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By Sverre Lodgaard
In the early days of his presidency, Vladimir Putin worked to improve ties with China, India and Iran while at the same time reaching out to Europe and the United States. Moves in one direction were sometimes offset by moves in another. After 9/11, the Russian leader seized the opportunity to forge - and prioritise - an unambiguously positive partnership with the Western world. In so doing, he changed the international political and security agenda in such a way that in the future, Russia is much less likely to get involved in humiliating disputes with the United States and other Western powers.
Throughout the 1990s, Russia was the loser in several conflicts of interest. Prominent examples were the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and NATO's intervention in the Kosovo conflict - setbacks soon to be followed, in the first years of this decade, by US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and agreement on a further round of NATO enlargement pushing into the Baltic region. However, by joining the USA - immediately and substantially - in its fight against terrorism; by playing on the clearly strong chemistry between himself and President Bush; and by announcing his readiness to enter into a profoundly new, cooperative relationship with NATO, Putin has managed - so far, at least - to extricate Russia from its previous pattern of clash and defeat.
Under the new partnership umbrella, the ABM issue came to an end not with a bang but a whimper. In effect, US withdrawal from treaty obligations was a given, anyhow: a noisy clash would only have highlighted Russia's inability to cope with US super power. Likewise, the forthcoming NATO enlargement, an unstoppable political force, will not now be met by fruitless Russian objections. Indeed, Putin may also be calculating that the rise of US unilateralism under the Bush administration could have an upside in shunting NATO's military significance - and thus its perceived threat to Russia - to the sidelines, reducing the Alliance to little more than a political framework. Article V of the North Atlantic treaty is dormant for lack of a credible threat to the NATO area, and out-of-area operations are conducted and orchestrated by the United States on a case-by-case basis. A fixed European alliance is unlikely to meet America's global military requirements.
For the US government, a clear priority is the removal of international restrictions on the conduct of its foreign affairs. The administration's key decision-makers tend to treat international agreements as nothing else or nothing more than the constellations of interests that created them. As interests change, treaties may be abandoned. Even less palatable, from such a perspective, may be the dilution of power and policies in the inevitable give and take of multilateral cooperation.
The new NATO-Russia Council (NRC) reflects this view. As long as the parties see eye to eye, a wide range of issues may be discussed in the Council on a consensus basis. Controversial issues, however, can always be referred to the decision-making procedures of NATO proper (along with Article V and enlargement issues, which are clearly subjects for discussion by 'members only'). In this way, flexibility is ensured.
Flexibility is an even more obvious feature of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), signed by Presidents Bush and Putin in Moscow last May. The agreement has no milestones or intermediate goals; verification has no role in assuring compliance; and apart from the obligation not to have more than 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads by December 31, 2012, it is actually hard to see how it can be violated. For that matter, since it expires by December 31, 2012, the United States could simply declare weapons above 2,200 to be not 'operationally deployed' for the day, and then revert to a higher level immediately afterwards.1 The flexibility is virtually complete: the treaty is unilateralism in bilateral form.
Using 9/11 to change the international political agenda, Putin has at the same time positioned Russia for closer economic cooperation with the West. Such a partnership, it is hoped, would provide a major resource in the still-embryonic economic modernisation of the country. Russia badly needs Western capital, technology and market access. To win these prizes, Putin paid a political price: recognition of US global political primacy and termination of the superpower strategic relationship. The ABM Treaty is gone and SORT is the end of strategic offensive arms control.
In short, to continue to pretend that Russia was still on a par with the United States, or to aim for equal status in as many respects as possible, was becoming a recipe for political humiliation and a brake on economic development. To some extent, the Cold War ambition of equal status lingered through the Yeltsin era and even into the beginning of the Putin succession, with its hollowness becoming increasingly exposed.
There are, however, limits and risks involved in every change of direction. To stay his new course, Putin must be able to demonstrate tangible economic returns and Russia's continuing political importance on the world stage. If this combination falls short of expectations - or, worse, if neither domestic economic gains nor international political relevance can be convincingly demonstrated - the Russian leader might share the fate of his predecessors, who were criticised for making too many concessions and receiving too little back.
SORT refers to statements by the two presidents, saying that Russia intends to limit 'all strategic nuclear weapons' while the United States will count weapons that are 'operationally deployed'. The United States has made clear that it has not committed itself to destroy or render unusable weapons that are no longer 'operationally deployed'. On the contrary, it specifically intends to retain many of these weapons for possible 'uploading' within days, weeks, months, or years. How many warheads will be removed from operational status, or added to the arsenal, and how many will be taken out of active service but retained for future use, will not necessarily be known. The parties are under no obligation to tell.
The 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference agreed on 13 "practical steps...to implement Article VI of the Treaty...and paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament'".2 Some of these steps have already been disregarded, among them (Step 1) "the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications...to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." While Russia ratified the CTBT in April 2000, the Bush administration has distanced itself from the accord and ruled out resubmitting it to the Senate. Indeed, the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), presented to Congress in January 2002, studiously keeps open the possibility that the US testing moratorium may be lifted in coming years.3 Should this happen, China is likely to follow suit and, quite possibly, be followed by India and Pakistan.
The 2000 NPT Review Document further calls (Step 3) for "the immediate commencement of negotiations" on a treaty "banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive purposes", with a view to their conclusion within five years. Despite agreement on a mandate, such negotiations have remained on hold at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva since 1995. The Document also calls (Step 4) on the CD to establish "an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament". No such body has been established.
Another element in the plan (Step 5) calls for the "principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures". SORT ignores this requirement, as it does the call (Step 9) for increased transparency. In this respect, SORT represents a major set-back in comparison with the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) agreements. Furthermore, while the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in Helsinki (1997) envisaged that non-strategic weapons would also be taken into consideration in the START process, and the NPT 2000 Document (Step 9) asks for unilateral initiatives to reduce such weapons "as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process", SORT leaves tactical systems out of account. The Russians dragged their feet on this matter at Helsinki, and have upgraded the significance of tactical nuclear weapons in their post-Cold War military doctrines.
The document emphasises (Step 7) the importance of the ABM Treaty as "a cornerstone of strategic stability" and "a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons". That cornerstone became history this year. Furthermore, the nature of SORT is such that "further development of verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements" (Step 13) has been rendered irrelevant.
Last but not least, the 2000 Document contains (Step 6) an "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals". This language clarifies and strengthens the obligations of the nuclear-weapon states under Article VI of the Treaty4 and has been much emphasised and quoted by disarmament advocates. Recent developments, however, shed grave doubts on the seriousness of this undertaking. Most troublingly, the US Nuclear Posture Review envisages the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to destroy or deter the use of chemical and biological weapons and, also, to deal with conventional forces. Not only does this undermine the negative security assurances that have been extended to the non-nuclear parties to the NPT, it is also a recipe for the indefinite retention of nuclear arms. Clearly, the NPR is at odds with the fundamental commitments assumed under Article VI.
In review, most of the 13 steps that were agreed in the 2000 Final Document have been either disregarded or placed in doubt. Taken together, these multiple failures amount to a serious challenge to the viability of the non-proliferation regime.
Until recently, international and national nuclear arms control agreements, laws and provisions constituted a web of undertakings centring on two key accords: the ABM Treaty and the NPT. While the ABM Treaty is gone, considerable resilience remains built into the NPT. From the Cold War years, the so-called 'Swedish lesson' remains sanely applicable: whatever the existing nuclear-weapon states are doing, it is not in the interest of non-nuclear-weapon states to acquire their own nuclear arms. The more time that passes without nuclear weapons being used, the stronger the norm of non-use becomes. The 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice leaves little possibility, moreover, of using them in a legal way. Such use, according to the Court, would have to be in accordance with international humanitarian law, and that is hard to envisage in practice.
Only eight states are known to possess nuclear weapons (with increasing doubts swirling around the status of North Korea's programme). Five of these states - the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council - are members of the NPT and therefore under an international legal obligation to eliminate their arsenals. The other three - India, Israel and Pakistan - are under no such obligation. Until recently, Cuba remained the only non-nuclear-weapon state outside the NPT5. In September last year, however, Cuba announced its intention to join the treaty. No other multilateral arms control treaty comes so close to universality.
Nuclear-weapon state disrespect for NPT undertakings does not necessarily translate into nuclear proliferation. Legal obligations to remain nuclear-weapon free, as non-nuclear parties to the NPT or as members of nuclear-weapon-free zones6; the enduring logic of the Swedish lesson; and special efforts to come to grips with non-compliant states like North Korea and Iraq may be enough to hold the line at eight nuclear-weapon states for some time to come. It may be recalled, moreover, that moral arguments, discrimination and concerns about compliance/non-compliance with Article VI have been part and parcel of the NPT process from the beginning.
A look at the history of the Treaty's review conferences reinforces this conclusion. The first conference, in 1975, managed to adopt a comprehensive final document consolidating the young regime. Towards the end of the 1970s, renewed tensions substituted for détente, and rearmament gained speed. Predictably, the 1980 conference ended without a consensus document. The period up to 1985 is often referred to as the 'second Cold War'; still, that year's conference found its way to a final document, an achievement seen by some as a striking reconfirmation of the Swedish lesson. Ironically, the 1990 conference was an exercise in stalemate and futility, the end of the Cold War notwithstanding. Convened towards the end of a period of progress on the disarmament front, the 1995 extension conference achieved indefinite extension of the Treaty. The 2000 conference succeeded beyond expectations, despite the fact that the window of opportunity after the Cold War had closed and big-power relations had once again become more strained. If anything, then, the record indicates that, to quite some extent, the NPT is sufficiently strong to withstand fluctuations in international security affairs.
Taking the 1970-2000 period as a whole, there was a significant though variable measure of cooperation on non-proliferation issues between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, in spite of all the conflicts and tensions that marred their relationship. Can we assume that big-power cooperation, the Swedish lesson and special diplomatic, political and military actions against potential proliferators, will likewise put a 'business as usual' stamp on the NPT process in the years ahead? For sure, we are used to big discrepancies between declaratory policies and actions, and we are well acquainted with double standards. It is not obvious that the NPT is more vulnerable to current versions of hypocrisy than previous ones.
Nevertheless, if the nuclear-weapon states are seen to retain such weapons for the foreseeable future - and none of the eight shows any sign of voluntarily leaving the club, as South Africa (and, in a sense, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) did - the present situation is unlikely to last for long. The main reason for this lies in basic considerations of national security. There are, after all, limits to the validity of the Swedish lesson. The fundamental, existential reality is that nuclear-weapon states are physically able to threaten the vital interests of at least adjacent non-nuclear-weapon states, at any time, with nuclear weapons. For purposes of coercion, it may suffice to use such weapons in a counterforce mode, or even just threaten to do so.7 For many non-nuclear-weapon states, this is a disconcerting dilemma traditionally and conveniently handled - until further notice - by simply disregarding this gap in their national security considerations. As long as they are not prepared to do anything about rectifying the situation, how much better not to draw attention to it? However, in a world in which tens of states are capable of acquiring a nuclear arsenal should they choose to do so, this is not a stable situation.
Of critical importance in this connection is the fate of the moratorium on nuclear testing. Should the United States resume testing, China may well follow suit, with India and Pakistan perhaps not far behind them in the queue. Such a grave deterioration of security affairs would alert other governments - most immediately in East, South and West Asia - to the security gaps noted above. In NPT terms, the phrase 'cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date' - always taken to refer to three measures: a nuclear test ban, a fissile material cut-off and security assurances - would be left as a naked trinity, unimplemented in all three respects. Add to this the attention that nuclear testing always draws and the pivotal importance of a CTBT - for long periods of time the flagship measure of nuclear arms control - and the non-proliferation implications might be severe.
A CTBT was part of the 1995 package that provided for the indefinite extension of the NPT. The seriousness of resumed testing must be judged against that background: for the NPT, it may be fatal.
Should one or more of the five nuclear-weapon parties to the NPT leave the treaty, it would quickly fall apart. None of them, however, has any reason to do so. While Washington has withdrawn from a number of existing accords, and has refrained from joining some new ones, yet others are being adhered to but downgraded in significance. Perhaps the most important agreement currently enduring this grudging treatment is the NPT.
The real risk is that among the more than 180 non-nuclear parties to the NPT, some may see fit to withdraw for reasons mentioned above. However, even in this dire case, while the treaty itself may fall into disrepair, the broader nuclear non-proliferation regime may only be partially eroded. This is because the regime contains back-ups to many of the NPT obligations. The International Atomic Energy Agency's 'full-scope' safeguards - as codified in NPT/INFCIRC 153 - would vanish with treaty membership. But INFCIRC 66 safeguards - the safeguards that accompanied nuclear exports before full-scope safeguards of the NPT-type entered into force - would remain. While these safeguards are facility-oriented and less comprehensive than NPT safeguards, they cover all military applications of imported items or derivatives thereof. Thus, while naval reactor fuel is exempted under the NPT, INFCIRC 66 does not allow any such application.
The weakness in this scenario is obviously that countries leaving the NPT will be under no legal obligation to declare indigenous activities to the IAEA for safeguards application. That is, they would no longer be legally constrained from pursuing nuclear weapons unless they are members of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. If they stay with their zonal obligations - as defined by all the zones agreed to date - they will still be under an international legal obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons and to submit all their nuclear materials and activities to full-scope IAEA safeguards. In addition, nuclear-weapon-free zones prohibit stationing of nuclear weapons on zonal territory, and seek to limit transits. Altogether, the nuclear-weapon-free zones cover more than half of the world's landmass, but include few sea areas. The restrictions that apply in those areas are mostly non-binding.8
Single states withdrawing from the NPT will, of course, still be subject to strict export/import regulations. Moreover, such states would inevitably draw much negative attention and may be subject to additional restrictions, embargoes and sanctions. Therefore, it will be a tough act for one or a few countries to leave while the big majority remains. The open question is, when would erosion cross the line into collapse?
Which are the less costly and, by that yardstick, more likely scenarios of withdrawal from the NPT?
Members of nuclear-weapon-free zones could withdraw in political protest at discrimination, lack of compliance by the nuclear-weapon states, etc., without affecting their nuclear-weapon-free status and probably without any serious repercussions. They would no longer be able to influence the NPT process, but this may not be considered a big loss by states driven to such a course of action. After 30 years of membership expansion since the treaty entered into force, these would be the first withdrawals. Even if they would not amount to proliferation, they would be concrete manifestations of misgiving and an unprecedented set-back for the Treaty.
Parties who are serious about reopening their weapons options may join in such a protest move in order to 'camouflage' their motivation. Mixed with 'innocent' withdrawals, they would not stand out so clearly, and so it may be more difficult to single them out for special treatment. The situation, however, would be unlikely to stay so easy. In reality, there are numerous ways of distinguishing innocent cases from cases of real concern: the camouflage would wear off.
Single break-outs by countries approaching nuclear weapon status - the precipice to which North Korea took the international community in 1993, and is again taking it today - will trigger the strongest reaction. To limit the pressure that other states may bring to bear on them - and, eventually, to deter a military counter-proliferation action - would-be proliferators may try to keep their programmes under the guise of peaceful applications as long as possible, preferably until some weapons are ready for use. In the 1970s, Iran under the Shah was the kind of regime that could have pursued nuclear weapons under the NPT/peaceful applications umbrella. At that time, however, little attention was paid to such a possibility.
Today, the completion of the Bushehr power plant and Iranian attempts to obtain other fuel-cycle technologies raise similar concerns9 A matter of particular concern is the possibility that significant activities may be conducted clandestinely, in underground facilities. Underground reprocessing may be hard to identify, as Mordechai Vanunu's pictures from the Israeli site at Dimona amply illustrate. Ever since the IAEA documented that North Korea had reprocessed more plutonium than it had declared, questions about underground activities have been critical in assessing the true situation in that country.
In US non-proliferation policy, and particularly in the traumatic wake of 9/11, the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi reactor (Osiraq) 1981 has become a model example. In the words of one strong proponent of preventive action the United States "is no longer prepared to rely mainly on negotiations, trade pressures, arms control regimes and international institutions... Time is not on our side. We need to act soon, act preemptively, and act alone if necessary. Osiraq is the new model of how foreign policy has to be conducted'.10 Hence the interest in new, nuclear 'bunker-busters' capable of destroying underground facilities before weapon acquisition programmes come to fruition. Not only may significant facilities be destroyed: regimes sticking their neck out risk decapitation by military force.
Although the parties are still in the early stages of determining what the NATO-Russia Council should try to do, non-proliferation is clearly one of the lead items. Among the issues that have already been identified under this label are cooperative threat reduction, safe management of fissile material, exchange of information of nuclear weapon doctrines, and political responses to WMD threats.
The European Union (EU) and Russia are firm supporters of the non-proliferation regime, while in US policy the regime has been marginalised. Clearly, the US government pays little attention to its compliance with NPT provisions and associated international commitments. The focus is first of all on the so-called 'rogue states'. In the view of leading Americans, there is nothing inherently wrong with the weapons: what matters is in who's hands they rest.11 Seen from the White House, China is a matter of concern: the United States has an unclarified strategic relationship with the Asian giant. Pakistan is worrisome, too, because of the political instabilities there. Any proliferation to the Arab world is unacceptable, while no pressure is put on Israel to become nuclear-weapon-free. Other weapons - French and British, even Russian and Indian - are in more or less legitimate or acceptable hands. It is hard to see how these agendas can be combined in a way that engages the Council in fruitful discussions.
Hard, but perhaps not impossible. Precisely because the approaches to non-proliferation have become so different, it is important to try to re-establish common ground. For such an exercise to be meaningful, the parties must recognise that their own approaches are not without flaws, and that the cause of non-proliferation may benefit from a search for common positions. For instance, the non-proliferation regime rarely acquits itself well in responding to safeguards violations and other acts of non-compliance. What should be the supplier policy towards India and Pakistan, nuclear-weapon states that have not been recognised as such and where full-scope safeguards do not apply? Cases like Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, Belarus, North Korea, Iran and Iraq have been treated in notably varying ways. While differential treatment of critical cases may be fully justified, it also speaks to the limitations of the regime and leaves some hard questions unanswered.
Dangers exist, alongside opportunities. Will consideration of such issues in the NATO-Russia Council be seen by others as a cartel-like initiative undermining the significance of the NPT process? Will it be perceived as a counterproductive move and therefore dismissed? Such a negative reception cannot be discounted. In the view of many, however, any dialogue with the Americans that may modify US unilateralism would be sincerely appreciated.
There is agreement to include cooperative threat reduction on the agenda as a non-proliferation item. Indeed, to reduce the scope for illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and materials from which such weapons are made, are entirely legitimate and commendable subjects for the NRC to tackle. At the same time, there are bilateral frames of cooperation on these matters; cooperation between the EU and Russia; as well as the important new 'Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction', launched by the G-8 last June. Yet another forum may have a contribution to make, or may prove redundant, depending on the orchestration of efforts.
Much the same applies to responses to WMD terrorism, another agreed agenda item. There are already a great many conventions and fora dealing with various aspects of this problem.12 One of them is the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which is currently reviewing its guidelines in order to make itself more relevant to the fight against terrorism.
Are there other specific issues that can profitably be discussed by the Council in addition to those already agreed upon? What about harmonisation of policies in relation to critical cases like North Korea, Iran and Iraq? North Korea is not a natural choice, since China, Japan and South Korea - not members of the Council - are so crucial in that case. Nuclear exports and export control policies in relation to Iran might be discussed, although Russia would be less than keen. In any event, the issue is high on the bilateral US-Russian agenda. Such questions are also natural, indeed pressing, subjects for the NSG to consider.
Tactical nuclear weapons are not included in SORT. One thing European members of the Council could do is to challenge the United States and Russia to reconfirm their unilateral statements of 1991, providing for large-scale withdrawal of tactical nuclear arms on both side. This is not just a bilateral matter: indeed, the whereabouts of thousands of small, mobile nuclear weapons are a major security concern also for non-nuclear-weapon states. Moreover, some 150-200 nuclear weapons are still deployed in seven West European countries. However, Russia's perceived dependence on tactical nuclear weapons, especially to defend its borders with China, may block joint discussion of this issue.
Would the NPT review process, and implementation of the 13 steps agreed at the 2000 Conference, be suitable agenda items? At this stage, probably not. Given the low priority accorded to the NPT and its review process in US policy, the subject is unlikely to fly. It would be better, first, to engage in a joint examination of basic approaches to non-proliferation and - if this proves productive - move on to considerations of specifics in time for the 2005 review conference of the Treaty.
During the Cold War, the US and the USSR agreed on the main tenets of their non-proliferation policy, to the overall benefit of the global non-proliferation regime. Today, approaches differ, not just between the US and Russia, but between the US and the Europeans as well. The NATO-Russia Council should be encouraged to regain lost common ground by initiating a concerted effort to strengthen non-proliferation policies.
1. Richard Garwin, 'Reducing or Increasing the Nuclear Threat?', paper for the 52nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, La Jolla, California, August 10-14, 2002.
2. For a review of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, including the full text of the 13-step 'Programme of Action on Nuclear Disarmament', see Rebecca Johnson, "The 2000 NPT Review Conference: a Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise", Disarmament Diplomacy No. 46 (May 2000). Article VI of the NPT reads: "Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament', adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, read: "3. Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between states which have prevailed following the end of the Cold War. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon states reaffirm their commitment, as stated in Article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. 4. The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below: (a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint; (b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein; (c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all states of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."
3. Currently, under US law setting the parameters of the Stockpile Stewardship Management Program (SSMP), the Department of Energy (DOE) cannot conduct nuclear tests or begin actual production of new nuclear warheads. There are rumours, however, about development of a new nuclear warhead of very low yield, down to the yields of conventional high explosives, and with penetrating power into concrete. The warhead is claimed to be clean in the sense that the radioactive fission products can be contained. Should this be close to the truth, the distinction between the two types of weapons will be blurred. To provide confidence in the new weapon, it would have to be tested. Bearing in mind the administration's disregard for international agreements, testing may well be authorised if the president considers it in the interest of the United States. For a summary of the debate over the NPR and the possible future direction of US nuclear testing policy, see "Hopes Mix With Accusation and Alarm in US-Russia Talks", Disarmament Diplomacy No. 64 (May/June 2002), especially pp. 38-42.
4. Before the 2000 NPT Review Conference, elimination of nuclear weapons was often referred to in the context of general and complete disarmament. Step 6 contains no such reference. Thus, although elimination of nuclear weapons would necessitate adjustments to other kinds of weaponry, the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world was separated from the objective (stated in Step 11) of general and complete disarmament. Neither does Step 6 use the term 'ultimate' objective in relation to the total elimination of nuclear arsenals.
5. The Cook Islands and Niue have not ratified the NPT, although both are states parties to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). Both countries, however, are considered bound by New Zealand's adherence to the NPT, since they are independent states in free association with New Zealand. See endnote 8.
6. The four zonal treaties - in Africa (Pelindaba), Latin America (Tlatelolco), Southeast Asia (Bangkok), and the South Pacific (Rarotonga) - currently encompass 113 states and 18 other territories, embracing 99 per cent of the total land area of the Southern hemisphere. (The Antarctic Treaty bans all weapons, not only weapons of mass destruction, from that region.) Of these treaties, only the Pelindaba accord has yet to enter into force. In addition, a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty may be concluded in the near future.
7. Gunnar Arbman, 'Horizontal Proliferation Risks Emanating from the Existence of Nuclear Weapons', paper for the 52nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, La Jolla, California, August 10-14, 2002.
8. Jan Prawitz, "Negotiating Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones", in Containing the Atom, Lexington Books, (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria), 2002.
9. For Russia, Iran is an important regional partner, both politically and economically. Construction of nuclear power reactors is tied to commercial interests in other sectors. Concessions to the United States stop short of accommodation to US pressures to stop cooperation with Iran in the nuclear field. In Russian politics, this is often seen as a line of demarcation - the last line of defence which the US should not be allowed to cross - without major concessions in return.
10. Bill Kristol, 'US Foreign Policy After 9/11: The Bush Doctrine', speech at the BESA Center, Tel Aviv, March 2002.
11. Such a one-sided approach conveniently ignores the fact that weapons do something to their possessors, be they nuclear weapons or small arms. By their very nature, weapons present options in terms of violent solutions to problems. Conversely, new options may translate into broader considerations of political agendas and priorities. At the low end of the arms spectrum, this is well known from studies of small arms and light weapons. For instance, many African countries no longer allow people to carry arms in public places, because this tends to nurture cultures of violence. At the high end, we see that superpower - sometimes referred to as hyperpower - encourages unilateralism. There is no simple answer to the question of what is more important, the gun or the man behind the trigger? Both matter.
12. For an overview, see William Potter and Nicolas Florquin, "The Different Faces of Nuclear Terrorism", (Appendix One: Summary of International Initiatives Related to Nuclear Terrorism), paper prepared for the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group, Stockholm, September 5-6, 2002.
Sverre Lodgaard is Director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
© 2003 The Acronym Institute.