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Conclusion

The Acronym Institute's Submission to the Strategic Defence Review, 8 July 1998

The multipolar world has significant advantages, not least for its citizens. But it also contains new insecurities. To the extent that the doctrine of deterrence had any coherence, it relied on predictable and rational responses and stable and recognisable decisionmakers, authority and power in the key countries. This is lacking in this changing post Cold War global equation. Proliferation of WMD and nuclear accident remain serious threats, but possession of nuclear weapons offers no credible defence, only an invitation to do likewise. In this context, exempting nuclear weapons from the Strategic Defence Review was short-sighted, though psychologically understandable.

I have chosen to concentrate on two specific areas of security and defence: non proliferation and arms control. I have tried to identify opportunities for progress by means of five-power talks and multilateral negotiations, recognising that the multilateral and bilateral mechanisms are currently paralysed by political and domestic obstacles. It is very likely that Britain will cease to be a nuclear power during the next two decades. In that context it is vital for defence planning that we recognise this fact and its implications.

The policy options I have outlined range from the immediately do-able to the longer term 'desirable'. Some could be accomplished by unilateral initiative and voluntary declaration, as have all of Britain's recent withdrawals and cancellations of tactical nuclear weapon research or deployment. Others would be better negotiated among the P-5. One reason why I favour the medium of five-power talks is that they can be initiated easily by resuming the P-5 meetings in Geneva, which worked in the margins of the CTBT negotiations and for other purposes, such as working out the P-5 statement to the 1997 NPT PrepCom. If political conditions warrant or necessitate, the talks could be intensified in short summit meetings, although this would inevitably draw more public and media attention.

The agreements would not have to be elevated to treaty status (which would run into ratification problems in some of the key states). However, they could be codified and given some degree of political clout by being made the subject of five-power declarations and endorsed under the NPT process or through the UN Security Council. The fact that they would not be fully legally binding could provide reassurance for reluctant military establishments. They would be viewed as confidence-building measures which could be revoked in certain circumstances (such as renewal of the nuclear arms race by Russia or the United States). Inclusion of the agreements in P-5 statements to the NPT or Security Council would make them more politically binding than voluntary moratoria or measures. Presenting the agreements to meetings under the enhanced NPT would serve the dual purpose of giving them political authority and reinforcing the credibility of the international non-proliferation regime.

I am aware that most of my considerations and suggested policy options address defence and security in foreign policy terms, with diplomatic solutions rather than particular force dispositions or types of hardware or high tech intelligence equipment. The latter have their role to play, but in the coming century international relations, globally sensitive foreign policy, cooperation and diplomacy will need to carry the major burden of British security. This was acknowledged by the Defence Secretary when he announced that the Strategic Defence Review would be foreign policy led. However, the defence establishment and armed forces must endorse the approaches taken and adapt to the changes or diplomacy becomes a dog's dinner of competing interests and turf power plays. That would not make for coherent defence or long term security.