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Statement by Ambassador Ian Soutar, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the Plenary meeting of the CD, CD/PV.800, Thursday 30 July
Extracts
[T]he present British Government announced when it came to power that it would carry out a Strategic Defence Review. The outcome of that Review was announced on 8 July. The resulting White Paper and its supporting essays can be obtained from Her Majesty's Stationery Office or read on the Internet (www.mod.uk). I do not therefore propose to summarize all aspects of the Review, but I would like to stress that consideration of how best to carry forward the Government's commitment to the global elimination of nuclear weapons was a key aspect of it. ...p> Before I turn to the specific actions which the United Kingdom is taking as a result of the Strategic Defence Review, I should like to set the role of the smaller nuclear-weapon States like ourselves in the wider context of the actions many different States will need to take if we are to achieve our common goal.
Clearly, a vital contribution to this goal is made by all those States which have undertaken obligations not to acquire nuclear weapons be becoming non-nuclear-weapon States party to the [NPT]... We recognise and acknowledge the enormous contribution made by those States towards facilitating the world's journey along the road to global elimination. ... And I welcome in this context the recent accession by Brazil to the NPT.
But vital as the contribution of non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT is to the achievement of our goal, there are two other categories of State which will also have to make major contributions if it is to be achieved. I refer of course to the five nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT and to the three non-parties to the NPT with significant unsafeguarded facilities, namely India, Israel and Pakistan.
As far as these non-parties are concerned, the United Kingdom continues to hope that one day they will take the steps necessary to become non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT. We have made this very clear through our co-sponsorship of the Middle East resolution adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and by our support for United Nations Security Council resolution 1172. But we are not naive. We recognise that the three countries have spent 30 years refusing to adhere to the NPT, because, as things stand, they do not believe that renouncing the nuclear option would be in their interests.
In these circumstances we shall continue our efforts to persuade these countries that in the meantime it is still very much in their interests to become parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and to participate constructively in negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, And of course...we shall continue to work hard to bring about both a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle east and a sustained bilateral dialogue on all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan. Movement on these subjects by these non-parties to the NOT is clearly essential if we are to achieve our goal.
As to the five nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT, all five clearly have a role to play in movement towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons. But, equally clearly, there is, fir the time being, a big distinction between the two largest nuclear-weapon States...and the three smaller nuclear-weapon States... What are their respective responsibilities in the march towards elimination?
An enormous responsibility lies upon the shoulders of the two largest nuclear-weapon States. Fortunately, it is a responsibility they have not shirked. Over the last 10 years they have concluded agreements and taken unilateral actions which have vastly reduced the number of their deployed nuclear weapons - and they have begun dismantling their non-deployed nuclear weapons. But this welcome momentum needs to be sustained - initially by ratification of the START II Treaty and its Protocol and of the associated ATBM-related agreements, and then by the subsequent opening and early conclusion on the START III Treaty, to which both parties are committed.
In emphasizing the heavy responsibilities of the larger nuclear-weapon States, I do not mean in any way to diminish the burden of responsibility that also falls on the smaller nuclear-weapon States. Their role on the path to global elimination is, first of all, not to become large nuclear-weapon States, and, secondly, to accept that in due course they will need to join the larger nuclear-weapon States in negotiations about their nuclear weapons. ...
I said a moment ago that one of the major responsibilities of a smaller nuclear-weapon State is not to become a large nuclear-weapon State. The United Kingdom is more than fulfilling this requirement. A decade ago, in addition to operating our force of four Polaris submarines, we were involved in operating land-based nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery, and we had a significant number of free-fall nuclear bombs in service with our air force.
Since then...we have been becoming a steadily smaller nuclear-weapon State. Some years ago now we withdrew from any involvement with land-based nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery systems. Subsequently, we decided that we no longer needed to retain a maritime tactical nuclear-weapons capability. And in March of this year we withdrew from service the last of our free-fall nuclear bombs. These developments mean that we now have only one nuclear system in operation. And the Strategic Defence Review took a careful look at this system.
As a result of the Review, the British Government has decided that: overall, the United Kingdom will maintain fewer than 200 operationally available warheads (compared with the previously announced ceiling of 300); a Trident submarine on deterrent patrol will carry only 48 warheads (compared with the previously announced ceiling of 96 warheads on each submarine); only one of our four Trident submarines will be on deterrent patrol at any one time; and this submarine's missiles will not be targeted and will routinely be at a "notice to fire" measured in days (rather than the few minutes' quick-reaction alert sustained throughout the Cold War).
These announcements reflect the British Government's recognition that there have been dramatic improvements for the better in the strategic landscape of Europe - and we hope that these announcements will further reinforce these very welcome improvements. For 50 years in Europe we have operated in a world where the dominant concepts have been nuclear deterrence against each other and conventional defence against each other. Moving towards a new world of mutual cooperation with one another and joint partnership with one another is not easy. The steps we have taken are intended to give this process a further push, and thus to bring us all closer to achieving the global elimination of nuclear weapons.
The British Government has already made it quite clear that, when satisfied with progress towards this goal, it will ensure that our remaining nuclear weapons are included in multilateral negotiations. As a result of the Strategic Defence Review we now intend to prepare ourselves more fully for that day by setting in hand a programme to develop a core of expertise in the United Kingdom on how to verify the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. We have made significant contributions in the past to the arrangements for verifying nuclear materials and prohibitions on nuclear testing. We intend this new programme to put us in a position to contribute in the reductions and elimination area as well. It is a tangible sign of our real commitment to the global elimination of nuclear weapons.
As a result of the Strategic Defence Review, we have also taken other tangible steps. If we are to achieve the goal of global elimination, it will be necessary, sooner or later, for all States which have had nuclear programmes outside safeguards to account for the fissile material they have produced in the past. As a result of the Strategic Defence Review we have therefore begun a process aimed at providing such an account. In addition, it will be necessary for such States to be transparent about their existing holdings of fissile material. As a contribution to this process the Strategic Defence Review concluded that we should for the first time declare our defence stocks of such material.
On the date of the announcement of the Review they comprised 7.6 tons of plutonium and 21.9 tons of highly-enriched uranium. we already published information about our holdings of civil plutonium, and we intend in future to publish similar information about our civil holdings of highly-enriched uranium.
But we are not merely setting a new standard for transparency in relation to these materials. Our civil holdings of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium re already under...EURATOM safeguards and liable to inspection by [the] IAEA. We are now taking steps to put these same safeguards arrangements 4.4 of the 7.6 tons of plutonium currently in our unsafeguarded defence stocks - in other words, more than 50% of it. We have also made it clear that, while we will retain our right to withdraw material from safeguards for national security reasons, such withdrawals will, as a matter of policy, be limited to small quantities of materials not suitable for explosive purposes - and the details will be made public. All this is further evidence of our intention to help push forward towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons.
So far as the further production of these materials is concerned, we made clear in April 1995 that we had ceased producing them for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. At that time all our facilities for enriching uranium were already under inspection both by EURATOM and by [the] IAEA. Most of our operations to reprocess plutonium were also under EURATOM inspection, and liable to inspection by [the] IAEA - but those involving spent fuel from our tritium-producing reactors were not. As a result of the Strategic Defence Review, however, we have now decided that the reprocessing of this fuel too should be under EURATOM inspection and liable to inspection by [the] IAEA. This means that henceforward all planned reprocessing and enrichment operations in the United Kingdom will take place under international safeguards. The United Kingdom has therefore gone a long way to meeting what will undoubtedly be one of the main verification requirements of a fissile material cut-off treaty.
There could be no clearer demonstration of my Government's commitment to such a treaty. I should like to stress yet again why it is so important. First, there can be no final achievement of the global elimination if nuclear weapons without verification arrangements on all reprocessing and enrichment facilities - so by putting these in place, an FMCT will also put in place an essential foundation for the eventual achievement of nuclear disarmament. Second, such a treaty will put a verified end to production of unsafeguarded fissile material by all those States which are still legally free to produce more of it - and some of which still are producing more of it, or are likely to do so in the absence of an FMCT. We reiterate our strong support for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of such negotiations in accordance with the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein. ... I must also put in a plea for all those States which have not yet done so to ratify the [CTBT]...
The United Kingdom has never made any secret of the fact that we do not believe the global elimination of nuclear weapons will be achieved solely by action in the nuclear sphere. Progress towards nuclear weapons elimination will be greatly facilitated by improving political relationships between key States. That is why the United Kingdom lays great emphasis on the importance of exploiting to the full the opportunities for cooperation and partnership in Europe offered by the recent established NATO-Russia Joint Permanent Council, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the partnership for Peace, as well as by longer-established bodies like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe. I am glad to say that a major theme of the Strategic Defence Review is the importance of using defence assets to bolster diplomatic efforts of this sort - a process it terms "defence diplomacy."
It is also apparent to us that progress towards nuclear elimination will also be greatly facilitated by parallel progress in other areas. I am sure that no one in this room will be in any doubt about the importance we attach to the successful conclusion of the negotiations in another forum for a protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - and to universal adherence and compliance with that Convention. We also attach great importance to universal adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention - and to compliance with it. The Strategic Defence Review has further reinforced our support for these important instruments.
As we approach our goal we shall also have to think more about arrangements for controlling conventional weapons and for strengthening collective security arrangements. In the meantime we hope all States will make the returns needed to make the United nations Arms Register effective - and will also remain open to ways of further refining and developing it. Progress on limiting conventional weapons by means of regional agreements has already been made in Europe, and we would welcome similar developments in other regions. For our own part, the Strategic Defence Review makes clear our firm commitment to the conventional arms control process in Europe.
While I am on the conventional theme, I should like to announce that the United Kingdom has completed the necessary Parliamentary procedures for ratification of the Ottawa Convention [banning landmines]... We shall work for the universalization of the Convention and will press in this Conference for complementary action, which could begin with a transfer ban. We are also taking an active interest in the problems posed by small arms. ...
[I]n conclusion, I wish to return to the main theme of my remarks, the commitment of the British Government to the global elimination of nuclear weapons, and the proof we have given of it in the outcome of our Strategic Defence Review... I believe that the outcome of our Strategic Defence Review demonstrates that the United Kingdom is at the forefront of efforts to pursue the global elimination of nuclear weapons, and we intend to remain there.
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