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Back to the main page on the First Committee
Merav Datan and Rebecca Johnson
Note: The first part of this thematic overview of the main substantive issues raised during the First Committee General Debate covers nuclear, chemical and biological disarmament, outer space and missiles, and themes of terrorism and reform. The overview does not purport to be a summary and does not cover the resolutions and the more in depth 'cluster' debates and interactive discussions that took place in the third week, which will be addressed at a later date. Where obtainable, quotations are taken from the statements, but in some cases contemporaneous notes have been used.
We hope to provide Part II on conventional weapons (such as small arms and light weapons) as soon as it is ready.
The First Committee of the 59th UN General Assembly opened its session on October 4 and will run to November 5, 2004. Chaired by Ambassador Luis Alfonso de Alba of Mexico, the First Committee has debated a range of issues, from weapons of mass destruction to small arms and light weapons, prevention of the weaponisation of space to regional security, including the UN's disarmament machinery and First Committee reform, part of wider moves within the United Nations to reform the GA and its committee work. Below we provide an overview on: nonproliferation and terrorism; multilateralism, verification and the rule of law; lack of progress in disarmament; concerns about the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in the run-up to the 2005 review conference; prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), missile proliferation and MANPADs; chemical and biological weapons; and reform of the First Committee. We hope to provide more coverage on conventional, small arms and light weapons shortly.
On October 26, the Committee will begin voting on the draft resolutions and decisions that have been introduced for consideration in 2004, as listed below.
Frequently repeating and expanding upon statements made by heads of state and foreign ministers to the General Assembly in September, the First Committee General Debate (October 4-14) saw states commenting on developments in the area of peace and security over the past year, such as those relating to Iran, Libya, North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - DPRK), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and UN Security Council resolution 1540 on weapons of mass destruction.
While developments and issues relating to particular concerns or sponsorship of resolutions were highlighted, many statements echoed the principal themes of the 58th First Committee (2003), and almost all the resolutions are repeats, though some at least have been reworded and updated. Reflecting the post 9/11 concerns about terrorism, and bolstering previous resolutions on missiles and small arms and light weapons (SALW), there are new resolutions this year supporting the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) on ballistic missile proliferation and addressing the problem of MANPADS. Efforts are also being made to harmonise a US-sponsored resolution with a rival resolution on reform sponsored by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Instead of reintroducing last year's withdrawn resolution calling for a conference of parties to nuclear weapon free zones, Mexico now has support for its offer to host such a conference in the run-up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
Opening the 2004 First Committee, the 59th Chair, Ambassador Luis Alfonso de Alba of Mexico, observed that the multilateral system for disarmament and international security was in a state of paralysis, mentioning specifically the Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD). He said that the FC had a duty to reaffirm the urgent need for progress and to identify practical measures. The universal political and normative environment needs to be more conducive to dialogue than it is, based on shared interests and enabling collective action. The Chair also welcomed Cheryl Stoute, who had become the first woman to hold the post of Committee Secretary.
UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Nobuyasu Abe recalled former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's reference to the GA disarmament resolutions as "hardy perennials" which, although non-binding, "contribute to a larger process of developing norms to guide the conduct of our Member States." He pointed to the need to reconcile two "often-competing" objectives: to be realistic - in goals and means - and adapt to changing realities, and to maintain our "profound commitments" to basic principles such as those of the UN Charter that "are not subject to re-negotiation every year". Abe broadly outlined current disarmament issues and drew attention to the work of the Department for Disarmament Affairs' regional centres and their need for more funding and assistance, particularly the Regional Center in Lome, Togo.
Sri Lanka observed that the FC is again meeting "at a time when the international security situation is in crisis" noting specifically the "tragic events of September in Russia" which have "returned the spectre of international terrorism to haunt us". In this context Sri Lanka observed that "[i]t had been assumed for a long time that the security of a nation state could best be assured on a weapon-based system relying on ever-greater technological advances. Yet we have in recent times seen that such impressive arsenals could not deter terrorists or non-state actors". Sri Lanka noted that "the recurrence of tragedies, aimed at the mostly militarily powerful of nation states, underlines the need for us to reflect deeply on the issues of security and the urgent need to work together to consolidate the international legal regime using all the branches of the UN system."
The threat of terrorism and the importance of efforts to combat it featured prominently in the statements of many states. References to Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 of April 28, 2004, on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were mixed. Russia, noting that a "particular topicality of effective measures in non-proliferation today is dictated also by a threat of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists," said that the adoption of UNSC 1540, which included "Russia's most active participation", provided a "sound groundwork for countering WMD black markets". At the same time, "the tasks of countering WMD proliferation and combating terrorism should be resolved in strict conformity with the norms of international law, and taking into account legitimate interests of security and development of all states."
While many states expressed support for UNSC 1540 as an important contribution to preventing the acquisition of WMD by nonstate actors, several noted in this context the importance of implementing, respecting and strengthening existing treaties. Singapore, for example, said the issues of disarmament, nonproliferation and terrorism were "inter-related"; while supporting UNSC 1540, Singapore called also for "universal adherence to multilateral arms control and non-proliferation treaties". Some states also cautioned against allowing the Security Council to adopt measures that circumvent the multilateral treaty negotiating process, while a number pointed out that the most effective measure for preventing nonstate access to WMD was through their elimination via "multilaterally negotiated disarmament agreements". As Mexico phrased it: "the success of the strategy in combating terrorism, in particular on the dangerous front of weapons of mass destruction, necessarily hinges on the implementation of the disarmament objectives." Jamaica was another that regarded the complete elimination of WMD a "preferable approach" adding that it is "important that such binding commitments should more properly be negotiated in a more inclusive, open and comprehensive manner". Bangladesh, India and others also drew attention to the Indian-sponsored GA consensus resolution of the past two years on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD (a resolution which is being presented again this year), with some states also reiterating in this context that the most effective way to achieve this goal is through the total elimination of all mass destruction weapons. Israel, which also referred to the dangers from MANPADs, said that the threat of terrorists acquiring WMD "combined with the broadening trend of suicide terrorism, provides a potentially apocalyptic vehicle for all who would totally obstruct the changes for a climate of security and stability."
As analysed in Disarmament Diplomacy 78, the European Union (EU) this year adopted a European Security Strategy and EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Netherlands, as current president of the EU, called WMD proliferation "potentially the greatest threat to global security", noting the possibilities of a WMD race and of acquisition by nonstate actors. Terrorism, regional conflicts, state failure (including civil conflict and bad governance), and organised crime are the other "key threats" identified by the EU. Such "essentially global" threats require global responses, including "fundamentally rethinking our ways of addressing the threats". The EU expressed strong support for UNSC 1540 as one of the necessary instruments and policies, none of which is sufficient in itself, and which also include multilateral treaties with effective verification, export controls, cooperative threat reduction programmes, PSI, and "as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter". The Netherlands outlined the EU's three strategic objectives, which may be shared by any country that accepts its analysis of the threats: addressing the threats, fostering regional security, and "an international order based on the rule of law and on effective multilateralism." Several states, notably Turkey and Ukraine, highlighted their support for or participation in PSI-related activities. Although the prime driver behind UNSC 1540, the United States did not mention it during the General Debate, though President Bush CHECK
Mention of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network was made by the United States, Israel and the Republic of Korea, among others. Pakistan, without naming this network, stated that it "has adopted comprehensive measures to prevent WMD proliferation", including "effective steps, in cooperation with the international community, to eliminate an underground proliferation network which had its tentacles in two dozen countries".
Growing concerns about the neoconservative-driven erosion of confidence in multilateralism and the rule of law have prompted a NAM-sponsored resolution, now tabled for the fourth year. On this subject, Malaysia said it "shares the view of many countries" that verification and enforcement relating to WMD require the strengthening of multilateral treaty-based mechanisms, "without resorting to other means, such as calling for action through the Security Council". Malaysia therefore considered that full adherence to disarmament treaties was "the only sustainable approach towards multilateral disarmament and prevention of proliferation activities."
For Sri Lanka, multilateralism is important, especially with regard to disarmament, because it "serves the interests of small states". Bangladesh said it "remain[s] convinced that establishment of [the] rule of law and multilateralism is the only option for us in dealing with the issues relating to international peace and security including disarmament." China observed that in the face of "ever more rampant" terrorism and the danger of WMD proliferation, no country can stand alone and we are "duty bound to push forward the multilateral arms control and disarmament process."
Similarly, Canada "continue[s] to believe that the best way of dealing with contemporary security threats is through multilateral cooperation premised on the rule of law. Legally binding agreements equipped with robust verification provisions that afford a high degree of assurance that any non-compliance will be detected, remain, in our estimation, the preferred means for consolidating advances on the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament front." Canada drew attention to its resolution on verification that proposed the establishment in 2006 of a panel of government experts "to consider and report in the same year concerning the issue of verification, the 16 principles and the appropriate UN role therein."
Mexico observed that "the international strategy to combat terrorism tends to emphasize non-proliferation in detriment of disarmament objectives and in particular the obligations of nuclear States in the disarmament field." Brazil said that the Rio Group (19 Latin American countries and a CARICOM representative) "is convinced that an effective multilateralism is the only path to the maintenance of international peace and security."
Quoting his own 2003 First Committee remarks that the international community "stood at a crossroads that would determine whether multilateral arms control institutions could break away from Cold War-era thinking and address new and emerging threats", Stephen Rademaker, US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, entitled his 2004 FC statement "On the test of effective multilateralism: meeting the dangers of the world with resolve". Citing remarks by President Bush in London that "the success of multilateralism is not measured by adherence to forms alone, the tidiness of the process, but by the results we achieve to keep our nations secure", Rademaker drew attention to the Joint Statement on Multilateralism issued by President Bush and UK Prime Minister Blair on November 20, 2003, which "emphasized that, 'Effective multilateralism, and neither unilateralism nor international paralysis, will guide our approach.'" From the US perspective, however, "progress over the past year toward our goal of effective multilateralism in the area of arms control and disarmament has been mixed"... "Candor requires us to admit ... that we are dismayed by the current state of the multilateral arms control machinery". Therefore, although the United States "has made clear its support for the principle of 'effective multilateralism' ... [i]t would defy logic ... to expect states to continue to rely on multilateral processes if doing so has the effect of preventing all action."
The DPRK, which announced its withdrawal from the 189-member NPT in 2003, used the FC opportunity to complain that "[u]nilateralism based on the supremacy of power ruthlessly destroys the norms and order of international relations". In particular, "[c]ountries are designated as 'axis of evil' and 'targets for preemptive nuclear strikes' and the unilateral military attacks against sovereign States are perpetrated under the pretext of 'suspicion over the possession of weapons of mass destruction' [which is] nothing but an artificial pretext to realize the policy of nuclear threat of a nuclear superpower aimed at controlling the world by maintaining the nuclear supremacy and nuclear threats. The development in Iraq proves it."
Undoubtedly in reaction to the recent shift towards nonproliferation through policing initiatives such as PSI and UNSC 1540, the interdependence of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation featured in many individual and group statements, as did concerns about the lack of progress in implementing the 2000 NPT agreements on nuclear disarmament, and specific issues such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a fissban or fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) and security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states.
Nonproliferation and disarmament
"Nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation are mutually reinforcing processes"
declared the New Agenda Coalition (NAC, composed of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland,
Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden), coordinated this First Committee
by Sweden. Nonproliferation is "vital" but "not sufficient". The EU, represented
by the Netherlands, stressed that disarmament and nonproliferation "should not
be viewed as a stand-alone issue." They are "fully interlinked with other questions
of security and stability, on the global and regional level."
India reiterated its position that the "focus on pursuing the goals of non-proliferation, without progress towards global and complete nuclear disarmament, may be detrimental and counter-productive" and that only such global and complete nuclear disarmament "within a time-bound framework" can eliminate the danger of nuclear war. In this context India recalled the 1998 Rajiv Gandhi plan. Nepal noted that "[t]here is no doubt that disarmament and non-proliferation will need to go hand in hand."
Sri Lanka considered nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation to be "two faces of the same coin", and expressed concern that delinking them was "fraught with danger, contributing to the crisis of confidence, particularly untenable" in the run-up to the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT. Uganda hoped that the 2005 NPT Review Conference "will reiterate and underline the umbilical link between non-proliferation and disarmament."
NPT Concerns
As touched on in the previous section, several kinds of concerns were raised
about the NPT and the challenges it faces in the run-up to the 2005 Review Conference.
These encompassed: the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and, in particular,
the failure of the nuclear weapon states to work towards the elimination of
their arsenals as agreed in 2000; lack of universality, particularly in unstable
regions such as the Middle East and South Asia; threats to the integrity of
the NPT regime arising from DPRK's announced withdrawal and the less-than-transparency
behaviour of some states, notably Iran; and the need for more effective security
assurances. Disappointment over the failure of the 2004 Preparatory Committee
(PrepCom) meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference to reach agreement on a
draft document on substantive and procedural matters was also a recurring theme.
The United States observed that the 2005 NPT Review Conference "is occurring at time of unprecedented challenge to the Treaty's non-proliferation goals" with "deliberate violations of Articles II and III of the Treaty and an announcement of withdrawal", specifically naming developments over the past year involving Libya, the Khan network, North Korea and Iran. The US referred to the NPT as "a vitally important tool" in furthering the goals of nonproliferation and keeping "nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists." Noting that "some argue that there is also a question of compliance by the nuclear weapon states with Article VI of the Treaty" Rademaker argued that with regard to the United States, "any such suggestion is both unjust and untrue". Likewise, Russia claimed that it "strictly and consistently implements its obligations and initiatives in nuclear disarmament, particularly within the framework of Article VI of the Treaty. Our practical deeds are there to prove it."
By contrast, although the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty between Russia and the United States was deemed to be a "step in the right direction", the New Agenda Coalition objected that it "is neither irreversible nor transparent". Moreover, "[i]nstead of eliminating nuclear weapons, some nuclear powers have plans to modernize or develop new kinds or new uses of nuclear weapons or new rationales for them. Some even entertain the notion that nuclear weapons may be used pre-emptively against non-nuclear weapon states, or see them as a possible defense against conventional weapons." According to Kazakhstan, the NPT has been "seriously eroded because of destructive actions on the part of a number of known states" and the regime now faces a "formidable threat."
Many states called for preserving the integrity of the nonproliferation regime and specifically for the implementation of the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament identified at the 2000 NPT Review conference. The New Agenda Coalition observed that the NPT is a "legally binding agreement which cannot be complied with à la carte" and "relies on a fine balance between its three pillars: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy". NAC member New Zealand added that the "most effective non-proliferation moves we could make collectively would be to ensure and enhance compliance with the NPT in all its aspects including nuclear disarmament, to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into force, and to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty." In this context, any multilateral disarmament treaty must include "a robust and comprehensive verification mechanism" in order to be effective. Brazil, on behalf of the Rio Group, stressed that "all commitments must be respected - not only non-proliferation, but also concrete disarmament, verification and the inalienable right to the development of nuclear technology for peaceful use."
Iran, under suspicion for its previously clandestine uranium enrichment and other nuclear programmes, again emphasised that it was "determined to realize its right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as enshrined in the Article IV" of the NPT. Iran pointed out the "reluctance" of certain nuclear weapon states to "grant their full commitment to the agreed thirteen practical steps" as the "most difficult hurdle for the success of the 2005 Review Conference" adding that "the new plans of one nuclear weapons state for production of usable mini nuclear weapons and allocation of millions of dollars for the research and development on these plans has put at stake the whole future of nuclear disarmament." According to Iran, other nuclear weapons states' possible efforts to maintain a balance "by pursuing the same path" could trigger a new arms race with adverse consequences for the NPT Review Conference "particularly on the issues of Negative Security Assurances."
Norway observed that the NPT is "under considerable strain" adding that the "DPRK's non-compliance is a serious matter" and there are "unresolved issues with respect to Iran's nuclear programme". In this context, "Iran must fully implement the resolution recently adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors, and allay justified concerns about its nuclear intentions."
China observed that there has been some positive progress, with Libya renouncing WMD and joining the international nonproliferation regime, and the "DPRK and Iranian nuclear issues" having been "put on the track of political solution". Others, including Angola, Armenia, Tanzania and Ukraine, also mentioned Libya as a positive example. Noting new proposals by states and international organisations aimed at strengthening the multilateral nonproliferation regimes, China also said that it "supports all efforts devoted to maintaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, strengthening the role of [the] International Atomic Energy Agency in safeguards and verification and bridging the gaps in the current regimes through multilateral cooperation" and is "ready to discuss... with all parties concerned in an open-minded and serious manner." Reiterating its undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, China emphasised "common security", "cooperation and dialogue", "political and diplomatic means", a "balance between nonproliferation and peaceful uses", and ensuring "the impartiality, rationality and legality of nonproliferation measures".
Many, including the NAC, Norway, Bangladesh and Turkey, voiced concern over the lack of universality of the NPT, while specific reference was also made to Israel's nuclear status and WMD in the Middle East, especially by other states from the region.
The DPRK took the view that "the nuclear superpower has been developing new types of nuclear weapons and even expanding the nuclear arms race into a space far from the abolition of nuclear weapons.... In essence the nuclear superpower abused the NPT in order to achieve its 'absolute security' by threatening and blackmailing non-nuclear weapon States with nuclear weapons at the cost of their security." Moreover, "[i]f the US had not listed the DPRK as an 'axis of evil' and 'target of nuclear preemptive strikes' and thus aggravated [the] situation the question of our nuclear deterrence would not have... arisen."
Pakistan, which remains outside the NPT, said that the "crisis" of the nonproliferation regime "arises not only from the apparent intention of some to acquire nuclear weapons but, even more so from the tension between nuclear legality and nuclear reality" which is apparent in three areas: (i) the legal commitment of the nuclear weapon states under NPT Article VI to achieve nuclear disarmament in contrast to the over 20,000 nuclear weapons in their possession and the intention of nuclear powers to retain their weapons "for the foreseeable future"; (ii) the NPT recognition of only five nuclear weapon states despite the reality of three other states possessing nuclear weapons; and (iii) the NPT "bargain" in which non-nuclear states accept "temporary retention" of nuclear weapons by five states in exchange for the promise of disarmament and cooperation in "peaceful uses of nuclear technology." Since the NPT does not elaborate on the "nature of such peaceful nuclear cooperation" many states now have "the complete nuclear fuel cycle" including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. Pakistan supports the convening of an international conference "to address and remove the current tensions between nuclear legality and nuclear reality" in these areas.
CTBT
There were frequent calls for entry into force of the CTBT. In particular, the
eleven states whose ratification is needed were called on to "adhere to the
treaty without further delay". Kazakhstan, which has "firsthand knowledge of
horrendous effects of nuclear testing," reaffirmed "its principled position
regarding a total ban of all nuclear testing." Tanzania, which was one of the
five states that abstained when the CTBT was adopted by the UN General Assembly
on September 24, 1996, announced that it had recently ratified the Treaty, adding
that though it has no nuclear capability, "we believe our signature to the Treaty
confirms that the CTBT is one of the most important instruments for advancing
global nuclear non-proliferation."
Brazil, speaking for the Rio Group, stressed the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT "including by all nuclear weapon states" and highlighted "the importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test-explosions or any other explosions pending the entry into force of that Treaty." China, which despite many promises, has yet to ratify, termed the CTBT "of milestone significance for promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament" and expressed its commitment to the moratorium on nuclear testing. Calling for the CTBT's entry into force, China said it was "actively promoting consideration and ratification of the treaty by the National People's Congress in accordance with due legal procedures."
Russia views the CTBT "as a key instrument in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation [whose] significant is evidenced by the foreign ministers' new joint statement in support of the CTBT adopted by the General Assembly on 23 September 2004" calling on all states to sign and ratify the treaty if they have not yet done so. Several states echoed this call and welcomed the foreign ministers' statement.
The CD and Fissban
A large number of interventions expressed their desire to get moving in the
CD on negotiating a ban on the production of fissile materials, which many considered
had been jeopardised by the US statement to the CD on July 29, 2003, that it
had come to the conclusion that effective verification of an FMCT was "not achievable"
and calling for negotiations on the basis of this approach. Rademaker reiterated
that "ending the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would enhance
global strictures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and presented
the Bush administration's "new approach" that "effective international verification
of an FMCT is not realistically achievable" as an effort to "break the logjam"
at the CD, since an "important advantage" is that "it will be possible to conclude
such a negotiation far faster than would be the case with an FMCT that sought
to achieve effective verifiability." China, which underlined its "unremitting
efforts" and readiness to accept the Five Ambassadors' Proposal, said that it
is "now studying in a serious manner the proposal of negotiating a FMCT without
verification". Australia, Norway and the NAC states were among those who said
that a fissban should include verification measures.
Negative Security Assurances
In addition to Iran, noted above, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Cuba, Ecuador,
Laos, Mongolia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and Viet Nam were among those
who noted the importance of negative security assurances. Several states specifically
called for a legally binding instrument on assurances to non-nuclear weapon
states in the context of the NPT. Non-NPT states India and Pakistan, which appear
now to regard themselves as nuclear weapon states, while still sponsoring resolutions
that they originated as 'non-nuclear' NAM states years ago, also referred to
the importance of security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states.
Raising concerns that "instead of eliminating nuclear weapons, some nuclear powers have plans to modernise or develop new kinds or new uses of nuclear weapons or new rationales for them," the New Agenda Coalition argued that, "the role given to nuclear weapons in security doctrines and policies has yet to diminish". Contrary to the security assurances given as part of UNSC 984 (1995), "[some NWS] even entertain the notion that nuclear weapons may be used pre-emptively against non-nuclear weapon states, or see them as a possible defence against conventional weapons." Arguing that this "would go against article VI of the NPT and the agreements made in 1995 and 2000", the NAC stressed "it is critical that any such plans be laid aside immediately."
Myanmar (Burma) on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), highlighted the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and reaffirmed its unanimous conclusion that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to [a] conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". The ASEAN states welcomed progress in the implementation of the South East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANFZ, also known as the Bangkok Treaty) and, specifically, China's announcement in November 2002 that it is ready to accede to the Protocol, and reiterated their call to other nuclear weapon states to accede to the Protocol. Kazakhstan mentioned the need to have NWFZs in "all the regions of the world", and, like its neighbours, considered the (currently stalled) initiative to establish a NWFZ in Central Asia to be "an important contribution" to nuclear nonproliferation and security. The NAC and many NAM states, especially from the Middle East, expressed concern that progress had not been made on achieving a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
Mexico, which in 2003 had reluctantly had to withdraw its proposal for a conference of NWFZ signatories and parties now has the support of states parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and is offering to host a NWFZ conference "with the aim of fostering a better coordination among those zones and to ensure scrupulous respect for legal regimes created by those zones, as well as to support the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in other areas of the world" and also "as a contribution to the 2005 Conference".
PAROS is once again proving to be one of the more interesting debates at the First Committee. In a new and significant development, Ambassador Leonid Skotnikov made an important no-first-deployment pledge that Russia "shall not be the first to place any weapons in outer space. We call on all nations with an outer space potential to follow our suit, which will make it possible to maintain a peaceful status of outer space." Sri Lanka, which traditionally co-sponsors the PAROS resolution with Egypt, made the interesting point that the near universal adoption of this resolution year after year accorded its principles the status of international law.
The terrorist potential of MANPADS was noted by Australia, China and Israel among others, leading to the first-time introduction of a new draft resolution on the 'Prevention of the Illicit Transfer and Unauthorised Access to and Use of (MANPADS)' by Argentina, Australia and Turkey.
Drawing attention to the GA statement by Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the necessity of "keeping outer space weapons-free", Russia also recalled its 1983 pledge "not to be the first in placing any kind of anti-satellite weapons in outer space", and the submission in the CD by Russia and China in co-authorship with a number of other states, of a "draft of basic elements of a comprehensive agreement on non-placement of weapons in outer space". This draft puts forward three basic obligations: "not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons; not to install such weapons on celestial bodies and not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner; not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects." Russia hoped "the work of the CD will be unblocked and an ad hoc Committee on Outer Space will be reestablished to start multilateral substantive discussion of a draft agreement."
China said that the current situation "highlights the necessity and urgency of preventing the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space" and recalled that with Russia and other states it has jointly tabled several relevant working papers regarding prevention of an arms race in outer space. Sri Lanka argued that the "annual presentation of the PAROS resolution in the First Committee and the almost universal endorsement of its principles we believe has had the salutary effect of according to these objectives, the status of customary law."
Initiatives to address missiles include the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which received occasional mention from member states, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), and the establishment of UN panels of governmental experts on "missiles in all its aspects". Though rivalry between these approaches has gradually been lessening, it was noticeable that a number of states mentioned only one or the other.
Chile, which currently chairs the HCoC, proclaimed it "a political undertaking intended to contribute positively to international security and to strengthen all Disarmament and Arms Control Treaties and Mechanisms.... [W]e strive for global security through politically binding measures such as the restraint in the development, testing and deployment of such Missiles. Also, by means of Transparency and Confidence Building Measures, including Annual Reports and Pre-launch Notifications." At the time of Chile's statement, 115 states were members of HCoC, but the number appeared to rise to 117 during the First Committee.
Several states noted the failure of the panel of governmental experts on missiles to reach consensus on its report, though Iran said the situation "prompts us all to work more seriously and dedicatedly". Iran, the initiator and lead sponsor for the missiles resolutions since 1999, exhorted: "we should acknowledge that our endeavour in this regard is at the initial stage of a longer process" in which "it is imperative to redouble our efforts".
A large number of states called for strengthening the norms against biological and chemical weapons through the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) - particularly in light of the threat of terrorism - and for greater adherence to these regimes including specifically the strengthening of the BWC and continued implementation of the CWC.
Russia, for example, expressed support for "efforts aimed at making the [CWC] universal and at setting up national mechanisms of its implementation" as well as strengthening the BWC regime "by creating its metrification mechanism." China mentioned its support for the CWC and recent co-sponsorship with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of the Second Regional Meeting of National Authorities in Asia. China particularly urged Japan to make further efforts at destruction of chemical weapons it abandoned in China. China also pledged its "active participation" in "necessary" ongoing multilateral discussions aimed at formulating measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the BWC.
Brazil, on behalf of the Rio Group, expressed the hope that "in the near future we obtain the universalization" of the CWC and BWC, including "a verification mechanism" for the BWC. India noted that new security challenges involving terrorism and WMD "can be effectively dealt with only through truly universal and non-discriminatory regimes" such as these two conventions. Several additional states expressed their hope for better implementation of the BWC with some, such as Indonesia, voicing disappointment over lack of success to date with regard to efforts to formulate measures for preventing and controlling deliberate biological or toxin attacks. The ASEAN states expressed the hope that the second annual meeting of BWC states parties, to be held in December 2004 "will strengthen and broaden national and international efforts and the optimum utilization of the existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans animals and plants."
First Committee reform, which is part of wider moves within the United Nations to improve the effectiveness of the GA and the work and procedures of its committees, was raised not only in several statements, but was the subject of a lively interactive session as well. Stephen Rademaker cited the "enthusiastic reaction to the resolution that [the United States] introduced last year on the revitalization of the First Committee" as a "positive" example of progress towards effective multilateralism, and also welcomed "the valuable recommendations submitted by governments to the Secretary-General on practical ways to improve the effectiveness of the methods of work of the First Committee". The US pledged that its draft resolution "will incorporate many of these suggestions" and has been "consulting with other delegations and with both regional and political groups, closely and in an open manner, to ensure that our draft resolution incorporates all good ideas, no matter where they originate."
Canada "heartily" welcomed reform efforts "to ensure greater relevancy for the work of the First Committee and meshing better its results with the objectives of the principal treaties in the disarmament field and the activities pursuant to them, as well as with other work that is taking place." In line with this, Canada's brief general statement expressed support for confining the general debate to the first week of the FC session, leaving more time for exchange of views on substantive disarmament issues. Canada "would also welcome more interactivity in such sessions and the inclusion of lead-off speakers drawn from the ranks of leading representatives or experts of concerned organisations."
Norway said that the ability of the First Committee "to face the threats posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as to deal with other security threats, clearly needs to be upgraded" and in this context has organised two informal workshops on FC reform. A paper on "our perception of" the most recent of these meetings was circulated. Among other states, China and Iran offered specific suggestions for improving the method of work of the First Committee.
Notes
1. On the 58th First Committee, see Rebecca Johnson, '"Troubled and Troubling Times": the 2003 UN First Committee Considers Disarmament and Reform', Disarmament Diplomacy 74 (December 2003). A detailed analysis of all the 59th First Committee resolutions will be published in Disarmament Diplomacy 80 (December 2004).
Index
© 2004 The Acronym Institute.