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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NPT Review Conference 1995
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1995 NPT Review Conference, the Package of Decisions Adopted
Decision 1 : Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty
- The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons examined the implementation of article VIII, paragraph 3,
of the Treaty and agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation
of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and
the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.
- The States party to the Treaty participating in the Conference decided,
in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, that Review Conferences should
continue to be held every five years and that, accordingly, the next Review
Conference should be held in the year 2000.
- The Conference decided that, beginning in 1997, the Preparatory Committee
should hold, normally for a duration of 10 working days, a meeting in each
of the three years prior to the Review Conference. If necessary, a fourth
preparatory meeting may be held in the year of the Conference.
- The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider principles,
objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty,
as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review
Conference. These include those identified in the Decision on principles and
objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted on 11 May
1995. These meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the
next Review Conference.
- The Conference also concluded that the present structure of three main Committees
should continue and the question of an overlap of issues being discussed in
more than one Committee should be resolved in the General Committee, which
would coordinate the work of the Committees so that the substantive responsibility
for the preparation of the report with respect to each specific issue is undertaken
in only one Committee.
- It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established within the
respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so
as to provide for a focused consideration of such issues. The establishment
of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee
for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review
Conference.
- The Conference agreed further that Review Conferences should look forward
as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing,
including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the
Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further
progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address
specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty
and to achieve its universality.
Decision 2 : Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament
"The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons
Reaffirming the preamble and articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons,
Welcoming the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of international
tension and the strengthening of trust between States,
Desiring a set of principles and objectives in accordance with which
nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international cooperation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued and progress,
achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process
provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, the enhancement and
strengthening of which is welcomed,
Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control,
The Conference affirms the need to continue to move with determination
towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions
of the Treaty, and accordingly adopts the following principles and objectives:
Universality
- Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons
is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon
to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that
operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all
States parties to achieve this objective.
Non-proliferation
- The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger
of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has
a vital role to play in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every
effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,
without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to
the Treaty.
Nuclear disarmament
- Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international
tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed
following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear
disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon
States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good
faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.
- The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization
and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme of action
as reflected below:
(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations
on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force
of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise
utmost restraint;
(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on
a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production
of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference
on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;
(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and
progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate
goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Nuclear-weapon-free zones
- The conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free
zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of
the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security is reaffirmed.
- The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension,
such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of
all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged as a matter of priority,
taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. The establishment
of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time of the Review Conference
in the year 2000 would be welcome.
- The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support
for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such
nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant protocols.
Security Assurances
- Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which was
adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, as well as the declarations of the nuclear-weapon
States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further
steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the
Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could
take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.
Safeguards
- The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible
to verify and assure, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the
Agency's safeguard system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with
States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article
III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear
energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the International Atomic
Energy Agency in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding
non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States
parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information,
to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary
actions in accordance with its mandate.
- All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring
into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not yet done
so should do so without delay.
- International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards should be regularly assessed
and evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at further
strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards should be supported and
implemented and the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities
should be increased. Also, States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons should be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards
agreements with the Agency.
- New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable
material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the
processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon
States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency's
full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not
to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear
activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under Agency safeguards
in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the
nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
- Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the
inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and
in conformity with articles I, II as well as III of the Treaty.
- Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.
- In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party
to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into
account.
- Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within
the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party
to the Treaty.
- All States should, through rigorous national measures and international
cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including
in waste management, and observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials
accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials.
- Every effort should be made to ensure that the International Atomic Energy
Agency has the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively
its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and
nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts
aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable
and assured resources.
- Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes
jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application
of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant
appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations.
The Conference requests that the President of the Conference bring
the present decision, the decision on strengthening the review process for
the Treaty and the decision on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, to the attention of the heads of State or Government
of all States and seek their full cooperation on these documents and in
the furtherance of the goals of the Treaty.
Decision 3 : Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons
The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons,
Having convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995, in accordance
with articles VIII, paragraph 3, and X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons,
Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty and affirming that there
is a need for full compliance with the Treaty, its extension and its universal
adherence, which are essential to international peace and security and the attainment
of the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty
on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control,
Having reaffirmed article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and the need
for its continued implementation in a strengthened manner and, to this end,
emphasizing the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty
and the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament, also adopted by the Conference,
Having established that the Conference is quorate in accordance with
article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty,
Decides that, as a majority exists among States party to the Treaty
for its indefinite extension, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the
Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.
Resolution on the Middle East
(Proposed by the Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the United States of America.)
The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons,
Reaffirming the purpose and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons,
Recognizing that, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty, the establishment
of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to strengthening the international
non-proliferation regime,
Recalling that the Security Council, in its statement of 31 January
1992, affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear and all other weapons of mass
destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security,
Recalling also General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus supporting
the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the latest
of which is resolution 49/71 adopted of 15 December 1994,
Recalling further the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference
of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of Agency
safeguards in the Middle East, the latest of which is GC (XXXVIII)/RES/21 of
23 September 1994, and noting the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially
in areas of tension,
Bearing in mind Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and particularly
paragraph 14 thereof,
Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and paragraph 8 of the
decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,
Bearing in mind the other decisions adopted by the Conference on 11
May 1995,
- Endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process
and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute
to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other
weapons of mass destruction;
- Notes with satisfaction that, in its report (NPT/ CONF. 1995/MC.III/1),
Main Committee III of the conference recommended that the Conference "call
on those remaining States not Parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby
accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear
weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities";
- Notes with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reaffirms in this connection the recommendation
contained in section VI, paragraph 3, of the report of Main Committee III
urging those non-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full-scope
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
- Reaffirms the importance of the early realization of universal adherence
to the Treaty, and calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not
yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible
and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards;
- Calls upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps
in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment
of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction,
nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain
from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective;
- Calls upon all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend
their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring
the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of
nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
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