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British Policy and Parliament

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The Acronym Institute's Submission to the SDR

Introductory Note, by Rebecca Johnson

The Acronym Institute and Disarmament Diplomacy made a submission to the Strategic Defence Review on 1 July 1997. The submission was not intended for publication, although it has been placed (with our permission) in the House of Commons Library. In view of the public and international interest in the SDR since its publication, we have decided to make the Acronym submission to the SDR available on our website, with the following caveat. Because of the unexpectedly tight deadline imposed by the MOD, and prior commitments in Geneva and Washington, Rebecca Johnson wrote the Acronym submission in only three days. In places assessments are provided in brief and overly blunt shorthand, for which I apologise. Although I stand by the core analysis, some important issues were omitted and if I had been able to take more time I might have changed the emphasis or nuance of some of my arguments and proposals.

Submission to the British Government's Strategic Defence Review 1997

• Executive Summary

• Introduction

• I Looking to the future

  • Arms control: the international context
  • The Conference on Disarmament
  • NATO
  • The NPT

• II Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

  • Identifying the problem
  • biological weapons
  • chemical weapons
  • nuclear weapons
  • International obligations
  • Rationale for retaining British nuclear weapons
  • a 'sub-strategic' role for Trident?
  • 'the Russian Threat'
  • 'rogue states, proliferators and terrorists'

• III Policy Options

  • humanitarian missions
  • anti-personnel landmines
  • fissile materials ban
  • no replacement of Trident
  • nuclear weapon convention
  • no increase of nuclear weapons
  • de-alerting or de-mating
  • keeping nuclear weapons to NWS' own territory
  • security assurances and no first use
  • no new or qualitatively advanced nuclear weapons
  • transparency/nuclear arms register
  • sequestration/immobilisation of nuclear weapons
  • banning tactical nuclear weapons
  • restricting or prohibiting missile deployment

• Conclusion

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© 1998 The Acronym Institute.