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Stephen Pullinger and Gerrard Quille
Nonproliferation and disarmament issues have historically been difficult for European Union (EU) member states to coordinate. Not least, this is because some are also members of NATO, while others are not. In addition, the division between the EU's two nuclear weapon states, France and the United Kingdom, and the other member states has hindered agreement on substantive common positions or statements in international disarmament or nonproliferation fora1. Recent events have stimulated efforts to address these challenges more coherently within the EU.
In particular, the EU has decided to address the key challenges posed by the US regarding the use of force. Concerned at the increasing preparedness of the US to bypass the existing multilateral regimes on grounds that they have failed to deal with proliferant states, such as Iraq and North Korea, the EU seeks to address 'pre-emptive engagement'2, placing it firmly in the context of respecting international law and supporting the UN system. In doing so, it also sets out a programme to improve the nonproliferation regimes.
In essence, the EU recognises that the threats must be addressed, but puts the use and limits of force into context: "In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled."3
This decision of Member States to use the EU as a framework for tackling their common concerns across a range of issues on the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction is viewed as something of a historical breakthrough.
Following the introduction and discussion of a Swedish Proposal for EU action on nonproliferation in the Political and Security Committee (PSC)4, EU Foreign Ministers at the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting, in Luxembourg on April 14, 2003, instructed the Secretary General, Javier Solana, in association with the Commission and the PSC, to develop work on:
When he presented his European Security Strategy (ESS)6 to the GAERC on June 16, Solana also submitted two documents - that were subsequently adopted - entitled: 'Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction' and an 'Action Plan for the implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction'. In the Presidency Conclusions at Thessaloniki, June 19-20, the European Council issued a 'Declaration on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction' that said further work would draw upon the Basic Principles with a view to "further elaborate before the end of the year a coherent strategy to address the threat of proliferation, and to continue to develop and implement the EU Action Plan as a matter of priority".
The Basic Principles and the Action Plan give teeth to the ESS identification of WMD and terrorism as EU priorities. They reaffirm the importance of international nonproliferation norms through international law and multilateral organisations such as the UN, while also according with Member States' concerns in addressing immediate proliferation challenges and possible terrorist uses, especially in the Middle East, closely mirroring US priorities since 9/11.
The European Commission has also gained expertise in recent years in the context of the EU's 'Nonproliferation and Disarmament Cooperation Initiative.' This is carried out through Community resources (a number of budget lines related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP) and in line with the Union's commitment to spending one billion euros over ten years that was pledged to the G8 Global Partnership against the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction that was launched at the G8 Kananaskis Summit in 20027.
The emerging ESS embodied in the draft document 'A Secure Europe in a Better World' launched at the Thessaloniki European Council on June 19-20, with the intention of being adopted as an EU Security Strategy at the December European Council in 2003, includes a statement that the "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security". Of particular concern are WMD in conjunction with ballistic missiles and the intersection of WMD and terrorism8.
The ESS clearly states that the EU and its member states will tackle their security priorities in a framework that emphasises multilateral institutions (specifically the UN and regional organisations), the rule of law (with a specific emphasis that military force alone cannot resolve security challenges and key threats), and which acknowledges the root causes of these problems. The EU's priorities are divided into those for immediate action and implementation by December 2003 and those for further development and implementation from 2004 onwards.
The EU's strategy against proliferation is based on the following key elements:
pursuing the universalisation of disarmament and nonproliferation agreements while stressing the importance of effective national implementation thereof;
ensuring compliance with nonproliferation commitments by making the best use of, and, when appropriate, strengthening international inspection/verification mechanisms;
strengthening export control policies;
introducing a stronger nonproliferation element in relationships with some partners;
having a focussed dialogue both with countries suspected of proliferation activities and with those whose co-operation is vital to effective policies against proliferation;
expanding co-operative threat reduction initiatives and assistance programmes;
ensuring that appropriate resources and support are allocated to international organisations and arrangements active in nonproliferation such as the IAEA, the OPCW, the CTBTO, PrepCom, and HCoC;
promoting close co-ordination with the United States;
pursuing an international agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
considering, in case political and diplomatic measures have failed, coercive measures, including as a last resort the use of force in accordance with the United Nations Charter.
The need for universalisation of nonproliferation agreements is clear. Ensuring that states, once they have become parties to treaties, then follow through and implement the terms of those treaties through national implementation measures is a vital part of developing a healthy, vibrant nonproliferation regime. This also includes addressing the important issues of compliance, verification and enforcement.
Affording greater priority and resources to implementation, improved sharing of information about suspicious activities in relation to imports of dual-use technologies and more stringent demands of end users, would all help to make it harder for proliferators to achieve their goals.
This should ensure that WMD nonproliferation goals are included in all appropriate intra-state discussions and also help move the issue up ministerial agendas.
Furthermore work should be initiated including nonproliferation concerns and objectives of the member states and the EU in all dialogue with third states. This requires thinking on the EU's coherence as an external actor and how nonproliferation can be mainstreamed therein.
Tackling the demand side of proliferation through diplomacy is crucial, and that effort should also be concentrated where it is really needed. An export control regime, for example, is only as strong as its weakest link and it makes sense to focus attention there rather than equally on everyone.
The Action Plan is intended to provide an initial work programme to allow a practical implementation of the Basic Principles. The authors recognise that building an EU WMD nonproliferation strategy will take some time and, as a result, it might be useful to add further actions to the plan. The Action Plan provides for immediate and longer term measures. Below we have italicised the main points from the Action Plan followed by (non-italicised) comment and analysis.
The immediate measures are accompanied by an expected timeframe for implementation, required instrument for implementation (political and legal), and the expected costs of implementation.
Detailed Plan of Diplomatic Activity.
This involves prioritising the EU's diplomatic strategy and action, defining and disseminating 'master messages' (i.e. key statements underpinning the strategy) developing a programme of demarches on key issues of concern, as well as using planned meetings more effectively. Concerted action in relation to assuaging fears about Iran's nuclear programme is an early example of how this might work in practice, but there is clearly much work to be done in this area.
The External Relations meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on November 17 asked the PSC to further elaborate a coherent draft EU strategy, which should be adopted by the next European Council9.
On December 9 in Brussels, the External Relations Council meeting reaffirmed this commitment and concluded: "The Council endorsed the draft Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and decided to recommend its adoption by the European Council [scheduled to meet December 11 and 12, 2003]. The Strategy constitutes an elaboration of an element of the European Security Strategy "A Secure Europe in a Better World". It incorporates and bases itself on the Declaration as well as the Basic Principles adopted by the European Council at Thessaloniki. The third chapter of the WMD strategy contains a list of specific measures for its implementation, which reproduces those elements of the Action Plan which are still under way, as well as complementing measures. This chapter will be subjected to regular revision and updating."10
Adoption of a firm engagement for the promotion of the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements. This will take the form of a Common Position or a Council Declaration.
At the November 17 External Relations meeting of the Council of foreign ministers the following conclusions were adopted:
'The Council welcomed the positive results so far in the implementation of the "Action Plan"...In particular, the adoption of the Common Position on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of nonproliferation on WMD and their means of delivery...'11
It is hoped that the restatement of this policy will serve as a yardstick in the negotiations of EU positions in international fora, as well as allowing the EU to address WMD proliferation situations of immediate concern.
Prolongation of the Programme on Disarmament and nonproliferation in the Russian Federation. This will require a Joint Action and the sum of 5 million euro has been earmarked12.
This money, taken from the CFSP budget line, represents continuity. (Previously, the average amount has been between €6-7 million). The Joint Action13 established an EU Programme for Nonproliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation, and mandated the European Commission to implement the EU's related activities with €6-8 million of the CFSP budget per annum. The implementation of the Joint Action is overseen by the Council's Working Groups on Non Proliferation (CONOP) and Disarmament (CODUN). The Joint Action has been extended for one year until the middle of 2004.
The longer-term strategy here is to create a nonproliferation budget line that is not just focussed on Russia and the Joint Action on Russia. The budgetary pressures arising from EU enlargement will require constant vigilance to ensure that such a goal is not lost. Also, in the longer term, similar programmes could be applied to any possible future regional disarmament agreements involving the elimination of WMD. These are likely to be costly and will require proper supervision.
The adoption of a Commission budget line on nonproliferation and disarmament should be a mid-term strategy for the next budgetary cycle beginning in 2007 in order to stabilise the budget line on Russia and to recognise the nonproliferation added value of the Commission's activities. In the first phase this does not necessarily have to lead to an increase in funds but would require separating the nonproliferation elements within nuclear safety budget lines (TACIS, PHARE, ISTC/STCU) and the joint action on Russia within a single CFSP nonproliferation and disarmament budget line. This would also contribute to the EU Security Strategy priorities on WMD nonproliferation.14
On nuclear weapons proliferation
Ratification and implementation by all Member States and Acceding Countries of the IAEA Additional Protocols.
At present some Member States, as well as some acceding States have yet to ratify and/or notify the IAEA of the completion of their procedures for ratification. This will send an important signal to the rest of the world that the EU not only values the Additional Protocol but is serious about its own nonproliferation obligations.
Provision of an adequate budget increase to the IAEA for implementing its safeguard tasks. This is a political and financial commitment between Member States.
There was a welcome increase agreed in the IAEA budget at the Board of Governors' meeting in July, which the EU wants to go in parallel with the continuation of the process of implementing integrated safeguards - thereby leading to a more effective and efficient safeguards system.
On Chemical Weapons Proliferation
Promotion of challenge inspections in the framework of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
The EU wants to discuss activating the challenge inspection instrument and for every Member State and acceding country to agree to support any challenge in the absence of specific information disproving it. At present, a draft paper is circulating in the PSC that has drawn on a UK paper circulated at the last CWC Review Conference.15
The implementation of the CWC has proceeded well since its entry into force but the real test of its strength and of that of the nonproliferation regime overall will indeed be when a challenge inspection is carried out and what then flows from its results. It is important that the EU ensures that correct inspection procedures are followed and that the consequences of proven non-compliance or of absolution are measured and clearly defined in advance.
The obvious danger here is that the US instigates a challenge inspection - perhaps of an Arab state - and then responds precipitately, either because the accused refuses an inspection or if non-compliance is proved, or if the US believes the inspection process has not produced the results it pre-ordained.
Make the EU a leading co-operative player in the export control regimes...
This is to be achieved by ensuring a co-ordinated EU position; supporting the membership of acceding countries and considering the involvement of the Commission in the regimes; promoting a catch-all clause (i.e. end-user oriented export control of non-listed items) in the export control regimes when appropriate; and promoting a further strengthening of the information exchange in the regimes, in particular with respect to sensitive destinations, sensitive end-users and procurement patterns.
Immediate attention will concentrate on bringing the EU (rather than just individual states) into the workings of export control regimes. This should help overcome the recent situation whereby the Commission reacted to not having been privy to the recent Nuclear Suppliers Group extension of restricted goods by saying that they were anti-competitive for European industry.
These measures do not come with a specific timeframe or required (political and legal) instruments for their implementation. They are an elaboration of the major elements within the Basic Principles.
In General
Mainstreaming nonproliferation policies into the EU's wider relations with third countries.
Here, the EU intends to use an effective stick and carrot policy, particularly in the context of co-operation agreements or assistance programmes, to bring other states into line with their nonproliferation commitments. One can already see evidence of this in relation to Iran, where the EU is making a trade agreement contingent on Iranian accession to the NPT's Additional Protocol.
Furthermore, at the November 17 External Relations Council the foreign ministers produced conclusions that brought forward this issue from the medium term with the '...adoption of a policy approach on mainstreaming a nonproliferation element in the EU's relations with third countries...'16 It will be important to monitor how this 'nonproliferation clause' is further developed beyond the present deal with Iran to include support for other states in improving transparency, building confidence and providing technical assistance (in particular for their emerging chemical and bio-tech industries).
Increase in EU co-operative threat reduction funding in the light of financial perspectives beyond 2006.
Beyond the EU's commitment of €1 billion to the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of WMD and related materials over the next ten years, further financial commitments will have to be secured in the next budget cycle starting in 2007. The EU wants a specific Community budget line for WMD nonproliferation and disarmament to be created, along with greater national contributions.17
Special focus on WMD proliferation at the Mediterranean Level.
The EU wants to conduct a WMD threat assessment focused on the Mediterranean area, and to include specific nonproliferation issues in future dialogue with countries therein. It also wants to study the implications for the Mediterranean area of the proposal for a WMD-free Middle East - a proposal supported by EU states as one of the conditions of indefinitely extending the NPT in 1995.
Adoption by Member States of common policies related to criminal sanctions for illegal export or brokering of WMD-related materials.
It is welcome that the EU recognises the importance of buttressing current nonproliferation efforts at state level with legislation that applies to individual citizens as well. There will be obvious implications for Accession countries.
Retaining the verification and inspection expertise of UNMOVIC.
The EU wants to consider how to retain, maintain and utilise UNMOVIC's unique verification and inspection competence. One way of doing so would be to establish a roster of experts within the UN framework, to be used after a decision by the UNSC. The EU might also decide to establish its own expertise in this field - perhaps based at the proposed WMD Monitoring Centre - again, available to the UN when requested.
Support for a stronger role for the UN Security Council in handling the threat of WMD.
The EU wants to explore a resolution in the UNSC to identify the spread of WMD and their means of delivery, as a threat to international peace and security. It also favours a UNSC resolution that endorses the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), recently launched by the US, aimed at interdicting shipments and over-flights of materials for use in WMD.
Achieving widespread support for each of these resolutions will be far from straightforward as they are both controversial. Although the aspirations of the general resolution should be universally supported some states will worry that its application may be pursued in a prejudicial manner. The PSI is potentially tricky as it would appear to cut across certain existing aspects of international law.
Setting up of a monitoring centre on WMD disarmament and nonproliferation.
This centre would be entrusted with monitoring the implementation of the Action Plan, the collection of information and intelligence, and ensure the necessary interaction with other international bodies. Working in close co-operation with the Presidency and the PSC, it would inform the Council and propose measures for preventing and combating WMD proliferation. It would also establish relations with other key international actors with a view to acting as a focal point and a clearinghouse.
It might also provide the focus, much like the Armaments Agency, for measuring progress, co-coordinating peer review and member state mechanisms for action on WMD (such as the future protection measures ensuing from the draft Constitution's solidarity clause).
On nuclear and radiological weapons proliferation:
Improve the control of high radioactive sources.
An EU Council Directive, already adopted by the Commission in January 2003, aims to harmonise and strengthen existing controls by setting out specific requirements ensuring that radioactive sources are always kept under control. This should reduce the risk of such sources being misused, e.g. for criminal purposes and will prevent them from becoming lost from regulatory control. This example of best practice should be taken up by other states.
A policy not to export nuclear related materials and equipment to countries not having ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol.
This is an important and necessary measure that demonstrates the EU's determination to strengthen the safeguards it requires on the possible use to which its nuclear exports are put. The Member States need to have a common view when discussing this issue in the frame of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Commission has also a concern when it comes to the Euratom Supply Agency.
On biological and chemical weapons proliferation:
Reinforcing the BWC and the CWC
The EU wants to establish its own group of experts to try to find ways of strengthening compliance with the BWC in the absence of any verification mechanism. In the meantime the EU will take the lead in efforts to strengthen regulations on trade with BW-related material and in supporting national implementation of the BTWC (e.g. in providing technical assistance). The EU will work to ensure concrete outcomes from the three already established meetings of state party experts to be held between 2003 and 2005 before the sixth review conference in 2006 and will also consider giving support to states with administrative or financial difficulties in their national implementation of the CWC and to the OPCW in its implementing work
Strengthening of national legislation and control over the pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins (in member states and acceding countries)
The EU, appreciating the limited possibilities following the demise of the Verification Protocol, wants to draw upon the experience of States Parties to establish "best practices guidelines" in order to promote the enactment of effective national legislation and compliance with the BTWC provisions.
The creation of an EU Centre for Disease Control should be analysed.
This would act as a European counterpart to the US Centers for Disease Control, enabling member states to keep independently abreast of developments in biotechnology and their applicability to potential use as biological weapons and share information.
EU-US (biological) industry dialogue.
The EU will initiate a dialogue with the biotech industry in Europe, on inter alia control of dangerous pathogens. Dialogue between EU and US industry should be encouraged to serve to enhance awareness, spread best practices and help overcome transatlantic suspicions about discriminatory trade restrictions.
On Export Controls:
Reinforcement of the efficiency of export controls in an enlarged Europe by:
"Peer review" of Member States' and Acceding Countries export control systems.
In order to better co-ordinate the EU's export control activities and to learn from each other's experience a Peer Review in all Member States and Acceding countries should be conducted. This would involve an examination of national legislation and its implementation in order to establish the best practices in the enlarged Union. The Commission could be asked to co-ordinate the Peer Review and be assisted by a Task Force. This work has begun but does not seem to be attracting the political support nor human resources that are necessary for the full and thorough implementation of this important exercise. Perhaps this is one more reason for developing an over-arching framework for work on the Action Plan such as occurs in the defence sector with its Armaments Agency.
The use of force poses a difficult dilemma for EU countries. When applied to the recent Iraq crisis, the essential division in the EU was between those who were committed to follow due legal process (as many Europeans wanted to do, for example, by giving the international inspectors time to complete their work) and those for whom the US military timetable was paramount. For the EU, reconciling these approaches requires them to be more prepared to back up treaty obligations - ultimately - with force, whilst demanding that the US plays by the international legal rules, even when these do not appear to suit its immediate narrow national goals.
There also needs to be more careful consideration of how a pre-emptive action is defined. Whereas pre-emptive action to negate an imminent threat can be (although this is still contested by some) an accepted and legitimate act of self defence as understood by Article 51 of the UN Charter, to take action on the basis of a possible future threat - 'preventive' action - is legally questionable and much more controversial. By way of illustration: if a country is known to be preparing its nuclear missiles for launch against us we would be entitled to strike them first, but if we simply believe that an adversary is developing weaponry with which he might threaten us in the future our entitlement to attack him in the absence of imminent threat is far weaker.
The language in the security strategy has attracted criticism. On the one hand, for being vague about the specifics as to what 'effective' multilateralism actually means and, on the other, for introducing the possibility of the EU using force 'pre-emptively' and opaque references to "disarmament operations". Such criticisms miss the point. This new document is intended to provide broad guidelines that highlight European strengths and values in pursuing security priorities and provide a general framework within which traditional EU priorities (conflict prevention, poverty and governance within regional dialogue) are balanced with the new priorities of responding to WMD nonproliferation and international terrorism. They are aimed at addressing US security concerns but without endorsing US methods.
Some have argued that such a debate is academic because even if the political will existed for a European strategy of preventive war, the strategic capabilities to carry it out do not exist. Nevertheless, one can envisage some calling for a lower level of possible military interdiction and engagement of WMD threats. For instance:
'stop and search' role as being discussed by some member states within the US Proliferation Security Initiative;
'search and destroy' options for special forces in relation to non-state actors supplies of radiological, chemical or biological materials/agents;
'strategic raiding' of a states' clandestine NBC facility, perhaps by air or supported by special forces;
'providing military technical assistance' to states trying to safeguard civilian nuclear, chemical and biological facilities;
'homeland security' as being discussed by the current IGC on the EU's solidarity clause in responding to a WMD attack on the territory of the EU.
It is clear that the EU's member states have yet to take up Kofi Annan's recent challenge to discuss these issues at a national level never mind collectively. It is important, however, because the EU is also being used as a framework by the member states to help generate defence capabilities to meet widely acknowledged shortfalls. We now have in place an emerging security strategy and WMD framework in the form of the Action Plan and a requirement that defence has a role to play in responding to nonproliferation concerns. It is now time for a European Defence Review.
A European debate on the role of military force in supporting security objectives is long overdue. This has been highlighted by the role of European forces in Afghanistan and Iraq; the need for greater clarity on the purpose and role of the Petersberg Tasks as highlighted by Solana in his Security Strategy; and by the references to the use of force in the Action Plan.
Solana, his staff and the member states have shown their understanding that making multilateralism work effectively boils down to political will. The Security Strategy highlights the areas where EU states feel they can commit political capital to move the nonproliferation agenda forward in a co-ordinated manner. Difficult issues are skirted around. Mention of regional strategies and identification of the "needs" of proliferators is innovative and important.
Nuclear disarmament is neglected, presumably to avoid confrontations with the UK and France and to allow the broader agenda to move forward. Inevitably, there were also concerns that a full discussion on the use of force in a WMD strategy might raise questions about nuclear deterrence, on which EU countries hold an irreconcilable range of views. Whilst France and the UK have increased their co-ordination in the force posture of their 'minimum deterrents', they are far from joining forces and perhaps even further from putting them at the service of the visibly fractured and weak CFSP. Nor is it very likely that such a move would be welcomed by many other member states. The prospects for an EU nuclear 'deterrent' force remain far distant if not inconceivable.
More work is needed in fleshing out the future of the nonproliferation regimes. Moving ahead on export controls will be easier than the thorny issues that are bound to re-surface at the NPT PrepCom in Spring 2004 and that will definitely result from any challenge inspection under the CWC. Trying to move forward on strengthening BW arms control will probably be painfully slow in the aftermath of the collapse of the Protocol negotiations and the fissile material cut-off treaty has run into a cul-de-sac.
Flashpoints in North Korea and Iran will keep nonproliferation in the headlines but the outcomes in each case are unpredictable. Parallel declarations by the US Administration to develop new roles for its own nuclear weapons and the possible need to resume explosive testing in direct contravention of its own nonproliferation obligations will also complicate the debate.
Importantly, the European Security Strategy and the WMD framework are weak on internal responses to WMD proliferation (border controls, monitoring, responding to an attack etc). This should also be addressed. How the EU responds to a terrorist attack involving WMD will be crucial and the knock-on effect for the WMD nonproliferation regime may be profound. This is where the IGC will be expected to deliver in the context of the draft Constitution's 'solidarity clause'.
The November 17 adoption by the External Relations Council of a Common Position on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral nonproliferation agreements is an important political step. Another would be in meeting the EU Security Strategy's other goal on strengthening verification provisions. Step-by-step, the EU and the Action Plan are entering the security policy environment with concrete provisions to make multilateralism effective.
In many respects the Action Plan represents a first mapping of nonproliferation issues both old and new. If it is to provide a useful framework for the member states to move forward collectively it would benefit from an early success. This would help to maintain the political momentum necessary to develop the Action Plan into a real EU Strategy on WMD.
1.The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), founded in 1957, was incorporated as part of the European Union in order to oversee the safe development of European nuclear energy. Whilst generally treated separately from nonproliferation and arms control issues it provides the EU with a wealth of experience and expertise to draw upon in some of today's proliferation challenges.
2. Javier Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World, Thessaloniki European Council, June 19-20, 2003, page 10. In the new draft this has become 'preventive engagement'.
3.Ibid. page 12
4. This was followed by a seminar in the Council secretariat (including a presentation from SIPRI) on March 20, 2003.
5. General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), External Relations, Luxembourg April 14, 2003, 8220/03 Presse 105.
6. Note: confusingly this is sometimes referred to in documents as 'European Union Security Strategy' (EUSS).
7. See for instance: Gerrard Quille 'A Transatlantic approach to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Nonproliferation and Disarmament? European Security Review No. 16, February 2003 and Gerrard Quille 'A European response to WMD: prevention or pre-emption?', European Security Review, No. 18, July 2003
8. Solana, op. cit. At the time of writing the language in the first draft has been changed from 'the single most important threat...' to 'is potentially greatest threat to our security.' Whilst referring to the publicly available first draft we have drawn upon the language of the second draft that will be released in December.
9. 2541st Council meeting on External Relations, Brussels, November 17, 2003, Provisional Version, page 21.
10. 2553rd Council meeting on External Relations, Brussels, December 9, 2003, Provisional Version, page 12.
11. 2541st Council meeting on External Relations, Brussels November 17, 2003, Provisional Version, page 21
12. On December 9, the General Affairs Council renewed for one more year, until June 24, 2004, the Joint Action under which the budget line of the "EU cooperation programme aimed at nonproliferation and disarmament in Russia" could continue.
13. The Joint Action is dated from December 17, 1999. Official Journal of the European Communities, L 331, 23 December 1999, p. 11
14. See: Gerrard Quille, European Security Review, No. 20, December 2003 at http://www.isis-europe.org
15. See Joanna Spear, The Emergence of a European 'Strategic Personality', Arms Control Today, November 2003.
16. 2541st Council meeting on External Relations, Brussels November 17, 2003, Provisional Version, page 21
17. See endnote 13.
Dr Stephen Pullinger is Executive Director of the International Security Information Service (ISIS) UK and a Senior Adviser to Saferworld on WMD issues.
Dr Gerrard Quille is Deputy Director of the International Security Information Service (ISIS) Europe.
© 2003 The Acronym Institute.