0003.htm#0903308000019
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the objectives are of the Threat Reduction Division at the Atomic Weapons Establishment; and how many staff are employed in this division.
Mr. Quentin Davies: The Threat Reduction Division at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) currently employs some 140 staff, drawing on expertise as necessary from other parts of the AWE workforce to support its tasking objectives. The Threat Reduction Division supports four work-streams:
Nuclear Treaty Verification (including arms control verification research and support to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation).
Nuclear Accident Response.
Counter Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism.
Nuclear Intelligence.
29 Apr 2009 : Column 1286W
The detailed tasks and objectives within the four work-streams are being withheld
as their release would, or would be likely to, prejudice national security.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090429/text/90429w0001.htm#09042951000008
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a) scientists, (b) engineers and (c) technicians the Atomic Weapons Establishment plans to recruit in the next five years; and what their areas of expertise will be.
Mr. Quentin Davies: Based on current contract assumptions and subject
to any change in priorities, AWE plc is planning to recruit in the order of
110 scientists, 160 engineers and 180 technicians over the next five years.
The areas of expertise are diverse, and will include computer, measurement and
material science; decommissioning and waste management; facility design and
operations; manufacturing; systems engineering; project management; assurance,
and IT/telecommunications.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090428/text/90428w0002.htm#09042850000014
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether (a) public-private partnership and (b) private finance initiative arrangements may be put in place under the AWE Aldermaston management contract.
Mr. Quentin Davies: There are no plans to put in place public-private
partnership or private finance initiative arrangements under the Ministry of
Defence's contract for the management and operation of the Atomic Weapons Establishment.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090420/text/90420w0017.htm#09042111000040
The Minister for Employment Relations and Postal Affairs (Mr. Pat McFadden): My noble Friend the Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform has made the following statement.
We are announcing today the commencement of a sale process to dispose of 100 per cent. of UKAEA Ltd (offers will also be accepted for a partial offer), the commercial operations of the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). The process will take the form of two stages, an initial stage which will allow bidders access to an information memorandum document written by Greenhill & Co and will request first round bids. Following this, a second stage, will allow a smaller number of interested parties access to detailed due diligence and put forward a further more detailed bid. It is the intention for HMG to complete the transaction prior to the summer recess.
The sale is the next step in the development of the commercial business of UKAEA Ltd, which was first approved by Ministers in 2005. The sale is recognition of the work done by management in creating a commercially viable enterprise that has become an important repository of key nuclear skills that will help ensure that the UK will remain at the forefront of the nuclear services industry.
UKAEA Ltd principally undertakes nuclear decommissioning work under contract for NDA owned sites in the UK (Dounreay and Harwell/Winfrith). The business also has a fledgling consulting services business within the nuclear decommissioning sector under which it operates tier 2 and tier 3 smaller scale contracts for both the NDA and other owners.
The principal site of operation for UKAEA Ltd is Dounreay, located in the north-east of Scotland. The business also contains a pensions administration business which administers the pensions of several nuclear industry public sector operators.
The business plan of UKAEA Ltd aims to grow revenues by principally growing the consulting services provided by the business. Within the UK and internationally there are a significant number of “old” nuclear facilities for which decommissioning services will be required.
UKAEA Ltd’s key decommissioning site Dounreay will be competed in the next two years Government would like UKAEA Ltd to be in a position to enter the competition with clarity and stability over the business’s ownership.
This
sale underlines the importance attached to the clean up of nuclear waste. It
will increase efficiency, competition and value for money for the taxpayer in
the decommissioning and clean up work of old nuclear power stations. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090330/wmstext/90330m0001.htm#09033010000011
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer to the hon. Member for Portsmouth South of 18 December 2008, Official Report, column 964W, on AWE Aldermaston, if he will place in the Library a copy of any Preliminary Safety Report prepared by the Directorate of Major Projects when it has been completed at AWE Aldermaston for the proposed Enriched Uranium Facility and Hydrodynamics Facility at AWE Aldermaston which has been provided to the Health and Safety Executive.
Mr. Quentin Davies: Neither of these documents currently exist. They
will be assessed for placement in the Library of the House if and when they
are produced.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090330/text/90330w0014.htm#09033026000034
Norman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many UK personnel have visited the Nevada test site in each year since 2002; and what the (a) dates and (b) purposes were of each joint UK/US experiment undertaken at the Nevada test site since January 2002.
Mr. Quentin Davies: The total number of UK personnel visiting the Nevada test site under the auspices of the joint United Kingdom/United States Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) is provided in the following table.
| Number | |
These figures include personnel making more than one visit in any given year.
Two specific sub-critical plutonium experiments were conducted in 2002 and 2006, the purpose of which was to gather scientific data essential for the maintenance and reliability of both US and UK nuclear weapons without having to conduct underground nuclear tests. The increased activity in 2005 coincides with preparations for the second of these experiments.
The increased activity in 2008 reflects a number of unrelated visits associated with stockpile maintenance activities and a specific classified project relating to nuclear counter-terrorism, details of which I am withholding in the interests of national security.
In
addition to these visits, a number of other non-MDA related visits will have
taken place. Statistics covering these visits are not centrally held and could
be provided only at disproportionate cost.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090330/text/90330w0015.htm#09033026000051
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 22 January 2009, Official Report, column 1668W, on AWE Burghfield: nuclear weapons, what internationally recognised standards and codes of practice are applicable.
Mr. Quentin Davies: A wide range of internationally recognised standards and codes of practice are pertinent to the proposed main process facility for the assembly and disassembly of nuclear warheads at AWE Burghfield. Those that are most relevant to the resilience to nuclear accidents are in the following table.
Typical standards relating to facility integrity are in the following table.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 27 February 2009, Official Report, column 1150W, on nuclear weapons, how much was spent on the visits in each year; and how much was paid for by the Government in each year.
Mr. Hutton: Information on the precise costs is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost. However, I am able to provide the average cost of UK attendance at the Joint Working Group meetings held in the US between 2001 and 2008; costs range from an average of £4,800 per meeting in 2001 to an average of £6,000 per meeting in 2008. All these costs are either directly or indirectly incurred by the UK Government.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) how the costs of co-operation with the United States on nuclear weapons technology are shared under the co-operation terms of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement;
(2) what the (a) total combined costs and (b) costs to the Government of co-operation with the United States on nuclear weapons technology have been in each of the last 30 years under the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement.
Mr. Hutton: Co-operation on experiments and trials conducted under the auspices of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, are generally undertaken on a “costs lie where they fall” basis. There are some exceptions to this, such as material and equipment procured to support national requirements or under bartering arrangements. The UK has also contributed to the funding of collaborative trials in the US which support the UK's strategic weapon programme.
Additionally, having judged it cost-effective to do so, MOD has recently entered into a collaborative arrangement which requires the UK to contribute financially to activities at the US National Ignition Facility (NIF) that support the UK programme. This extends the previously announced investment at the NIF to $64 million.
Neither the total combined costs, nor costs to the UK of our collaboration
with the United States under the Mutual Defence Agreement are readily available
and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090325/text/90325w0017.htm#09032563000048
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer to the hon. Member for Lewes of 26 June 2008, Official Report, column 337W, on AWE Burghfield: planning permission, on what dates he expects to submit planning applications for the proposed Enriched Uranium Facility and Hydrodynamics Facility at AWE Aldermaston to the local planning authority.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The latest forecast date for the submission of the
planning application for the proposed replacement Uranium Handling Facility
is the fourth quarter of 2009. The date for the proposed Hydrodynamics Facility
is mid-2010.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090324/text/90324w0020.htm#09032470000112
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the United Kingdom has ever provided tritium for the United States nuclear weapons programme.
Mr. Hutton: The Government set in hand in their 1998 Strategic Defence Review a process of declassification and historical accounting of defence fissile material production since the start of the United Kingdom’s defence nuclear programme in the 1940s. In 2000 they produced a report dealing with plutonium. In that report an explanation was given of the bartering arrangements provided for in the UK/US Mutual Defence Agreement under which the UK received 6.7 kg of tritium from the US between 1960 and 1979 in exchange for plutonium.
I am withholding further information on the movement of tritium or other fissile
material between the United Kingdom and the United States in the interests of
national security.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090324/text/90324w0022.htm#09032470000118
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence in which years since 1990 experiments have been carried out with the United States on US warhead designs and nuclear weapons technology.
Mr. Hutton: Research, including trials, and experiments, is conducted on a regular basis, by the Atomic Weapons Establishment as part of its responsibility for maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the UK nuclear stockpile in the absence of live testing. Some of this research, is undertaken in collaboration with the United States under the auspices of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement.
Following publication of the 2006 White Paper, “The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent” (Cmd 6994) and the subsequent exchange of letters bAWE Burghfield: Planning Permissionetween Prime Minister Blair and President George W. Bush in December 2006, additional research is currently being undertaken, some in collaboration with the US,
23 Mar 2009 : Column 18W
on how we may need to refurbish or replace our current warheads to help inform decisions, likely to be made in the next parliament.
I am withholding the detail of this collaboration in the interests of national
security.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090323/text/90323w0004.htm#09032312000050
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the date was of each meeting of each sub-group of each Joint Working Group since 2001; and what the purpose was of each meeting.
Mr. Hutton: I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him on 27 February
2009, Official Report, column 1149W. In the interests of national security I
am withholding further information on the nature or extent of work undertaken
by these Joint Working Groups.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090323/text/90323w0004.htm#09032312000046
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer to the hon. Member for Lewes of 3 November 2008, Official Report, column 71W, on USA: military alliances, on what date and at which location the next Stocktake meeting between the Government and the US administration under the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement will take place.
Mr. Quentin Davies: Arrangements have not been finalised but it is intended
that the next Stocktake meeting will take place in early June in the UK.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090320/text/90320w0003.htm#09032041000042
Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will place in the Library a copy of the new operational annex added to the United Kingdom-United States mutual defence agreement on atomic energy matters 1958.
Mr. Hutton: No new operational annex has been added to the United Kingdom-United States Mutual Defence Agreement. I refer the hon. Member to the
16 Mar 2009 : Column 833W
answer I gave on 2 March 2009, Official Report, column 1370W, to the hon. Member
for North Devon (Nick Harvey)
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090316/text/90316w0005.htm#09031619000064
Lynne Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the source is of the funding for the joint US/UK warhead research taking place at the Atomic Weapons Establishment Aldermaston.
Mr. Hutton: The Atomic Weapons Establishment undertakes research to
ensure the continued safety, security, and performance of the United Kingdom's
nuclear stockpile. Additionally, it is currently assisting the Ministry of Defence
in reviewing the optimum life of the existing warhead stockpile and analysing
the range of replacement options that might be available. This work, some of
which is being undertaken with the United States under the 1958 Mutual Defence
Agreement, will inform decisions likely to be necessary in the next Parliament
on the need to refurbish or replace the current warhead. The funding for this
work is met by the UK Defence budget.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090310/text/90310w0007.htm#090310125000048
Questions Asked by Lord Astor of Hever
To ask Her Majesty's Government who decided not to disclose the terms on which British Nuclear Fuels Ltd agreed on 17 December 2008 to sell its one-third share in the management company of the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston, to Jacobs Engineering Group of Pasadena, California.
To ask Her Majesty's Government what considerations
led to their decision not to disclose the terms on which British Nuclear Fuels
Ltd agreed on 17 December 2008 to sell its one-third share in
3 Mar 2009 : Column WA131
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether any independent professional advice was taken as to the agreement by which British Nuclear Fuels Ltd sold its one-third share in the management company of the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston, to Jacobs Engineering Group of Pasadena, California; and, if so, by whom such advice was provided. [HL770]
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform & Cabinet Office (Baroness Vadera): The decision on the form of the announcement was taken by the Board of BNFL, having consulted with the shareholder executive and the MoD.
As is common, with transactions of this nature, it was a term of the Jacobs proposal that the price and other commercially sensitive terms remained confidential. The Jacobs proposal was materially superior to the other proposal received.
The board of BNFL was
advised in relation to the disposal by NM Rothschild and Freshfields.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/
ldhansrd/text/90303w0001.htm#09030337000509
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) whether the Mutual Defence Agreement 2004 has been amended to enable co-operation on the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme;
(2) whether the Mutual Defence Agreement 2004 has been amended to enable the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston to (a) undertake and (b) host work on the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme;
(3) whether the Mutual Defence Agreement 2004 has been amended in order to (a) give the United Kingdom access to information on the use of control technologies and (b) enable the United Kingdom to participate in the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme.
Mr. Hutton: No. While the duration of the Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) was extended by another 10 years (to 2014) in 2004, no extension to its scope was made then or since. In my reply to an earlier question by the hon. Member on 4 November 2008, Official Report, column 308W, I confirmed that following the exchange of letters between the then Prime Minister and the then US President in December 2006, enhanced collaborations are taking place between the United Kingdom and the United States under the MDA in support of the UK’s nuclear stockpile stewardship programme and which contribute to the ongoing review of warhead options announced in the 2006 White Paper—“The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent (CMD 6994)”.
I am withholding the information about the detailed nature of these enhanced collaboration, in the interests of national security.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether staff at the Atomic Weapons Establishment Aldermaston follow similar concept design, development and production processes as in laboratories in the United States.
Mr. Hutton: There are a number of similarities in approach between the
Atomic Weapons Establishment and their counterparts in the United States national
laboratories. These include the management of research, the assessment of technology
readiness, and the fundamentals of science-based stockpile stewardship in the
absence of underground nuclear tests. However, our warheads are based on a wholly
UK design and differ from US warheads in a number of areas.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090302/text/90302w0037.htm#09030250000152
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether British personnel were involved in the design competition for the Reliable Replacement Warhead.
Mr. Hutton: No.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether British personnel were involved in the design competition for the Reliable Replacement Warhead.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether British personnel were briefed on the results of the Reliable Replacement Warhead design competition.
Mr. Hutton: Officials from the Ministry of Defence and the Atomic Weapons Establishment regularly discuss a range of nuclear matters with their US counterparts under the auspices of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement. I am withholding information about the detail of these discussions in the interests of national security.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the date was of each meeting of the Joint Working Group since 2001; and what the purpose of each meeting was.
Mr. Hutton: The following Joint Working Groups (JOWOGS) operate under the auspices of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement:
| Joint working group | Title |
Since January 2001 the following number of JOWOG and JOWOG—related meetings have taken place:
| Meetings in the US | Meetings in the UK | Total number of meetings | |
I am withholding further detail of the content of JOWOG discussions in the interests of national security.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what visits have been made by (a) US personnel to Aldermaston and (b) Aldermaston personnel to (i) Los Alamos, (ii) Sandia and (iii) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories in each year since 2003; and what the purpose of each of those visits was. [258427]
Mr. Hutton: The total number of visits by Atomic Weapons Establishment personnel to each of the US national laboratories and vice versa in support of all aspects of work covered by the Mutual Defence Agreement (including the Polaris Sales Agreement—as amended for Trident), is as follows:
| To Los Alamos | From Los Alamos | |
| To Sandia | From Sandia | |
| To Lawrence Livermore | From Lawrence Livermore | |
These figures include personnel making more than one visit, and visits to several sites during a single trip.
I am withholding further detail of the purpose of these visits in the interests of national security.
Nick
Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether
scientists from the United States have made use of hydrodynamic facilities at
the Atomic Weapons Establishment for experiments on US warhead designs.
Mr.
Hutton: Under the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, joint
UK/US hydrodynamic experiments have been carried out to ensure the continued
safety, security, and performance of our current nuclear stockpiles.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090227/text/90227w0011.htm#09022737000121
John Hemming: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the Orion laser is capable of (a) developing the nuclear warheads for the new generation of nuclear submarines and (b) producing warheads compatible with future US-designed missiles.
Mr. Quentin Davies: In the nuclear test ban era, laser physics is one of the principal areas of research essential to underwrite the safety and reliability of the UK's nuclear warhead stockpile. High-powered lasers enable the replication in the laboratory of the physical conditions present in a nuclear detonation on a minute scale, over a tiny fraction of a second.
The Atomic Weapons Establishment's HELEN laser has been operating for over 25 years and is now reaching the end of its technically useful working life. Its replacement, Orion, will enable us to continue to underwrite the safety and reliability of the Trident stockpile through the remainder of its service life.
There is currently no programme to develop a new UK warhead, although decisions are likely to be necessary in the next Parliament.
Whilst not specifically designed for the purpose, the Orion laser could have
utility in any research employing laser physics in support of any possible future
warhead design.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090212/text/90212w0008.htm#09021318000006
Mr. Drew: To ask the Minister of State, Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform when the decision was taken to transfer RWE Aldermaston to Jacobs.
Ian Pearson: After consultation between BERR (then DTI) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the decision to undertake the process of selling the British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) one-third stake in AWE Management Limited (AWEML) was taken at the end of June 2007 and was announced to Parliament on 16 July 2007, Official Report, column 1WS, before the process commenced.
AWEML is the consortium of BNFL, Serco and Lockheed Martin) that has the 25-year contract with the MOD to manage and operate the Atomic Weapons Establishment on MOD's behalf. The Government have not transferred or sold any of its stake in the Atomic Weapons Establishment itself, which remains entirely owned by the MOD and in which UK sovereignty remains protected.
It became clear during the summer of 2008 that the bid from Jacobs Engineering
Group was the most attractive and the decision to accept that bid was agreed
by BERR Ministers on 25 September 2008 subject to finalisation of various contractual
matters. The contract confirming the deal was finally signed by BNFL and Jacobs
on 17 December 2008.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090212/text/90212w0038.htm#09021354000223
Mr. Flello: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the value was of his Department's contracts held with SERCO in each of the last five financial years. [Official Report, 27 March 2009, Vol. 490, c. 6MC.]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The value of contracts with SERCO Group PLC, in terms of spend, in each of the last five financial years was as follows:
| £ million | |
The figures are shown exclusive of VAT rounded to the nearest million. They
exclude any contracts placed by MOD Trading Funds or by British Defence staff
(Washington) and low-value purchase transactions, for which records are not
held centrally.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090210/text/90210w0020.htm#09021074000016
Question Asked by Lord Astor of Hever
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the full terms on which British Nuclear Fuels Ltd agreed on 17 December 2008 to sell its one-third share in the management company of the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston, to Jacobs Engineering Group of Pasadena, California, were considered and approved by HM Treasury. [HL769]
The Financial Services Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Myners): HM Treasury were involved in the development of BNFL’s strategy. This strategy involved transferring the management of decommissioning sites to NDA appointed contractors through competitive processes, ceasing to carry out any non-commercial activities and seeking to realise value from other assets including the sale of the BNFL stake in the management company for the Atomic Weapons Establishment.
Implementation of the sale of the AWE stake was led by BERR and approved by
BERR's Secretary of State and accounting officer. Treasury officials provided
advice on the interpretation of rules relating to parliamentary notification
as covered in Managing Public Money. (ISBN 9780115601262).
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/
ldhansrd/text/90202w0001.htm#09020211000370
Question Asked by Lord Astor of Hever
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they retain full ownership and control of all the assets of the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston, notwithstanding the appointment of a consortium company to manage the establishment; and, if so, (a) in whom that ownership and control is vested; and (b) in what documents their working arrangements with that management company are set out. [HL771]
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Taylor of Bolton): The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) operates under Government-owned contractor operated arrangements. AWE has been contractorised since 1993. The UK Government have retained full ownership and control of all AWE assets, vested in the Secretary of State for Defence.
The management and operation of AWE have been contracted to AWE Management Limited (AWEML) since 1 April 2000. Day-to-day operations are undertaken by a separate company, AWE plc, which is owned by AWEML and has its own board of directors with no AWEML parent company affiliations. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) holds a special share in AWE plc, which would allow intervention in the management of AWE or the transfer of responsibility to another contractor if that became necessary.
The AWE contract is managed by the Directorate Strategic Weapons (DSW) in the Defence Equipment and Support area of the MoD. DSW works with a wide range of stakeholders in the MoD and other government departments.
The primary document that
defines the relationship between the MoD and AWEML is the contract between the
parties. This requires the MoD to be consulted in respect of any changes to
the composition of AWEML. Such consultation took place in respect of the recent
changes in ownership of AWEML, which has no bearing on the ownership and control
of AWE assets. Strategic requirements and the UK deterrent programme are set
by the UK Government. UK nuclear forces will remain fully operationally independent;
decision-making and the use of the system remains entirely sovereign to the
UK.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldhansrd/
text/90126w0001.htm#09012623000375
Mr. David Anderson: To ask the Minister of State, Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform for what reason the Government decided to sell the remaining portion of its stake in AWE Aldermaston; and what sum it received from the sale.
Mr. McFadden: The Government have not sold any of their stake in the Atomic Weapons Establishment itself. All Atomic Weapons Establishment sites and assets remain in Government ownership, as they have done since the Atomic Weapons Establishment was first contractorised in 1993. What happened on 17 December was that BNFL reached agreement to sell its one-third share in AWE Management Limited (AWEML) to Jacobs Engineering Group subject to clearance under EU merger control requirements. AWEML is the consortium of BNFL, Serco and Lockheed Martin that has the 25 year contract with MOD to manage and operate the Atomic Weapons Establishment on MOD's behalf. The sale of the one-third share arose as a result of the dismantling of BNFL and the terms remain confidential between the parties.
Further details of the sale and the nature of AWEML’s relationship with AWE
plc are given in the written statements that I gave to the House on 12 January
this year, Official Report, column 1WS and my right hon. Friend, the previous
Secretary of State gave to the House on 16 July 2007, Official Report, column
1WS, respectively.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090120/text/90120w0016.htm#09012069000007
The Minister for Employment Relations and Postal Affairs (Mr. Pat McFadden): Further to the previous Secretary of State’s announcement on 16 July 2007, Official Report,column 1WS, regarding the planned sale by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) of its one third stake in Atomic Weapons Establishment Management Ltd (AWEML), I can confirm that agreement was reached on 17 December 2008 to sell the one third stake to a UK subsidiary of the Jacobs Engineering Group, subject to clearance under EU merger control requirements. The terms of the deal remain commercially sensitive.
Jacobs is already working as a key strategic partner to AWEML and their acquisition of BNFL’s one-third stake followed a competitive process conducted by BNFL in close consultation with the BERR and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). HMG is satisfied that the sale of BNFL’s one third stake to Jacobs achieves the dual objective of maximising shareholder return from the stake while ensuring that a strong AWEML consortium is in place under Government owned contractor operated arrangements to manage the enduring performance of AWEML’s subsidiary, AWE plc, which is responsible for the day-to-day operation of AWE itself and for meeting the requirements of the customer, the MOD. The MOD is satisfied that Jacobs meets the relevant security requirements.
Strategic requirements and the UK deterrent programme are set by the UK Government.
UK nuclear forces will remain fully operationally independent; decision-making
and the use of the system remains entirely sovereign to the UK. All AWE sites
and assets remain in Government ownership, as they have done since AWE was first
contractorised in 1993. The MOD continues to hold a special share in AWE plc,
which would allow the MOD to assume control of AWE plc, should that become necessary.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090112/wmstext/90112m0001.htm#0901123000007
Tom Brake: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) how many Airwave handsets issued to the Nuclear Accident Response Organisation have been lost in each year since their introduction; and how many handsets issued to the organisation have been disabled by the service provider through (a) loss, (b) breakage and (c) other reasons in each such year;
(2) how many Airwave handsets issued to (a) the Ministry of Defence
Police and (b) the Ministry of Defence Guard Service have been lost
in each year since their introduction; and how many handsets issued to each
service have been disabled by the service
12 Jan 2009 : Column 107W
provider through (i) loss, (ii) breakage and (iii) other reasons in each such year; [246182]
(3) how many Airwave handsets issued to armed forces units based on the UK mainland have been lost in each year since their introduction; and how many handsets issued to UK-based forces have been disabled by the service provider through (a) loss, (b) breakage and (c) other reasons in each such year.
12 Jan 2009 : Column 108WMr. Bob Ainsworth: No Airwave handsets have been lost by the Nuclear Accident Response Organisation.
The number of Airwave handsets reported as lost by the Ministry of Defence Police, the Ministry of Defence Guard Service and armed forces units based on the UK mainland is as follows:
| 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | |||||
| Lost | Recovered | Lost | Recovered | Lost | Recovered | Lost | Recovered | |
|
Ministry of Defence Police |
8 |
5 |
14 |
7 |
33 |
26 |
18 |
15 |
|
Ministry of Defence Guard Service |
— |
— |
0 |
n/a |
3 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
|
Armed Forces |
5 |
4 |
2 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
15 |
6 |
| n/a = Not applicable. Note: MGS received Airwave Radios in 2006. |
||||||||
Airwave handsets are disabled within one hour of being reported lost.
Records of airwave handsets reported damaged or with technical failures are
not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost. All
repairable handsets are not disabled but are repaired and reconfigured for use.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/
cm090112/text/90112w0023.htm#09011234000072
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