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Back to the main page on the First Committee
Rebecca Johnson
There was no formal meeting on Friday, but on Monday November 1, the UN First Committee adopted a further 9 resolutions, ranging from the CTBT to the Mine Ban Treaty, Southern Hemisphere nuclear weapon free zone and verification.
CTBT
First up was the CTBT (L.25/Rev.1), which was principally sponsored by New Zealand
(joined traditionally by Mexico and Australia), co-sponsored by over 100 states
and overwhelmingly adopted by 147 votes to one against (the United States, as
it has done for the past 4 years). As in last year and 2002, there were 4 abstentions
(Colombia, India, Mauritius and Syria), which would probably have been persuaded
to allow the resolution to be adopted without a vote if the United States had
not insisted on a vote so that it could vote against.
Updating the CTBT resolutions of 2000, 2002 and 2003, this year's text welcomes the Joint Ministerial statement of September 23, 2004 that reaffirmed support for the CTBT, and underlines the continuing urgency of the treaty and its entry into force. It notes that 173 states have signed, including 41 of the 44 needed for entry into force, and that 119 states have ratified, including 33 of the 44. Remaining states, especially the necessary 11, are urged to accelerate their ratification process to enable the treaty to enter into force. The resolution urges the relevant states to maintain their existing moratoria and to refrain from doing anything that would defeat the CTBT's object and purpose in the meanwhile [e.g. conducting a nuclear explosion]. Also, in light of apparent reluctance from Brazil and some other developing states, the resolution "underlines the need to maintain momentum towards completion of the verification regime".
A large number of states had emphasised their support for the CTBT during the First Committee debates, and the Netherlands on behalf of the EU and associated states reinforced this message before the vote, saying that the EU "attaches upmost importance to the early entry into force of the treaty and will continue to call on those states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT, without delay and without conditions." Noting that both the legally binding prohibition on nuclear testing and a credible verification regime "are vital", the EU also pledged strong support for the Special Representative of the ratifying states [Jaap Ramaker, former NL ambassador and head of the final year of CTB negotiations in the CD, appointed by the 2003 Article XIV conference] who would be visiting a number of states "to promote universal adherence to the CTBT". Israel, which has signed but not ratified, explained that it voted in favour because it is committed to the CTBT's objectives and was playing an active role with regard to practical procedures for verification (especially the OSI operational manuals). Israel, however, had reservations about the wording of OP1, with urged signature and ratification "without delay and without conditions" and said that the completion of the verification regime was a "prerequisite" for entry into force; that verification should be "effective but immune to abuse", and that remaining "salient political issues" should be resolved. Since entry into force did not look imminent, Israel emphasised the importance of adhering to the commitment not to conduct nuclear tests (abiding by moratoria) and the necessity to continue to provide sufficient funds for the CTBTO, saying that the international monitoring system (IMS) and international data centre (IDC) needed to be operated and tested and that the seismic operations should be expanded.
As it had done in 2003, the US baldly stated that it had voted against the CTBT resolution "as we have repeatedly made clear, the US does not support that treaty and will not become a party to that treaty". The US would, however, continue to maintain the moratorium. Pakistan, which is not yet a signatory, explained that it voted in favour of the resolution but considered that "as regards the call in the resolution for promoting signatures and ratifications leading to CTBT's entry into force, this goal will of course be facilitated when major erstwhile supporters of the CTBT decide to restore their support." Pakistan also remarked that "acceptance of the CTBT obligations on a regional basis in South Asia will also facilitate its entry into force."
In terms familiar from last year's explanation of its abstention, Colombia referred to a "constitutional difficulty" with regard to ratifying the CTBT and hoped further discussions with the CTBTO and others would remove this impediment. It is understood that Colombia's national laws preclude its payment for a treaty until it ratifies; since September 1996, in accordance with the UN resolution adopting the CTBT, states have been paying towards the establishment of the CTBTO. Colombia is concerned that when it deposits its ratification it will be hit with a large bill for backdated contributions which, according to its domestic law, it is not permitted to pay.
Syria said it abstained because the CTBT did not enshrine security assurances against the use or threat of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states, that it did not refer to the development of new types of nuclear weaponry but "confines itself to banning only explosions". Syria complained about the inclusion of Israel as part of the Middle East and South Asia (MESA) regional group in the treaty. Although sanctions were explicitly ruled out during the entry into force negotiations in August 1996, Syria claimed concern that signatories could take measures against non-signatories that would fall under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Timebound nuclear disarmament
The vote on the resolution traditionally sponsored by Myanmar (Burma) calling
for nuclear disarmament in a timebound framework (L.26/Rev.1) was 93:42:18.
With 22 OPs, as last year, this traditional omnibus resolution on nuclear disarmament
evokes past NAM declarations and recommendations, UN Special Sessions on Disarmament
and the Millennium Declaration, and the NPT agreements especially from 2000.
The vote on this traditional nuclear disarmament resolution splits unchallengingly
along group lines; it is backed by most of the NAM, and opposed by NATO
and its aligned states. China and some NAC countries voted in favour; Russia
and other NAC countries (Sweden and Ireland) abstained. India said it abstained
because of the references to the NPT. Japan abstained because although it shared
the resolution's goal of the total elimination of ncuelar weapons, it rejected
the approach based on a timebound framework and considered that "realistic and
progressive" incremental steps were preferable.
Southern Hemisphere NWFZ
There was familiar controversy on the resolution calling for a nuclear weapon
free Southern Hemisphere (L.41), which received 149 votes in favour with 3 votes
against (Britain, France and the United States), with 6 abstentions (Bhutan,
India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and Spain). The resolution places its calls
for the ratification of all nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and their protocols,
as relevant, in the context of the determined pursuit of "the total elimination
of nuclear weapons" and "the important role of NWFZ in strengthening the nuclear
non-proliferation regime". A new preambular paragraph (PP8) welcomes Mexico's
decision to host a conference of states parties signatories to all the NWFZs
in 2005. As the preamble indicates, the resolution's lead co-sponsors, Brazil
and New Zealand, again emphasised that the draft did not conflict with the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea UNCLOS) or other norms and international laws
relating to navigation. However, the three NWS, which regularly transport nuclear
weapons or materials through the oceans of the Southern Hemisphere, voted against,
saying that they had no objection to NWFZs in principle, but feared that "the
real goal of this resolution is the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone
that covers the high seas". Spain, which is unhappy that the Canary Islands,
which it regards as part of Spanish territory, is included in the zone of the
African NWFZ, objected to PP8 and gave a lengthy but unclear explanation of
its abstention.
India insisted on a vote to remove specific mention of the need for a NWFZ in South Asia (the words "and South Asia") from OP5, and when that failed (139:2:9), insited on voting against OP5 altogether (144:1:8); failing to achieve any modification of the resolution, as in past years, India and Pakistan abstained. India, practically duplicating its statement of previous years, declared that this aspect of the resolution ran counter to the established understanding that NWFZ must be freely arrived at by the states concerned, and queried why South Asia was singled out, when it was "no more relevant" than a NWFZ in Western Europe or East or North Asia.
Conventional Weapons
Two resolutions, from Mali on assistance to curb the illicit traffic in small
arms (L.21/Rev.1) and from Sweden on the CCW (L.54), were adopted without a
vote. The resolution sponsored by Thailand on implementing the Mine Ban Treaty
(Ottawa) was overwhelmingly adopted by 140:1:18. Though the DPRK had registered
the sole vote in opposition, its representative was quick to insist that North
Korea had meant to abstain, so the vote should probably have been 140:0:19.
Several states, including China, Russia, South Korea, Cuba, Morocco, India,
Myanmar (Burma) and Singapore said that they supported the objectives of the
Mine Ban Treaty but felt they could not join it because their regional security
situation necessitated the use of landmines, which they universally described
as horrible. Some, emphasised illicit transfers, while some (most notably Libya)
said the Mine Ban Treaty did not hold states responsible for the problems caused
by their mines laid in the territory of other states. South Korea said it gave
money to African states to help with demining. Singapore said it had indefinitely
extended its moratorium on exporting anti-personnel landmines. Both Cuba and
China argued for a balance between humanitarian concerns and "legitimate self
defence". China said it had sponsored with Australia a workshop sponsored by
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) on mine clearance in Asia.
Reviving a debate from the 1990s, India said it would support negotiations in
the CD to ban illicit transfers of landmines on the basis of a mandate that
reflected the interests of all parties.
Verification
Although in the end adopted without a vote, Canada's new resolution on verification
had been seriously contested and provoked many statements of explanation. Entitled
"Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in
the field of verification" (L.33). The resolution reaffirmed the "critical importance"
and "vital contribution" of effective verification measures in nonproliferation,
arms limitation and disarmament agreements, and proposed that a panel of government
experts be established by the UN in 2006 to "explore the question of verification
in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of
verification".
Objections came from two different perspectives. Britain, the United States and Japan, for example, were concerned about the scope and parameters of the proposed expert panel, and emphasised that it should not overlap or undermine the existing functions of the IAEA, OPCW and existing instruments. The United States referred back to its statement of October 22, in which it argued that verification, compliance and enforcement were three interdependent components of policy, weighed against a state's obligations and commitments, and questioned what the UN study was intended to deal with. From a different perspective, India, Pakistan, Egypt and Iran argued that since the UNDC had already debated and elaborated 16 principles of verification which were endorsed by the General Assembly in 1988, the UNDC should be the body to continue the study, focussing on implementing the principles. In Iran's words, "both substantively and procedurally the UNDC is still the best UN body to explore verification further, including the role of the UN..."
Pakistan did not want "a new verification paradigm [that] will negatively impact the existing achievements and consensus" and firmly objected to "any moves to revise or negate the already agreed parameters and principles in the field of verification or to propagate certain fringe experiences, such as UNMOVIC". Pakistan's warning against "creative but misplaced impulses" makes more sense in the context of India's statement that it had previously proposed a single multilateral verification institution under the United Nations. India also considered that verification must be linked with specific obligations, such as timebound nuclear disarmament. Pakistan said that "in a spirit of cooperation" it went along with the draft resolution, it was "not convinced that another Panel of Experts can make a significant contribution at this stage to the philosophy of verification". Pointing out that "major disarmament initiatives since the verification principles were agreed upon have suffered setbacks," Pakistan said, "it is not for want of knowledge in the field of verification that these initiatives have been sidelined but on account of political reasons."
Nigeria's resolution supporting the UN disarmament fellowship, including training and advisory services (L.4/Rev.1), was adopted without a vote, as was Germany's well sponsored and expanding resolution resolution supporting practical disarmament measures. This resolution stresses the relevance of the "Guidelines on conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament", welcomes the "synergies within the multistakeholder process", espcially with respect to implementing the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons, and also welcomes the Secretary General's report on disarmament and nonproliferation education.
© 2004 The Acronym Institute.