Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 61, October - November 2001

CTBT Report

Boycotts and Blandishments: Making the CTBT Visible

By Rebecca Johnson

Introduction

The Second Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) unanimously adopted a Final Declaration intended to highlight the importance of the CTBT for non-proliferation and international security. Attended by some fifty Foreign Ministers¹ from a total of 117 countries, the Conference underlined that the conduct of nuclear explosions "constitutes a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation" and called on all states that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT to do so as soon as possible. Pending entry into force, all were enjoined to maintain the current moratoria on nuclear testing. The United States, which had been the first country to sign the Treaty on September 24, 1996, dismayed the 108 participating signatories and ratifiers by boycotting the Conference altogether, despite having participated in some of the Vienna-based negotiations on the text of the Final Declaration. Among the 44 key states necessary for entry into force, India and North Korea, which have not signed, did not exercise their right to attend the Conference as observers, but nine others, including Pakistan, were present. Libya, in one of the last statements of the conference, announced its decision to sign.

The Conference, held in New York, November 11-13, was convened in accordance with Article XIV of the CTBT, which specified that the Treaty would enter into force only after the signature and ratification of 44 states named in Annex 2 as having relevant nuclear facilities and capabilities. Recognising how difficult it would be to meet this stringent condition, Article XIV also provided that if entry into force had not been achieved within three years, a Conference of the States which had ratified the Treaty could be convened to consider the extent to which the 44 accessions have been achieved and to "consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty". The first such conference took place in Vienna in October 1999.²

Facing the empty US seat, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan underlined the importance of the CTBT when he opened the Conference: "If anyone thinks that [the CTBT and the Conference] have been overshadowed or marginalised by the events of 11 September and their aftermath... those events should have made it clear to everyone that we cannot afford further proliferation of nuclear weapons." Annan concluded by telling the meeting "we have a fleeting opportunity to render this troubled world a safer place, free of the threat of nuclear weapons. We must not let it pass."

The Conference was principally a forum for speeches expressing support for the test ban, but three developments - two negative and one potentially positive - are of particular importance. Of greatest concern was the US decision, not finalised until the last moment, not to attend in any capacity. Secondly, following earlier US indications that it would withhold support from selective aspects of the verification regime, Brazil and Argentina raised questions about the burden of verification costs on the non-nuclear-weapon states while the treaty remained in limbo. Also worth noting was Russia's unprecedented offer to the United States of additional bilateral confidence-building measures at the test sites after entry into force. While many non-nuclear weapon states had advocated greater transparency and confidence-building measures - and even the closure of the test sites - such moves have hitherto been resisted by the major powers. Russia's initiative was clearly designed as both a political challenge to the United States and a practical mechanism for clarifying ambiguous events that might be construed as low yield explosions in violation of the treaty.

High Level Statements

Miguel Marín Bosch, Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico, was unanimously elected President of the Conference. It was a fitting choice, as Marín Bosch had played a key role in bringing the test ban to the negotiating table. He had also chaired the first year of CTB negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in 1994. Many considered that the decision to hold the Conference in conjunction with the General Assembly debate was vindicated as around fifty of the 80 national or group statements made in support of the test ban treaty were delivered by Foreign Ministers or equivalent senior government officials.

Bringing the Conference up to date, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO PrepCom), Wolfgang Hoffmann, said that up to November 11, 161 states had signed and 84 had ratified, including 31 of the 44 necessary for entry into force. He described progress on the verification regime and the international monitoring system (IMS), including the completion of the construction and upgrading of 121 IMS stations, and progress on a further 90. Of the 337 designated IMS facilities, legal arrangements already covered 290 in 71 host countries.

There was little to distinguish the many fulsome expressions of support for the Treaty from around the world, but concern about the implications of recent moves by the United States formed a subtext to many statements. Ministers spoke of the importance of the test ban for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Some related the CTBT to commitments in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), particularly those undertaken at the NPT Review Conference in May 2000, where the United States had joined consensus on a range of disarmament agreements, including the importance of early entry into force of the CTBT. Almost all underlined the necessity of maintaining the various unilateral moratoria against nuclear tests, currently observed by all five NPT-defined nuclear weapon states. After each conducted a series of nuclear explosions in May 1998, India and Pakistan also declared unilateral moratoria on further testing and indicated that they would sign the treaty, though neither has yet done so. Among the weapon states, Britain, France and Russia have ratified, while the United States and China have signed but not ratified.

Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe of Japan, who has provided leadership in promoting the ratification of the CTBT over the past two years, referred to the abuse of science and technology by terrorists. He stressed that the CTBT underpinned the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and "is a practical and concrete measure for realising a nuclear weapon free world". The European Union welcomed the belated holding of the Conference as a "strong sign of the international community's determination not to let itself be deterred from its objectives by intimidation and threats". The EU underlined the "symbolic and practical" significance of the CTBT in international efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, objectives it would "unreservedly support". Canada regarded entry into force of the treaty an "urgent and compelling necessity". The CTBT underscored the "principle of preventive action" and provided "strength to the same partnerships and coalitions that are now so essential to the fight against terrorism". Costa Rica went further, condemning the use, possession, threat of use and development of nuclear weapons, arguing that it is a misconception of national security to rely on military doctrines that justify the possession or use of nuclear weapons since "no state can claim for itself the right to endanger the survival of the human species".

Russia, which ratified the Treaty in April 2000, gave emphasis to its verifiability. Igor Sergeev, Special Assistant to President Putin, told the Conference that as someone with personal experience over several decades dealing with nuclear weapons and nuclear tests, "the unprecedented international verification mechanism being developed under the CTBT and the available modern national means of monitoring make it absolutely impossible to hide any violation of the Treaty". He then went on to make an unprecedented offer to the United States of mutual confidence-building measures at the US and Russian test sites, to be considered after entry into force. Shrewdly playing to the unfounded accusations about possible test ban violations in the form of low yield or hydronuclear testing, as periodically alleged by those who question the CTBT's ability to detect and identify very low yield explosions, Russia proposed developing "additional verification measures for nuclear test ranges going far beyond the Treaty provisions... [which] could include the exchange of geological data and results of certain experiments, installation of additional sensors, and other measures". Sergeev made clear, however, that the offer was tied into CTBT entry into force. At the same time, Putin issued a statement emphasising the importance of universality for the test ban treaty. In calling for the CTBT's "early entry into force in strict compliance with Article XIV", Putin clearly signalled that Russia would oppose provisional or selective application of the Treaty or efforts to weaken or bypass the veto inherent in the stringent Article XIV requirement based on accession by the 44 listed states.

In a deeply worrying development, Brazil and Argentina raised questions about the financial burden of verification on the non-nuclear-weapon states while the treaty remained in limbo. Expressing concern that the IMS was being installed more quickly than warranted by "the real perspectives" of CTBT entry into force, Brazil objected to the "substantial increases in national contributions to the Preparatory Commission, without concrete perspectives for the corresponding legally binding commitments to be in force and applicable universally...including the five nuclear-weapon states and other countries supposedly having nuclear weapons capabilities". Brazil's further complaint that non-nuclear members of the NPT already have legal and verifiable commitments has serious implications for efforts to revive the stalemated talks on negotiating a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (fissban). In like vein, Argentina objected to the high costs of the verification regime and said that "the budget of the Organisation cannot be determined based on abstract considerations about the necessity of programmes" but has to take into account the prospects for entry into force and the resources and capacities of the members.

As is familiar in such fora, several statements from Middle Eastern states criticised Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Israel emphasised that it had signed the CTBT as part of a "long standing policy of supporting international non-proliferation efforts with due consideration to the specific characteristics of the Middle East and our national security needs". Like a great many countries, Israel emphasised its active participation in the CTBT verification regime.

Some statements referred to the environmental harm caused by decades of nuclear explosions, both atmospheric and underground. Most notably, New Zealand castigated the testing conducted by Britain, France and the United States in the Pacific "with little attention to their impact on the environment, the people displaced by them or indeed those who observed them". The Pacific Islands Forum called on all nuclear powers to "accept full responsibility and liability for past nuclear testing", including monitoring former test sites and taking steps to avoid testing-related problems for health, safety and the environment.

New Zealand was also one of the very few prepared to challenge diplomatic niceties and name the 13 states whose failure to sign and/or ratify now impedes the CTBT's entry into force. The NGOs, who gave a collective statement to the Conference, explicitly called on India, Pakistan and North Korea to sign and ratify the CTBT, and urged Algeria, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel and the United States to ratify without further delay. Like the governments, the NGOs stressed the vital importance of preventing any further testing, for fear of destroying the test ban norm and setting off a "dangerous international action-reaction cycle of military and nuclear confrontation". The NGOs proposed that the Conference "should commit its participants to condemn any future testing and call upon governments, businesses and people from around the world to respond to any future test by withholding military sales, trade and other business support from the testing countries." To ensure that the testing moratorium is maintained, it would be necessary for potential violators to realise that the penalties and costs would be significant.

US Boycotts Conference

Though very useful, the speeches endorsing the CTBT were overshadowed by the statements made by those same Foreign Ministers or their Heads of State next door in the UN General Assembly, where broader issues of security, terrorism, disarmament, development and inequality were being addressed. The test ban meeting was given unexpected visibility, however, through the actions of the United States, which chose not to attend the meeting in order to convey the Bush Administration's opinion that the CTBT is irrelevant. Questioned about the empty US seat, Rick Grenell, spokesperson for the US Ambassador to the UN, confirmed: "We're just not going to engage".

The boycott was seen as the latest in a series of unilateral actions by Washington to undermine the test ban treaty. Just a week earlier, the United States had astonished the UN First Committee (Security and Disarmament) by forcing a vote on a simple procedural decision to retain the CTBT on the UN General Assembly agenda next year. Such decisions are usually treated as formalities and sent forward on the basis of consensus, regardless of whether a government is for or against the subject. After forcing the vote, the United States was the sole country to oppose. All others present in the First Committee voted in favour, including India, which had previously vetoed the CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament and refused to support the treaty when the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted it in September 1996. A US representative explained that he asked for the vote because his country "did not support the CTBT". Also at the First Committee, the United States said it was "primarily due to the CTBT language" that it felt "compelled" to oppose the annual NPT-based Japanese-sponsored resolution on 'A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons'. Japan had tried to avert US opposition by utilising CTBT language drawn from a G-8 communiqué supported by Secretary of State Colin Powell earlier this year, attracting criticism from some non-nuclear-weapon states for watering down the CTBT language adopted in May 2000. Despite all efforts, however, the United States - alone among the nuclear powers - voted against Japan's resolution. India, which generally opposes resolutions supporting the NPT, was the only other state to vote no.³

In the first direct attack on the implementation and international administration of the CTBT, Washington announced in August 2001 that it intended to withhold support for (and would not participate in) certain non-IMS activities of the CTBTO PrepCom, particularly activities connected with preparing for on-site inspections. Bush also reiterated that he did not plan to put the Treaty forward again for ratification by the Senate. During a damaging period of internecine warfare, when the Republicans dominating the Senate sought to destroy anything perceived as having President Clinton's support, ratification of the CTBT was deadlocked for three years and then, in October 1999, suddenly brought to the floor for a perfunctory debate, after which it was defeated in a partisan 49-51 vote. Though Colin Powell was formerly on record as a CTBT supporter, it became a condition of his job as Secretary of State that he repudiate the Treaty, which he duly did in January 2001.

Despite diplomatic tradition, which tends to constrain direct criticism of individual states, the EU, comprising many of the US' main allies, regretted Bush's position, describing it as "all the more worrying given that until now the United States has played a key role in nuclear arms control, in particular within the framework of the CTBT". The EU, like many, welcomed and underscored that the United States had declared its intention to maintain its moratorium and not to conduct any further nuclear tests. Without mentioning the United States by name, China, which has likewise signed but not ratified, devoted half its statement to criticisms of missile defence and US policies, calling for other countries to "join together to urge the country concerned to change its erroneous position on the CTBT, observe the principle of 'pacta sunt servanda' in international law, stick to its commitment of a moratorium on nuclear test explosions, and pay its contribution to the PrepCom for the CTBTO in full and in a timely manner..."

Pointed statements were also made about the relative value of multilateral and unilateral initiatives. Sweden declared that "now is the time to promote multilateral solutions and to refrain from unilateral decisions that may cause a new arms race and a more insecure world". Sweden linked positive action to end nuclear testing, halt the production of fissile materials, and implement the 13 steps for nuclear disarmament agreed by NPT Parties in 2000, with the efforts to "strengthen the security net" against proliferation and terrorism. Switzerland acknowledged that "unilateral procedures can serve as a catalyst or as a temporary measure, but they cannot replace multilateral treaties [which] establish universal and lasting norms which bind and protect all members of the international community". Norway, too, welcomed the unilateral moratoria, but emphasised that international agreements give legally binding force to such measures and bind all states to the norms and institutions of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Arguing that "states cannot decide in isolation" and that the problems lie in the security doctrines and not in "technical and minor verification issues", Iran lamented the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate "which has enormously affected the overall ratification process", and feared that the US delegation's withdrawal from negotiations on the operational manual for on-site inspections would disrupt the CTBTO's ability to prepare the ground for entry into force. Even the UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, issued an oblique criticism of Washington, underlining that "We all have to meet our budgetary commitments to enable [work on the verification regime] to continue."

Assessment

During the difficult end-game negotiations on CTBT entry into force in July 1996, critics of Article XIV complained that the conference provision - a Canadian initiative to ameliorate the stringency of the 44-state requirement that was being pushed by Britain, China and Russia - would produce little more than a 'hand-wringing conference'. It might have been expected that this second entry-into-force conference would be blanked out by the post-September 11 focus on terrorism and the war in Afghanistan and the highly charged General Assembly debates taking place in parallel with the CTBT. It is true that the CTBT meeting barely registered on the public consciousness, although the churlish US boycott provided a useful news hook for press coverage in the Washington Post and through agencies such as AFP, Reuters and AP, which were distributed and used worldwide.

Speaking on behalf of the Mexican Presidency, Ambassador Olga Pellicer told an end-of-conference press briefing that the meeting had been "a success". She drew particular attention to the high level attendance by so many Foreign Ministers "all of whom reiterated their support for the CTBT... and its verification system" and the fact that during the months and days prior to the meeting, some 13 additional states had ratified the CTBT, bringing the total number of ratifiers to 87. The Conference had also proved an opportunity for a further country, Libya, to bring the signatures up to 162. Holding the Conference, therefore, provided some kind of impetus for governments to accelerate their ratification processes in order to participate as full members.

The major work of the Conference was not in what happened November 11-13, but in the run-up and behind the scenes. To bring Foreign Ministers to speak required briefings that brought the CTBT to high-level governmental and diplomatic attention. Likewise, the negotiations on the Final Declaration, conducted over many months in Vienna, pushed the CTBT onto official and government radars when before it may have languished at a lower, less visible level of attention.

Several countries had also been involved in regional efforts aimed at facilitating entry into force and establishing the monitoring stations for the treaty's verification. In April 2001, New Zealand, in conjunction with the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, held a seminar for Pacific states to discuss with relevant experts and officials the legal, technical and political issues connected with ratification of the CTBT, CWC and IAEA Additional Protocol. In May, Turkey hosted an "Inter-regional workshop on International Cooperation and National Implementation/Ratification Procedures". Azerbaijan announced its intention to hold a regional seminar in 2003 to promote information exchange and facilitate ratification among Central Asian and neighbouring countries. Such regional initiatives to provide practical assistance and information can play an important role in enabling countries to get their ratification legislation passed sooner rather than later. NGOs have also played a useful role, showing how synergy between the monitoring and verification components can provide a high and reliable degree of verifiability, and keeping up the political pressure in favour of full adherence to the test ban.⁴

The fundamental fact remains, however, that the CTBT's problems are political, not technical. Verification questions may be the tool used by test ban opponents, but they are not the reason for that opposition. And whether we like it or not, the fate of the CTBT hangs on the United States. Of course we should keep the political pressure on China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and others among the 13 states obstructing entry into force. But as long as the United States shows such hostility towards the CTBT, the effect of international blandishments on those other countries will be derisory.

As Democratic Senator Jeff Bingaman, a long-time member of the US Senate Armed Services Committee pointed out, the empty US seat at the high level CTBT Conference sent "exactly the wrong message during this difficult time". Yet there seems to be nothing US allies can do to influence Bush not to throw away this long-sought treaty. One after another the Foreign Ministers of America's most important allies underscored the role of the CTBT in international security and their own national security considerations. But the contradiction exposed by the juxtaposition of President Bush's speech to the United Nations General Assembly on November 10, in which he appealed for unity to fight terrorism, and the empty US seat at the CTBT Conference next door, does not seem to embarrass an administration whose cavalier attitude towards treaties in general - and the CTBT in particular - is becoming more overtly 'rogue' month by month. There is speculation that the extreme hostility exhibited against the CTBT is Freudian in its depth: a Democratic Congress imposed the first US testing moratorium on Bush's father in 1992, just prior to his defeat by Clinton. Psychoanalysis notwithstanding, US allies need to make clear that defeating terrorism involves more than high-tech bombing, and will require unprecedented levels of collective action to prevent proliferation and deny access to the materials and technology of weapons of mass destruction.

Though the Article XIV Conference helps speed up additional ratifications, it was to a large extent an exercise in public relations. Very few of all those high-level speeches had anything to say about the next steps for the CTBT. Many referred to the need to prevent the moratorium being eroded and ensure there is no resumption of nuclear testing; but how? The danger signs to the test ban regime are centred on the United States, China and South Asia. Though none wants to be seen to plunge in the knife that kills the CTBT, there is a danger they might egg others on (as Bush officials this summer appeared to encourage China to modernise its arsenals). Paul Robinson, director of the US Sandia National Laboratories, is the most vocal advocate of resuming nuclear testing for the development of low-yield nuclear weapons ('mini-nukes'), but the United States is unlikely to be the first to break the moratorium. Nuclear laboratories elsewhere, however, will also harbour officials keen to bury the test ban, and they may be absorbing mixed signals from the United States that they could take such a step without paying a high political or economic price. To ensure that the testing moratorium is maintained, it is vital that potential violators realise that the penalties and costs would be significant. As reported above, the NGOs, able to speak more freely than most governments, called upon "governments, businesses and people" to make clear they would respond to any test with prompt, serious and concerted action.

Many have condemned the US attempts to 'cherry pick' its financial commitments to the CTBTO and establishment of the verification regime, but they need to have a strategy if the US tactic of withholding some funds should provoke a haemorrhage. In this regard, the comments on funding by Brazil and Argentina run the grave risk of undermining the Treaty. Though such financial concerns are understandable in terms of the economic priorities of non-nuclear-weapon states with development needs, CTBT supporters must ensure that they do not contribute to the Bush agenda of promoting the Treaty's demise. It is of the utmost importance to maintain adequate credibility and support for the CTBTO and IMS.

Regional efforts, such as those being undertaken by some countries, can provide assistance to help the 'soft cases' among the 13 states whose ratification is essential for entry into force. What strategies would work with the 'hard-cases', some of which have yet to sign? There is well-founded anxiety not to push so hard that the states in question run in the opposite direction. But it must be recognised that in all those countries, opinion on the CTBT is not monolithic or consistent. There are senior military and political officials, parliamentarians or equivalent representatives who are test ban supporters or undecided. In addition to raising the CTBT whenever possible with governments, more thought should be given to developing support in other constituencies, through bilateral or group meetings between military officials and elected representatives from countries which have ratified and those which have not. It is also essential to keep sending high-level emissaries to the hold-out states and to press for their signature and ratification at every opportunity, including bilateral meetings. With particular reference to the United States, it is not enough to include a passing sentence on the CTBT; the urgency of locking down this important restraint must be raised as part of the discussions on combatting terrorism.

The CTBT signatories at the Conference did more than just wring their hands, but because most of the work was done before they arrived in New York, they were also rather bored. Pressure must be maintained, but the process must not be turned into a routine event. Serious thought needs to be given to the next meeting. When and where should it be held? What does it need to address? Are there ways in which NGOs, CTBT signatories and the CTBTO can work more effectively together on strategies to promote entry into force between the 'set piece' conferences?

Is it time to consider provisional entry into force? Probably not, but it is time to bring that debate more out into the open and to consider more carefully the legal and political options and approaches most likely to help reinforce the CTB regime if the strict conditions of the Article XIV list are not met. Without the United States, provisional entry into force is almost certainly a non-starter. It would risk pushing the United States and its funding and IMS stations out of reach, letting test ban opponents off the hook. If the credibility of the CTBTO being developed under the auspices of the Preparatory Commission is maintained and not weakened, it already carries many of the norms and institutions associated with provisional application. The question is, what more can be done?

Notes and References

1. Numbers vary between 46 and 52, as some Ministers were scheduled but did not speak due to problems of access and timing, exacerbated by very difficult security conditions in and around the UN. This second conference was postponed from September 25 in conjunction with the UN General Assembly high level debate, which was deferred after the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. On November 12, just as the second day of speeches got underway, the UN was locked down for several hours after security guards panicked when a jetliner crashed in New York in what is now understood to be a tragic accident with no political overtones. Throughout the meeting security was high and very jittery, with access to the United Nations and adjacent roads severely restricted.

2. For a report of the First Conference, see Rebecca Johnson, Vienna Article XIV Conference on Entry into Force, Disarmament Diplomacy 40, September/October 1999.

3. For analysis of the resolution, see Jenni Rissanen's First Committee Report in this issue.

4. See, for example, the report by the Independent Commission on the Verifiability of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, October 2000 (http://www.ctbtcommission.org). For a summary of the report by Commission Chair Trevor Findlay, Executive Director of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC, http://www.vertic.org), see Disarmament Diplomacy No. 51, October 2000, pp. 2-5.

Rebecca Johnson is Executive Director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy.