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The Labour government braved unpopularity to undertake a thoroughgoing review of the health service, ruling out nothing. It is a sad reflection of the 1980s trauma still felt by sections of the Labour Party that the Secretary of State for Defence felt unable to make as fundamental a review of Britain's defence and security requirements. To declare the retention of British nuclear weapons as a bottom line is to turn Trident into a sacred cow. If the arguments for Trident are sufficient, the importance of maintaining the nuclear force should emerge from the defence review. If not, what is the purpose of retaining British nuclear weapons? The review is intended to identify the security challenges and plan security policy and defence resources to the year 2015. This period covers not only the deployment of Trident, but also the decision-making period for its replacement, if any. Nuclear weapons were an instrument of Cold War policy. It is right and necessary that they should be re-assessed in light of post-Cold War conditions and developments.
As in the United States, British military and political opinion on the utility of nuclear weapons is undergoing change. Analysis of the role of nuclear weapons in defence policy might lead to a number of decisions besides immediate elimination: for example, to consolidate at lower numbers by unilateral decision or mutually verifiable arrangements with the five NWS; to take weapons off alert status, either by removing the guidance systems or by separating warheads from the missiles; to merge British nuclear forces with those of France, for independent European deterrence. The point is that this discussion should not be pre-empted by an ideological declaration of nukes forever.
General Lee Butler, formerly the US Commander-in-Chief of strategic forces, criticised the Clinton administration's 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, saying that it cleared the agenda of some pressing force structure questions but "purposefully avoided the larger policy issues." It would be a great pity if the Labour government's defence review made the same short-sighted mistake.
Identifying the Problem
Curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was identified as a major priority by the Labour Party. How serious is the danger?
Biological Weapons
Britain has been an active participant in negotiations to strengthen the verification of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which entered into force in 1975 and now has 133 states parties. Almost any country could manufacture toxins, agricultural destroyers and nerve agents. It is more complicated to weaponise in large quantities and build a reliable missile delivery system. The countries of present concern to Britain are listed as: China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Russia, Syria and Taiwan. Terrorist use and attack with biological weapons is also of grave concern, as demonstrated by the sarin nerve gas attack by Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo underground. Because of the nature of the weapon and public abhorrence it is less likely that political groups with a liberation agenda would use biological weapons. The biggest danger lies in nihilistic terrorist factions or fundamentalist religious sects, which may flourish with the marked growth of Millennium Obsession Syndrome. Biological and chemical weapons (CBW) may become the choice for future terrorists because they do not require large facilities to make, and can be relatively easily transported, hidden and used. This relative ease of production may also make CBW more attractive to states who want to redress a perceived inferiority in their conventional forces or to 'balance' the nuclear capability of an adversary. Responding to proliferation requires a comprehensive approach, including technology denial through export control arrangements, regional confidence-building, and maintenance of cutting-edge research capabilities, providing active and passive defence. One problem with defence research in this field, such as that carried out in Porton Down, is that one country's defence capability is another's weapon of attack. Suspicion of the purpose of defence research programmes may provoke a proliferation spiral, increasing the risk of accident, theft or misuse of CBW.
Chemical Weapons
The Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force on April 29, 1997, with over 65 states parties. The United States Congress managed to ratify just in time, but Russia and China have not yet done so. The US and Russia possess the largest stocks of chemical weapons. Destruction of these stockpiles continues to be a major problem, particularly for Russia. Other countries of noted chemical weapon concern include Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Serbia. Middle Eastern countries have stated that they will join the CWC only when Israel dismantles its nuclear arsenal and joins the NPT.
Chemical weapons are known to have been used by the government of Saddam Hussein against his own people in Halabja, and in the Iran-Iraq war. There appeared to be a demonstrated willingness to use chemical weapons against the allied forces or Israel in the Gulf War, January 1991. The jury is still out on the question of whether chemical weapons were in fact used during that war or if allied troops have been affected by contamination when chemical munitions were destroyed. As with biological weapons, chemical weapons are sometimes regarded as the 'poor dictator's nukes' and the weapons of mass destruction most attractive to terrorists, since they are able to be relatively easily produced and stored.
The diffusion of cruise and ballistic missile technology capable of delivering a chemical warhead has increased demands in the United States and among some NATO countries and Japan for missile defence research schemes. Similarly there are growing arguments among some United States and Russian military planners to make explicit an extension of nuclear deterrence to CBW: i.e. to threaten nuclear retaliation if chemical or biological weapons were to be used. A few analysts have begun exploring an alternative approach, of restricting or prohibiting certain classes of missiles or technology. These are discussed more fully below.
Nuclear Weapons
Since 1989 the number of deployed nuclear weapons has more than halved, leading some to argue that the nuclear arms race has ceased for ever. Others consider the reductions as a cost-driven rationalisation of post-Cold War nuclear forces. There are still over 20,000 nuclear weapons in the operational inventories of the declared nuclear weapon states (NWS): Britain, China, France, Russia and the USA. The US has approximately 7900 strategic and 1000 tactical warheads; Russia has over 7,200 strategic and up to 4000 tactical warheads; China has an estimated 300 strategic and 150 tactical warheads; while France retains over 500. Britain has fewer than 300 warheads, with the last of the WE-177 nuclear free fall bombs due to be removed by the end of 1998 and not replaced.
The Labour Party pledged "to ensure that Trident carries no more warheads than Polaris". There has been some uncertainty and debate over how many warheads were carried on Chevaline, deployed between 1982 and 1996. Norris, Burrows and Fieldhouse concluded from classified US sources that Chevaline carried two warheads. In this case, the commitment to deploy no more warheads than Polaris would result in an operational deployment of up to 96 warheads (assuming one submarine in refit, 32 per boat).
Three non-NPT states, India, Israel and Pakistan, have also developed a nuclear capability, although assessments vary regarding the degree to which they have weaponised. By latest estimates, Israel has around 100 warheads (this has been revised downwards from estimates of over 200 warheads in 1995). India may have fewer than ten. Pakistan is thought unlikely to have weaponised but may have produced some simple bombs. South Africa had made some 6-8 nuclear devices, which it dismantled when it joined the NPT in 1992. Following successful diplomatic negotiations, the heavily nuclear-armed former Soviet republics Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan, joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) and gave up their nuclear weapons for dismantling in Russia.
Some NPT parties are also regarded as nuclear wannabes, with considerable evidence that Iraq's programme was more advanced and sophisticated than intelligence had indicated before 1991. North Korea and Iran are still of proliferation concern. North Korea may have diverted plutonium for a small number of bombs, while Iran is persistently suspected of interest in the blackmarket purchase of fissile materials from Russia.
International Obligations
Britain is a party to the NPT, BWC and CWC. With regard to the latter two, we are among the forefront of states seeking to strengthen the international treaty regimes and verification capabilities. With regard to the NPT, Britain is regarded as delinquent. The United Kingdom frequently comes in for criticism for failing to take its obligations seriously, especially with regard to Article VI.
Britain, as one of the five identified NWS has sometimes flaunted this status as though it were conferred in perpetuity. The purpose of distinguishing between nuclear possessors and the 'have-nots' in 1968 was to formulate different obligations, not to confirm inequalities. There was a recognition during the Cold War nuclear arms race that eliminating the great arsenals would be a long a delicate process, so the Treaty articulated a long-term objective of nuclear disarmament, while at the same time distinguishing two kinds of obligations for the NWS and the NNWS as long as nuclear weapons were still in existence.
As an NPT party (and depositary), Britain has obligations under the Treaty not to "transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices." (Article I). The possible violation of this article by NATO military strategy was raised during the NPT Conference in 1995 (principally by Mexico) and again during the first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the enhanced review process (by South Africa).
For most NPT states, the fulfilment of Article VI of the NPT is fundamental to the Treaty's long term credibility: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." During the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, inadequate progress on nuclear disarmament was the reason most often cited by NNWS who opposed indefinite extension. They feared that making the Treaty permanent would freeze the nuclear status quo. In giving up the leverage implicit in a shorter extension in favour of indefinite extension, which was strongly advocated by the United States, Britain, France and Russia, some of the NNWS pushed instead for greater accountability. Their determination to maintain pressure for full implementation of the NPT resulted in a package of decisions on a strengthened review process. In effect, the enhanced review process means that NPT Parties will meet during four out of every five years to measure progress and discuss more effective implementation of the Treaty.
Where Article VI makes a vague commitment to 'pursue negotiations in good faith', the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament agreed in May 1995 requires "the determine pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all states of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." In July 1996 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave an advisory opinion on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in response to a request from the UN General Assembly (UNGA res. 49/75K). On the question of the legality of using nuclear weapons the Court was divided. It ruled that "a threat or use of nuclear weapons contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter...that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful." Therefore, it followed that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law." However, the Court could not "conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake." The 7-7 split on this paragraph is misleading as some judges voted against because they disagreed that any threat or use of nuclear weapons could be lawful, while others opposed because they considered the self-defence criterion to be too narrow.
The ICJ was unanimous that "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control"[emphasis added]. This unanimous opinion was not a mis-statement of Article VI, as suggested by UK representatives in the UN GA First Committee in November 1996. It was an interpretation of the meaning of the Article VI obligation in light of other international legal consideration. The President of the Court, Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui of Algeria, went even further: "Nuclear weapons, the ultimate evil, destabilize humanitarian law, which is the law of the lesser evil. The existence of nuclear weapons is therefore a challenge to the very existence of humanitarian law."
The ICJ gave only an advisory opinion, not a judgement or ruling. It is not binding on any government. However, it is indicative of a growing and important trend in international opinion. It coincided in 1996 with three other significant events in nuclear arms control history: the signing of the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT); publication of the Canberra Commission Report, sponsored by the Australian government; and the December 5 call for 'urgent and deep nuclear disarmament' by 61 retired senior military officers from 17 countries, including Britain, France, Russia and the United States. This followed on from a three-point plan outlined by General Lee Butler, retired Commander-in-Chief of the US strategic nuclear forces:
"First...for the declared nuclear-weapon States to accept that the Cold War is in fact over, to break free of the norms, attitudes and habits that perpetuate enormous inventories, forces standing alert and targeting plans encompassing thousands of aimpoints. Second for the undeclared States to embrace the harsh lessons of the Cold War: that nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, hugely expensive, and militarily inefficient; that implacable hostility and alienation will almost certainly over time lead to a nuclear crisis; that the failure of nuclear deterrence would imperil not just the survival of the antagonists, but of every society; and that nuclear war is a raging, insatiable beast whose instincts and appetites we pretend to understand but cannot possibly control. Thirdly, given its crucial leadership role, it is essential for the United States to undertake as a first order of business a sweeping review of its nuclear policies and strategies. The Clinton administration's 1993 [sic] Nuclear Posture Review was an essential but far from sufficient step toward rethinking the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. While clearing the agenda of some pressing force structure questions, the NPT purposefully avoided the larger policy issues."
Rationale for retaining British nuclear weapons
During the 1950s, there appeared to be three dominant themes underlying British nuclear policy: international status and prestige, expressed as the necessity to avoid sending a Foreign Secretary "naked into the conference chamber"; the importance of demonstrating an independent British nuclear deterrent; and defence against a 'potential aggressor'. In the early days, the 'potential aggressor' was clearly the Soviet Union, but never named. By 1980, when the decision was taken to replace Polaris with Trident, the objective was defined as "inflicting, on key aspects of Soviet state power, damage which any Soviet leadership would regard as out of all proportion to any likely gains from aggression against us."
The culture of secrecy in Britain, especially where defence and nuclear matters are concerned, means there is a dearth of published policy discussions on these issues for the 1950s to 1980s. Gradually, during the 1980s, the government began to publish more information about nuclear weapon policy and dispositions, including Polaris and Trident, in annual statements to Parliament on the defence estimates and in Defence Open Government Documents from the Defence Council. The clearest expression of the Conservative Party's post Cold War rationale for the retention of nuclear weapons was delivered in November 1993 by Malcolm Rifkind, who was then the Secretary of State for Defence. Rifkind argued that: "Our analysis of deterrence, and the contribution of nuclear weapons to it, now has to relate to a new context." He came up with a host of rationalisations, utilising both traditional arguments and new threat concerns, summarised below:
i) nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented;
ii) Russia as the potential aggressor: "There is no question that Russia will remain the pre-eminent military power in Europe. She will retain very substantial military forces, and will continue to be a nuclear superpower...decisions about our own future force structures and postures should take into careful account what has proved hitherto to be successful in maintaining stability in the presence of Russia's military strength."
iii) current positive developments are not necessarily irreversible;
iv) war prevention (this appears to be a version of the simplistic argument that nuclear weapons have kept the peace in Europe for 50 years);
v) the possibility of a new East-West threat and the "possibility of the renationalisation of defence, by which we mean a diminishing of commitment to collective security and a re-emergence of purely national policies." Is this a coded reference to Germany or Japan or warning of other emerging powers?
vi) maintaining the Atlantic Alliance
vii) European defence considerations and closer Franco-British cooperation and cohesion in nuclear matters: "there are no differences between France and the United Kingdom on the fundamental nuclear issues".
viii) deterring potential proliferators;
xi) deterring chemical or biological attack.
Rifkind then went on to say: "The basic ideas do not change. Deterrence is about sustaining in the mind of the potential aggressor a belief that our use of the weapons could not prudently be altogether discounted; and this in turn requires that the hypothetical use should be credibly proportionate to the importance to us of the interests which aggression would damage." He acknowledged that "Those conditions may not be so obviously met in future as they seemed to be in the central setting of the Cold War...There will be more room for uncertainty over the nature and scale of aggression that would justify the threat of a nuclear response." Rifkind then questioned whether, in the absence of an "established nuclear deterrent relationship" such as the East-West blocs of the Cold War, "an intended deterrent would work in the way intended... Would the threat be understood in the deterrent way in which it was intended; and might it have some unpredictable and perhaps counter-productive consequence?"
Given the Labour Party's stated desire for a bi-partisan approach to defence, it is worth looking closely at Rifkind's rationale for Trident. Unencumbered by Labour's historical baggage with regard to unilateral nuclear disarmament (both commitment to and the knee-jerk phobia against), it is interesting to note that at several points Rifkind seems uncertain or unconvinced by his own arguments for Trident's mission or utility. Some of his positions were little more than ideological clichés of the Cold War era. On the question of military utility, the most telling argument related to whether nuclear weapons could be extended to cover other weapons of mass destruction. His theories on the necessity of nuclear weapons in maintaining the Atlantic alliance and keeping abreast of France are pre-eminently about political relations, not military utility, and subject to political changes affecting NATO and the EU.
The Canberra Commission intelligently rebutted others, including i)nuclear weapons deter the use of other weapons of mass destruction; ii) they have prevented and will continue to be needed to prevent war between the major power; iii) they deter and if necessary could defeat large scale conventional aggression by regional powers; iv) they protect the credibility of security assurances to allies; v) they provide effective defence at lower cost. The Canberra Commission also addressed two arguments not made by Rifkind but often evoked by the former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher: that nuclear weapons confer political status and influence; and that the elimination of nuclear weapons is unverifiable. I do not need to repeat the Canberra Commission's arguments here as they should be familiar to all.
Rifkind sounded uncertain about a future credible role for Trident. In arguing that Britain's nuclear reliance does not mean that other countries would receive the benefits of deterrence if they acquired nuclear weapons, he argued that deterrence had to be learned and 'embedded in strategic thinking'. He contended that it is possible to translate the stability of learned deterrence to the post-Cold War era, but failed to address how this would be compromised by the recognised instabilities in Russia. Russia has serious and continuing problems of nationalism and regional disintegration, as well as problems of political and military authority and decision-making. These would seem to be crucial factors limiting his argument.
Warning of the dangers of proliferation, Rifkind noted that "the process of achieving a new stable relationship of nuclear deterrence is a process of evolution which unavoidably involves risks, where the consequences of failure could be catastrophic. The acquisition of nuclear weapons might lead a country to believe that it could achieve a regional hegemony that was not possible with conventional weapons alone. The prospect of a neighbour or near-neighbour acquiring such weapons might lead other countries to consider some form of pre-emption, and so on." Rifkind accurately identified some of the risks and dynamics of proliferation. It is necessary to go further and be prepared to look at how the existing nuclear weapon states -- especially the smaller ones -- reinforce the myths of nuclear possession. Though it would be naive to attribute any country's nuclear ambitions to the possession of nuclear weapons by Britain and France, the emphasis placed by Britain and France on the role of nuclear weapons in guaranteeing their security and use their nuclear power status to 'punch above their weight' makes the marginalisation of nuclear weapons more difficult and contributes to undermining international strategies of nuclear non-proliferation.
A 'sub-strategic' role for Trident?
Trident is a long range ballistic missile with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) warheads, mounted on long-service nuclear-powered submarines. The intended role during design and purchase was strategic. With the ending of the Cold War, and discussion of deterring 'rogue states' and chemical and biological attack, planners have argued that Trident would be too heavy handed, and might not be an effective deterrent because the conditions under which it could be used would be so limited. Rifkind acknowledged this: "...the ability to undertake a massive strike with strategic systems is not enough to ensure deterrence. An aggressor might, in certain circumstances, gamble on a lack of will ultimately to resort to such dire action. It is therefore important for the credibility of our deterrent that the United Kingdom also possesses the capability to undertake a more limited nuclear strike in order to induce a political decision to halt aggression by delivering an unmistakable message of our willingness to defend our vital interests to the utmost." This was further clarified in 1994, when Douglas Hogg defined the sub-strategic role as "a means of inducing an aggressor to cease aggression without triggering strategic nuclear exchanges". This amounts to a role for Trident as a 'shot across the bows', using single low-yield warheads in place of the present 100kt, MIRV capability. However, it would be a high risk warning shot if ever used against another NWS, since there is no guarantee that this sub-strategic nuclear shot would not trigger a nuclear response. If used against a NNWS it may well violate the security assurances and would be likely to be condemned internationally as 'disproportionate'. Arming Trident with single low-yield warheads would either reduce the warhead complement further, or might prompt a government to increase the number of warheads in order to maintain Polaris levels of 'explosive power'.
The thinking behind sub-strategic deterrence is to utilise Trident more flexibly. However, Rifkind ruled out the use of low yield nuclear weapons in a 'surgical strike' role: "The implications of such a development of a new war-fighting role for nuclear weapons would be seriously damaging to our approach to maintaining stability in the European context, quite apart from the impact it would have on our efforts to encourage non-proliferation and greater confidence outside Europe. This is not a route that I would wish any nuclear power to go down." Rifkind's arguments for eschewing mini-nuke or micro-nuke warfighting roles should be heeded by the Labour government. Consequently, about all that is left of the sub-strategic concept is the shot across the bows. Whether it is workable or not is unlikely to be put to the test. The ephemeral in pursuit of the unriskable is not a very convincing utility for an expensive system like Trident.
'The Russian Threat'
In the late 1990s the major threat from Russia is not of invasion or external aggression using nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. If this was not desirable or feasible for the Soviet Union during the Cold War, which most analysts now recognise, it is even less so now. Yet Russian instability and its possession of large arsenals of WMD do pose a significant risk, which Britain needs to develop credible policies to counteract. The wars of nationalism and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia could be repeated elsewhere in the ex-Soviet bloc if Russia disintegrates further or criminal and nationalist populists gain power and weapons. Civil war rather than international ambitions poses the near term threat. So do the state of Russia's nuclear industry and its poverty stricken armed forces. The former President of Russia's National Security Council, General Alexander Lebed, gave a frightening assessment of the safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons and fissile materials in November 1996. He noted Russia's growing vulnerability at nuclear plants and military facilities, caused by poor security and low morale, concluding that "through nuclear terrorism and blackmail, a handful of scoundrels can give the world a tremendous headache."
The recent edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists gives a grim picture of Russia's nuclear and military problems. This was confirmed by Russian participants at the June 1997 Carnegie Endowment Conference in Washington. They also warned of a re-evaluation and reinforcement of the political and military utility accorded to nuclear weapons. Powerful interest groups within MinAtom, the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces want Russia to maintain many of its tactical nuclear systems and research new 'flexible' types of weapons, as a means to offset Russia's declining conventional capability. NATO expansion, the threat to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by proposed US missile defences, and CBW threats were all cited as justifications for Russia to reinvigorate its nuclear weapons programme, despite its lack of funds.
In a recent statement to the CD in Geneva, Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov noted that some of these concerns had been addressed in the Founding Act of Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and NATO, as well as the Helsinki Summit agreement with the United States regarding START III and assurances given on the ABM Treaty. Others fear that the cracks were only papered over and that more serious attention must be given to reducing Russia's sense of vulnerability, and diminishing its perceived threat of encirclement from NATO. Russia also fears that its deterrence posture may be undermined through missile defence programmes. Although Russia lacks the money to retain large strategic arsenals, their would be strong domestic pressure to do so to counteract missile defences. The key questions for Britain are:
The Defence Review would also have to consider how it would respond should Russia emerge as a military threat to Europe. However, planning military forces and weapons to defend against this risk should not be exclusively prioritised. Enemies can be created as well as destroyed, and it is the challenge of intelligent foreign policy to steer between the two. As noted above, many fear that the shortsighted and mishandled response of NATO expansion to the aspirations of former Soviet-bloc countries to be accepted into the economic and security arrangements of the West could be worse than a missed opportunity; it may deliver Russia into the hands of nationalists and hawks.
It would be preferable to postpone the expansion of NATO and re-consider the alternatives. If it has gone too far for the basic decisions to be revisited, there are policies that may minimise the perceived threats from enlargement and reassure Russian public opinion. In an expansive (and perhaps not sober) gesture after signing the Founding Act, President Boris Yeltsin pledged to take warheads off the missiles of all Russian weapons pointed at NATO countries. The spin-doctors moved swiftly to say that he meant de-targeting. Russia already has bilateral de-targeting agreements with Britain and the United States. These are symbolically useful and make it less likely that an accidental firing would annihilate major centres of population, but the missiles can be retargeted in seconds. President Chirac reportedly believed that Yeltsin's promise indeed related to de-alerting, with a possible three stage process: deprogramming the missiles' targeting mechanisms; de-mating the warheads from their delivery vehicles; and finally destroying the warheads (by treaty agreement). Primakov also underlined Yeltsin's proposal that all nuclear weapons should be withdrawn to the territory of the NWS that owned them.
'Rogue States, Proliferators and Terrorists'
These are heavily laden terms, which I do not necessarily endorse, but which are convenient shorthand, recognisable to defence planners. This group, which comprises different regimes to different governments at different times, is often cited as a reason for needing to keep nuclear weapons or for building missile defences. Yet there is little that a nuclear weapon could be used for except retaliation, which would generally be contrary to international law and counterproductive in foreseeable circumstances. It is extremely improbable that one of these regimes would have the capability or military interest to launch a missile attack on Britain or other European countries. (Israel faces a more credible threat of such an attack.) If a government wished to strike at the heart of Britain with WMD, a personal means of delivery would be more efficient and less detectable. In all cases, the best defence against the rogue or terroristic use of WMD is prevention: strengthening the international treaty and verification regimes; restricting access to the materiel and technology; monitoring possible production facilities. To this should be added two means that Britain's present policies undermine: marginalising the role of nuclear weapons and restricting arms sales (which boost military élites and ambitions).
The international community should explore ways of extending the missile control technology regime (MTCR) and placing legally binding and verifiable restrictions or prohibitions on the production and deployment of intermediate-range missiles, whose primary role is for delivering WMD. Not only are nuclear weapons an inappropriate and futile response to threats of WMD attack by fanatical regimes, groups or individuals. The infrastructure, production facilities, storage and transport requirements of maintaining nuclear weapons in the NWS, including Britain, may in the future provide the routes by which 'rogue' regimes and terrorists gain access to nuclear weapons. In this regard, the separation of plutonium and enrichment of uranium for commercial purposes (such as that carried out at Sellafield), also pose a proliferation hazard that could threaten Britain's security in the future as previous arms sales to Iraq for commercial gain threatened our citizens and troops in 1990-91.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.